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ABSTRACT
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE
Georgeta V. Pourchot 
Old Dominion University, 2000 
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
Using the concept o f representation, this study advances a comparative interpretive 
analysis which makes use o f hard statistical data and soft data to assess the direction of 
democratization in Eastern Europe between 1990 and 1998. Specifically, the study looks 
at how governments in Eastern Europe chose to heed constituencies’ calls for the 
institution of a market economy, and analyzes the degree o f  government responsiveness 
towards constituencies. The study finds that the region is moving towards a more 
responsible and responsive type o f governance, but at different paces and degrees. Poland 
leads with respect to government responsiveness. The Czech Republic displays signs o f 
elitist responsiveness. Hungary is also moving in the direction o f responsive governance. 
Events in the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Romania have been too unsettled to conduct 
a meaningful analysis o f government responsiveness at this time.
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From declaring Western democracy’s moral victory over communism in 1989, 
to considering post-communist societies still far from joining West European 
democracies, ten years after the collapse o f communism question marks remain with 
respect to the direction of democracy in the region. Some countries from the former 
communist bloc, like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have advanced 
politically and economically towards a distinguishable form of democracy and a market 
economy, Others, such as the Slovak Republic, have witnessed contradictory trends, 
from moving towards a more open political and economic environment to regressing 
into authoritarian tendencies. Yet others, like Bulgaria and Romania, have witnessed 
more regress than progress in their attempt to democratize. This situation left analysts 
with two legitimate questions: What are the differentiating factors affecting 
democratizing processes in Eastern Europe, and what analytical tools should be used in 
order to draw meaningful conclusions about the direction o f democratization in the 
region? This study uses the concept o f representation to address these questions.
Academic controversies persist around the concept of “representation,” with 
one seeming point o f agreement: there is conceptual and methodological differentiation 
between the American and the European understanding o f representation. The 
American way focuses on a bottom-up approach to representation, with constituencies
This dissertation follows the submission guidelines required for International Security.
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giving mandates to their representatives and representatives implementing those 
mandates when they get elected.1 The European way focuses on a top-down approach, 
with responsible and disciplined parties offering election agendas to their constituencies 
and then attempting to carry out those agendas when they get elected.2
Between these two poles, a wealth o f literature focuses on various aspects o f 
representation: from the proper way to conceptualize the elements o f analysis to the 
appropriate tools to carry out empirical research.3 Irrespective o f  on-going 
controversies, the notion that individuals elected or appointed to perform a public duty 
have an obligation to “act in the interest o f the represented, in a manner responsive to 
them” is widely accepted to be a basic tenet o f  democracy.4
The choice o f representation as analytical tool to address the direction o f 
political developments in Eastern Europe is grounded in two reasons.
First, it offers the researcher an ideal o f government behavior against which to 
judge the direction o f democratization in the region. This ideal is considered very 
important by this researcher; Eastern Europe spent half a century under totalitarian rule, 
and many o f the leaders freely elected to office between 1990 and 1998 were raised in 
beliefs incompatible with a liberal and representative type o f  governance. To the extent 
that these leaders manifested a willingness to adapt to the requirements of a 
representative democracy, it is essential to acknowledge the change o f direction in East 
European politics.
Second, analyses o f representative democracy in Eastern Europe are scarce to 
nonexistent. Availability o f comparative data and uncertainty about what the data
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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actually measures are two common reasons why this type o f  analysis is not attempted 
more often.
This study opens the door for an interpretive analysis of the direction o f 
democracy in the region. The analysis combines the use o f  soft and hard data to 
interpret the conflicting trends in the region, rather than confirm or infirm known 
models o f analysis. The study is therefore intended to encourage a statistically modest 
approach to the study o f developments in the region. Given the uncertainties about the 
actual meaning o f hard data, existing statistical analyses can be enriched with the 
approach proposed in this study, to the betterment o f our understanding o f where 
Eastern Europe stands and where it is headed.
The key issue o f representation is the relationship between government action 
and constituency preferences on given issues. In the spirit o f  this core issue, it is time 
to ask if post-communist East European governments acted in the interest o f those they 
represented, in a manner responsive to their constituencies in the past decade since the 
collapse o f communism.
The policy issue selected for study is government policy on the question o f  the 
introduction of a market economy. The broad questions to be addressed are: Did 
governments in the region heed to public calls for the introduction o f a market 
economy? Is there an observable relationship between government policy-making and 
opinion trends on the selected question? Does that observable relationship qualify as 
representative o f constituency interests? The answers to these questions will be the 
focus o f this analysis.
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BACKGROUND
The debate over Eastern Europe went through several stages within the past ten 
years since the collapse o f communism. In so doing, questions o f democratic theory, 
method, and regional specificity were touched upon either on purpose or in conjunction 
with larger issues o f transition.
In the early nineties, the debate focused on the moral victory o f Western 
democracy over communism. Implicit in that debate was the victory o f the Western 
political and economic system over the command economy o f  the socialist system. 
Issues o f the superiority o f a market economic system were central to that debate.
If prior to the collapse of communism East European leaders could claim the 
superiority o f the command economy as a fair system which did not produce 
unemployment and inequality, that argument could no longer be made once the Iron 
Curtain was lifted. The widespread poverty and inequality found at all levels of social 
interaction in Eastern Europe, as well as the deleterious effects o f planning the 
economy were too evident to be concealed or explained away. As a result, in the early 
nineties, the debates moved away from the question o f which system was right, towards 
the question o f how to make the political and economic system developed by Western 
democracies more right. In other words, with the renunciation o f  communism by 
Eastern Europe, and a few years later by the Soviet Union, the debate pitched 
advocates o f a market economy against critics of the downsizes and inequalities 
inherent in the system, rather than against advocates o f the command economy.5
The main catalyst o f  these debates was whether there was a right way to 
democratize and to change the entire philosophic foundation on which a country’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5
system was built. While analysts and policy-makers alike agreed that there was no 
cookbook to recommend to Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union states, 
everybody also agreed that there should be some rough guidelines to follow that would 
make the transition to a Western democracy and a market economy successful.
Political negotiating style, economic liberalization preceding political opening, and no 
less important, the political culture of a particular country were all hypothesized to 
account for a higher or lower degree of success in the democratizing process.6
All the former communist countries held free elections; could they be declared 
democratic? Most former communist countries liberalized their economic policies, 
albeit at different paces; were they to be considered market economies? In mid­
nineties, the debate moved to analyze specific characteristics o f the East European 
transition to a market economic system.7
By 1996, international institutions and other donors conceded that early 
analyses misleadingly translated the success o f transition in some countries as the 
automatic beginning o f growth. “Transition” and “economic growth” were not the 
same thing, and a successful period of transition did not really mean that a market 
economy was established and functioning. In the 1995 Transition Report o f the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, development is defined as “the 
enhancement o f  the standards o f living o f  individuals [through] command over 
resources, education and health,”8 to be distinguished from “transition,” which is an 
extensive process o f policies that take a market from a command to a market oriented 
economy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
Transition processes are socially painful, do not always produce rapid and 
widespread well-being, and can be undermined by public distrust if they fail to be 
conducive to economic growth. The 1998 Transition Report acknowledged that, 
irrespective o f partial success or failure o f  markets in Eastern Europe, there was a 
growing gap between the degree o f market liberalization and privatization, and 
institutional modernization that allows markets to function properly. Some countries 
performed tasks such as market liberalization and privatization faster than other 
countries; however they failed at establishing institutions that protected a market 
discipline and established a business environment conducive to growth and economic 
well-being for all. Additionally, there was an admission that the lack o f attention to 
accompanying social policies to alleviate the effects o f transition was likely to erode 
trust in democracy and a market economy. 9
The social turmoil caused by transition policies was legitimate and real in all the 
countries in the region especially in mid-nineties, and raised questions about the 
appropriateness o f adopting policies that hurt large numbers o f people in all these 
countries. In mid-nineties, one o f the first critics o f governments’ “tough economic 
policies” and “shock therapy” (where it applied) argued that the complex process of 
transition to democracy and a market economy had been left solely in the hands o f 
economists and hence was only considered successful if the economists said so. In fact, 
Przeworski argued, if only economists gave guidelines for the transition policies, the 
social fabric that was to support the policies was likely to erode.10
Alarmingly, the mid-nineties witnessed the voting out o f popular figures 
considered to be pro-market, and the voting in office o f  former socialist and communist
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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leaders or political groups. In Poland, Lech Walesa lost his bid for re-election to a 
“communist,” Alecsandre Kwasniewski, while Solidarity lost the parliamentary 
elections to the Democratic Left Alliance, the former communist party reformed; in 
Hungary, the pro-market Hungarian Democratic Forum lost to the Hungarian Socialist 
Party, which was oriented towards more state-control over the economy; and in the 
Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic Party lost to the Social Democrats. In mid­
nineties, Eastern Europe seemed to be turning towards the Left.
Ten years after the collapse o f  communism, we witness yet another 
metamorphosis o f the debate over the direction o f Eastern Europe. End o f the century 
assessments of the direction o f  democracy in Eastern Europe, as well as in other 
emerging democracies throughout the world argue that we are witnessing a new 
political phenomenon, the “rise o f  illiberal democracies” rather than the “globalization 
o f democracy” as it was widely believed at the end of the Cold War." It has been 
argued that free elections are being held in emerging democracies around the world, but 
that they sometimes bring to power extremist power players, with little respect for 
human rights or the rule o f law, such as in the states of the former Yugoslavia.
Markets are being liberalized, but the process o f turning former state assets into private 
property leads to increased monopoly over resources by former communist 
nome/datura. Should countries in which such phenomena occur be called democracies 
and emerging market economies? Or does the scholarly persistence in using established 
models of analysis obscure aspects o f  emerging markets that need a different analytical 
scrutiny? These assessments challenged the results of analyses o f democratization and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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cast yet another big question mark over the manner in which the scholarship persisted 
in their analytical orthodoxy.12
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
The concept o f "representation" offers an attractive alternative analytical tool to 
researchers of Eastern Europe. It combines elements o f procedural and normative 
democratic theory, and allows the researcher the luxury o f looking at different angles of 
the same political phenomenon, in order to assess direction and depth o f a particular act 
o f representation.
Theories of democracy and democratization fall largely into two categories: 
those advocating the primacy o f the democratic procedure (i.e. free elections), and 
those capitalizing on normative requirements (i.e. equal participation in political life, 
just distribution of resources). At stake is the relationship between governments and 
their constituencies in the pursuit o f  some general goal. Advocates o f the procedural 
definition see constituencies as instrumental in the election o f a governing body which 
decides social and political priorities. Promoters o f normative approaches see 
governments as instrumental in the pursuit o f people's aspirations for freedom, the 
achievement o f the common good, and social justice. Both categories then analyze a 
political system polarized around "the people's representatives" and their activities.
Even when government responsiveness is largely accepted as a key indicator o f 
a democratic society, defining the right tools to measure responsiveness empirically 
remains an unsettled issue in both North America and Western Europe. Few analysts 
o f democracy would disagree with Key's observation that "governments ... must
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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concern themselves with public opinion ... they do not maintain their authority by brute 
force alone";13 many also argue that conclusive causality between public opinion and 
government behavior, and/or policy-making has yet to be demonstrated.14
The difficulties in determining the appropriate analytical tools to measure 
causality eventually led the debate down a less ambitious path o f assessing opinion- 
policy “direction.”15 Is there a popular mandate in a representative democracy that 
makes the system such a distinctively preferred form o f  governance? Do policy-makers 
tend to heed their constituencies' mandates? Or are there accidental instances of 
linkage between the public mandate and the policy-making which mask a manipulative 
political system that is no more representative than a  totalitarian one? The policy­
makers' disposition to act in accordance with, or in response to, public opinion, that is 
their “responsiveness” to public views replaced the debate over causality as a yardstick 
o f representativeness o f a government.16
A finding that policy-makers actually manipulate constituencies in what appears 
to be an act o f representation o f constituency interest may not shatter the foundations 
o f a Western democracy. However, similar findings in a region that lived through more 
than four decades o f  government manipulation may indicate that constituencies in 
Eastern Europe merely traded one set o f authoritarian leaders for another, albeit with 
more liberal views o f  political and economic rights. An assessment of the progress of 
democracy in the region must take into consideration government responsiveness to 
public opinion. The present project concerns itself with the direction of democracy in 
Eastern Europe from the standpoint o f governments’ willingness to “heed” the 
opinions o f their citizens.17
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To date, assessments o f  democracy’s progress in Eastern Europe have paid 
surprisingly little attention to the question o f  government responsiveness to those they 
represent, their ‘disposition’ to implement policies largely favored in public opinion 
polls.18 As previously noted, a large body o f  literature was spawned after the collapse 
o f  communism that focused on traditional analyses o f  transition to a new political 
regime over consolidation o f  political processes and institutions.19 Occasionally, the 
need to create new analytical categories to account for the post-communist changes has 
been signaled.20 Opinion research concerned itself with mass reaction to transition 
processes rather than with policy response to public opinion.21 Occasional and isolated 
studies signaled that commitment to representation may be perfunctory in the region,22 
but were not followed by analyses o f government responsiveness to their publics.
The seeming absence o f  representation analyses in post-communist Eastern 
Europe may be due to the valid objection that the application of “idealist standards” o f 
analysis are inappropriate at this stage in the historical development o f the region.23 It 
has been argued that representative democracies are upgraded, modem stages o f 
democracy honed by centuries o f  political development through trials and tribulations, 
and that evaluating emerging democracies by the same standards as older ones is 
misleading.
A similarly valid point can be made that Eastern Europe’s forty-year legacy o f 
government without accountability makes it doubly important to evaluate the direction 
o f the public-govemment relationship. A political culture that worshiped the state as 
the sole guarantor o f political, economic, and individual rights is in itself a threat to 
democratization processes that foster liberalization, decentralization, individual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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enterprise and human rights. Schopflin and others have argued that political culture is 
the main obstacle to democratization in the region, and that some countries in the 
region would require several generations before any progress could be made towards 
democracy o f Western flavor.24
The difficult process o f  economic transformation observed in the region since 
1990, the recognized inertia o f government institutional structures, and evident human 
rights abuses in some countries are good indicators that caution and modesty should 
guide any conclusions about the direction of democratic transformation o f the region. 
Observed developments also indicate that government responsiveness to their 
constituencies should not be taken as a given.
The analysis o f representation in Eastern Europe in this study is cross-country 
and cross-regional, drawing largely on Western conceptual and analytical models while 
allowing for regional and country specificity. Progress towards a representative 
democracy is evaluated by the examination of how governments in Eastern Europe 
represented their constituencies’ mandate in one particular policy, the shift from a 
central-planned economy to the introduction of a market economy.
The selection o f the introduction o f a market economy as the benchmark policy 
to be addressed in relationship with public opinion support has strong domestic and 
international underpinnings.
After half a century o f  experiments with the central-planned economic system, 
the countries o f Eastern Europe demanded radical change o f  their economic 
environments. They demanded a change for a better life, through the introduction of 
the economic system that was successful elsewhere. That was the market economic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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system known in traditional democracies. The level o f  poverty o f the populations 
across the region unveiled when the Iron Curtain was lifted, the lack o f  competitiveness 
o f the planned economies, the widespread corruption brought about and maintained by 
the practices of a central system which sustained itself through deceit and fraud, were 
all reasons for the constituencies o f Eastern Europe to strongly support the 
introduction o f a market economy as a government priority, ahead o f  other government 
policies. It is then doubly important to analyze how and whether policies conducive to 
a market economy were introduced, and what their outcomes were in relation to the 
constituencies of the region.
Additionally, all the former communist countries have officially expressed 
interest in joining the European Union and some wish to join the Atlantic Alliance. For 
accession to occur, the member countries o f these two powerful international players 
set criteria that need to be met by applicant countries before membership can be 
considered. The creation o f a market economy is a top requirement for accession in 
both of these organizations.25
Within each country, public opinion support for the introduction o f a market 
economic system is compared with policy outcomes in the actual introduction o f the 
desired system over a period o f eight years, between 1990-1998. Evaluation o f the 
direction o f policy are made on the basis o f observed macro-economic trends and 
direction of transition, per available transition indicators.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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METHODOLOGY 
Like many essentially contested political science concepts, political 
representation has unsolved theoretical aspects that are best reflected by the variety of 
methods used to measure the concept empirically. If the outcome o f free elections was 
indeed a body o f public servants that defended the interests o f  the voters, then both 
procedural and normative analysts would be satisfied that democracy were achieved. 
Free elections would satisfy the former, defense of public interests the latter. However, 
the large number o f studies that attempt to establish analytical categories to measure 
representation empirically suggests that neither category o f scholars is satisfied with the 
mere outcome o f  free elections as a means and end result o f the democratic practice. 
The theoretical dilemma reflects on the selection of measurement categories, and 
analysts need to defend one course o f  analysis over another.
A minimum of two alternative working hypotheses can be derived from the 
literature: either public opinion influences government conduct, reflected in variations 
in policy or legislative outcomes in accordance with approval ratings on specific issues; 
or policy and legislative outcomes, dependent on categories other than public opinion 
result (or not) in popular support for the government.
It immediately seems apparent that the two approaches do not explain the same 
thing. The former hypothesis assesses degrees o f government responsiveness illustrated 
by the change in government conduct in relation to public opinion; the latter explains 
government conduct in relation to social and political categories unrelated to public 
opinion. The former fits in the large category of “the American model” o f 
representation. The latter hypothesis, the so-called “European model” o f
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representation, conceptualizes policy outcomes as results o f categories such a party 
politics, social composition o f legislatures, personal opinions that MPs hold, 
perceptions of what voters actually want, etc.
In the first case, legislative accountability, executive responsiveness, or 
leadership are the occurring analytical categories used to measure degrees of 
congruence (read causality) between the public and its representatives. In the second 
case, socio-economic factors o f elected MPs, party loyalties, party recruitment patterns, 
or personal perceptions o f public opinion are categories used to measure specific policy 
outcomes. In the second case, the implicit and sometimes explicit conclusions are that 
congruence between publics and representatives cannot be a realistic expectation on the 
part o f the researcher, or of the public, given that a host o f processes having little to do 
with the will to represent are interposed between the public and their representatives.
The tensions between the two hypotheses go to the hard core o f the democratic 
practice. If, as Americanists argue, the public merely reacts to policies and politicians 
lead voter opinion as some West-European analyses indicate, then the system should be 
characterized as elitist and non-responsive.26 Europeanists argue that this type o f 
reasoning is simplistic, and neglects to address the “black box” o f intervening variables 
between voter reaction and policy-making. If  the relationship between voters and their 
representatives is conceived and analyzed as a direct line between two poles, a 
multitude o f processes that follow elections and precede policy outcomes remain 
unaddressed. MPs, Europeanists argue, are influenced in their work by processes 
taking place in the parliament, by party politics and protocols, by their own biases and 
beliefs, or by their own perceptions o f what the voters want. If that is the case, then
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the analysis of representation should not focus on causality between public opinion and 
policy outcome but rather on the strength o f various factors in the policy and legislative
process-making.27
Evidently, such arguments make the methodological decision even harder. How 
is one to study empirically the relationship between government conduct and public 
opinion? If the West-European researchers (and some American ones as well) are 
correct, analyzing causality is the wrong approach to assess a society’s degree of 
democratization. The analysis o f  party politics provides answers to the shape and 
direction of policy-making, and the analysis of the manner in which M.P.s “sell” their 
product to the public explains public support for policies.
However, even if we accept Lippmann’s position that the public tends to be an 
ignorant and politically passive actor in the policy-making process, the above position 
does not explain political representation, and changes the shape o f the analytical model 
in a way that does not do justice to political processes that tend to fit the congruence 
model. In this study, the view is taken that in order for a political system to be called a 
representative democracy, some degree o f government responsiveness to public opinion 
must exist.
Working Hypotheses, Variables and Indicators
If the intention of the present analysis was to measure degrees o f government 
representation in a Western democracy, the following clusters o f hypotheses could be 
inferred from the literature: if representative democracy, then responsive government.
If responsive government, then causality between government policy and public
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opinion. If causality, as approval ratings on specific issues go up (over a period o f  
time), a government initiates or adopts policies to support and implement public 
preferences on given issues.
However, this is not an analysis o f a Western democracy, and standards o f 
representation should be applied with caution to countries with unsettled types o f  
political arrangements. In Eastern Europe, all we can hope for is an indication that 
public opinion and policy outcome trends go in the same direction, most o f the time. 
Should that be the case, a modest initial assessment can be made that Eastern Europe is 
moving in the direction o f  building a representative type o f governance.
This study approaches the representation analysis in Eastern Europe from a 
comparative perspective that borrows from Western models but allows room for 
specificity in interpretation. Public opinion support for the introduction o f a market 
economy is compared with actual government policy outcomes over a  period o f eight 
years.
Within each country and across the region trend analyses are offered, with 
particular attention to domestic specifics o f  opinion change. Trends in public opinion 
are illustrated by line charts indicating direction o f change between 1990 and 1997. 
Direction of policy outcomes is charted based on macro-economic indicators o f 
economic performance, and indicators of progress in transition towards a market 
economy are drawn from data available from the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and European Union Annual Reports.
The line charts o f  public support and policy trends are thereafter superimposed, 
to observe whether the two variables are related in any manner. For each country, an
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opinion-policy line chart is designed, and observations on the nature o f the relationship 
between the two variables are inferred. Across the region trends are also discussed, 
especially in light o f  the fact that some o f the countries under analysis started their 
reform in a more aggressive and determined manner than others.
A final section within each country study looks at election outcomes over the 
same period, to observe public reaction to government performance. Although election 
results are means to gauge after-the-fact accountability and are not considered very 
reliable indicators o f an opinion-policy relationship, they are important for the 
assessment o f constituency maturity in Eastern Europe. Even in Western democracies, 
constituencies tend to be regarded as immature and not knowledgeable o f  political 
processes. In Eastern Europe, such a reality would be deadly for the establishment o f 
democracy. Electorate response to government performance is a critical component of 
democracy-building and could easily become the driving force o f change in the region. 
In this final section, we are interested to see whether the public is ‘punishing’ policy­
makers for not fulfilling their mandate and voting them out o f  office, or whether 
mandates are renewed based on performance.
Data
For each o f the six countries, public opinion data is available between 
1990-1997 on the pace and direction o f  economic reform from the Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer.2% The New Democracies Barometer questionnaires did not ask a 
specific question on the desirability o f the introduction of a market economy.
However, the survey asked a variety o f questions to tap into the respondents’ views on
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market economy in general. These surveys are used wherever necessary to the analysis, 
to complement Eurobarometer findings.29 The variation in methodology between the 
two surveys does not allow the use o f some median value, but in cases where the 
direction of the trend is radically different, a discussion follows.
For the direction and outcome o f government reform, indicators o f progress o f 
transition, as well as macro-economic indicators are available from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction.30 Additionally, evaluations by the European Commission o f the 
progress of applicant countries towards a functioning democracy will be discussed.
PLAN OF STUDY 
The analysis is pursued in six chapters. Chapter II presents a journey through 
the concept and practice o f  representative democracy into the twentieth century. Since 
disputable agreement has been made regarding conceptual and analytical characteristics 
o f representative democracy, a  summary o f the main theoretical points o f contention is 
useful in order to build a relevant analysis for Eastern Europe. Debates over the 
meaning of representation are presented, with observations regarding the relevance and 
usefulness o f several concepts for assessing democracy’s direction in Eastern Europe.
Chapter m  addresses issues o f method in the study o f traditional representative 
democracies, and offers an analytical framework to interpret the dynamics o f 
government responsiveness and public support in Eastern Europe. The terms o f 
analysis of policy-opinion direction are introduced, and models o f analysis are 
evaluated. General trends in the East European constituencies’ demands for a market 
economy and their governments’ policies to meet those demands are presented. The
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chapter sets the background for individual country analyses, and formulates hypotheses 
that facilitate interpretation o f events.
Chapters IV through VII are country studies. The relationship between opinion 
support and government policy is analyzed in the Czech Republic (chapter four), 
Hungary (chapter five), Poland (chapter six), and the Slovak Republic (chapter seven). 
These are the so-called ‘front-runner’ countries in the introduction o f reform o f their 
economic systems, where the transformation to a market system took a more 
recognizable shape. An analysis o f representation in these countries from the 
standpoint of the introduction o f  a market economy is justified by the governments’ 
efforts to meet public expectations.
The same willingness to reform could not be observed in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Economic reform was slow in both countries, and political indecision and instability 
delayed economic transformation. Chapter VIII briefly addresses conditions o f 
systemic transformation in Bulgaria and Romania, with the conclusion that an analysis 
o f representation is not yet appropriate in these countries.
Chapter IX offers conclusions about representation in Eastern Europe based on 
observed trends. Three kinds o f  conclusions are offered. First, theoretical conclusions 
address the question of the appropriateness o f applying conceptual assumptions 
inherent in analyses of traditional democracies to analyses o f  Eastern Europe. Second, 
methodological conclusions address the appropriateness o f using analytical models o f 
representation specific to traditional democracies to analyze Eastern Europe. Third, 
regionally specific conclusions identify variables affecting representation in the region 
and offer predictions of future development o f representation based on observed trends.
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CHAPTER II
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BEGINNING OF THE JOURNEY
The difficulty in assessing democracy’s direction in Eastern Europe is both 
conceptual and methodological. It is dependent on and sensitive to Western scholarly and 
policy debates over meaning, method, and relevance. Democracy grew in Western Europe 
and in the United States over a period o f  two centuries, and developed differently in 
individual countries. To defend the undertaking o f a representation analysis for Eastern 
Europe is to defend the choice o f  representative democracy over other models of 
democracy.
Two distinctive characteristics o f  representative democracy make this model an 
appropriate analytical tool to assess the direction o f democratization in Eastern Europe: 
government accountability, and responsiveness. After living for a little less than half a 
century under authoritarian regimes, Eastern Europe needs to do more than develop the 
institutions o f free elections. It needs to develop a new understanding o f the role o f  the 
government and of elected representatives towards the people. The development o f  this 
new understanding, characterized by government accountability towards constituencies, 
and the inclination to heed to the people’s voice can be best assessed within the 
framework o f accountable and responsive governance that representative democracy 
offers.
As with many other politically contested concepts, inconclusive agreement has 
been made to date about the overall conceptual and analytical characteristics of 
representative democracy. However, elements o f representation have been embedded in
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many political arrangements since the dawn of mankind, some o f which were not 
democratic. A summary o f the conceptual journey o f democracy since its beginnings into 
the twentieth century is useful and necessary in order to build a picture o f the available 
theoretical dimensions for a representation analysis. It also helps the researcher track 
down elements o f representation that have evolved over many centuries until they found 
expression in a political system called representative democracy. Finally, this picture helps 
with the identification o f elements o f analysis such as accountability and responsiveness 
that need to be part of modem analyses o f the nature o f emerging democratic political 
systems.
The conceptual journey o f  representative democracy presented in this chapter goes 
back briefly to ancient Greece and medieval times, then moves on to Hobbes into the 
twentieth century to offer insights into the main theoretical points o f contention over 
meaning and methodology. Section one looks at the beginnings o f  democratic ideas and 
practice to see how and why the idea o f popular government came into being in ancient 
times, particularly in Greece. Section two comments on the decline o f  democratic notions 
of governance between ancient times and the middle o f the sixteenth century. The focus 
o f the section is on the possible explanations for this decline and on the rejuvenation of 
democracy by the end o f the period. Section three discusses the revival o f democratic 
ideas and the main philosophical approaches to govemment-by-the-people into the 
eighteen century. Section four discusses the finalization o f  democratic ideas and accepted 
practices on the eve of the twentieth century. A concluding section identifies major trends 
in philosophical thinking and core analytical characteristics o f a representation analysis 
that are thereafter used in the analysis o f the direction o f democracy in Eastern Europe.
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ANCIENT GREECE: WHAT IT MEANT TO BE A DEMOCRAT 
Dahl calls the political process that started in ancient Greek city-states roughly in 
the first half o f the fifth century B.C. and then spread among Romans and other Italian 
cities the “first democratic transformation” in the history o f  humankind. The core idea of 
this transformation had to do with governance o f the polis: after centuries o f rule by 
tyrants and vicious rulers, the Athenian Greeks decided it was time to have a rule by the 
many instead o f a rule by the few.1 They called that rule demokratia, etymologically a 
combination o f two Greek words, demos, meaning people, and kratia, meaning rule or 
authority. The first democratic transformation refers then to the historic shift from 
tyrannic or oligarchic rule o f government to a government ruled by the people.
Despite scant primary sources to determine the nature of this initial type of 
democracy,2 its main characteristics seem to have embodied both procedural and 
normative elements o f political governance that are part o f the modem practice o f 
democracy. In the recorded history o f  the Peloponnesian war, we are told that all the 
Athenian citizens met in regular Assembly meetings, to discuss and decide together on 
laws and policies to benefit the largest numbers.3 Citizens took turns to serve in office 
regularly, actively administering the affairs o f the city.4 Governance decisions were 
motivated by concerns o f equality and fair treatment to all the citizens of the polis.5 We 
can easily recognize in this sketch o f decision-making processes desiderata for quality and 
fairness for the polity advocated in modem representative democracies.
A few elements o f  this initial democracy stand out as essentially different from 
modem democracy in a manner that is relevant to the discussion o f representation. One is 
the question o f  citizenship.6 While the notion that ‘all’ citizens o f a city come together to
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make decisions about the common good sounds not only ambitious but also appealing 
from a normative point o f view, the reality o f  ancient Athens and o f other Greek city- 
states was that citizenship was restrictive and exclusive. Not all the inhabitants o f the 
polis were citizens; slaves, children, women, and long-term resident aliens such as the 
metics were excluded. Athenian citizenship was primarily a hereditary privilege conferred 
only to males based on ties o f  kinship, a feature hard to defend in the twentieth century. 
Metic families which lived in Athens for generations and contributed to the general well­
being o f the polis were denied rights o f citizenship and of land and real estate ownership. 
They did enjoy a limited number o f  rights to protection in legal courts. Participatory 
politics were therefore restricted to a select group o f people within the larger group of 
inhabitants that essentially made up the polis. Since the decisions adopted by a select 
group affected the larger whole, arguably Athenians had designed a type o f  political 
representation whether they acknowledged it or not.
Other characteristics o f  the Greek democracy are simply anachronic and contain 
the seeds o f a rule o f people by the people that builds directly into the procedural 
representation model. The most evident anachronism of this kind is the issue o f  size o f 
popular assemblies. Commonly referred to as ‘small-scale systems’, the city-state 
democracy o f ancient Greeks could be a direct exertion of the rule o f  people precisely due 
to its small size, a feature which by no means can be replicated in modem nation-state 
democracies. Elections were performed in those times as well, but “from all among all.”7 
Direct participation was possible due to relatively small political entities organized as 
demokratias and was motivated by the belief that it would be unfair and unjust for some to 
decide on the affairs o f all. Historians argue over the exact numbers o f  Athenian citizens
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who must have been involved in the famous general assemblies.8 Even if the size o f the 
polis was in the thousands, subtracting the non-citizens and absentees would still make 
attendance fairly high. That feature evidently cannot apply to modem nation-state 
democracies, and could not apply to populations even less numerous than the twentieth 
century states, such as those o f  the Middle Ages.
The fact that the Greeks’ organization was based primarily on the notion o f  city- 
state rather than on confederations o f city-states allowed for direct participation in 
government and was no incentive to delegate power to representatives. However, the 
attractiveness o f procedural and normative elements o f government such as citizen 
participation, responsible decision-making, and quality and fairness o f  the political process 
can be seen in these early political arrangements. These elements of governance were to 
be revisited sixteenth centimes later, when the historical stage became ready for them.
A HISTORICAL GAP 
Few analysts tackle heads-on the question o f where the “concept” o f democracy 
went between ancient Greece and the seventeenth century. Whether due to the rise of 
Christianity as an alternative view o f  authority, stratification of social classes, or a 
combination o f political, social and religious factors, for more than sixteenth centimes 
there is no record o f any government attempt to build a type o f governance remotely 
resembling democracy.9 At the end o f the sixteenth century, it became apparent that 
religion had become divisive and that the powers o f the state should be separated from the 
duty o f rulers to uphold any particular faith. At this juncture, the question o f the 
relationship between govemants and governed came to be considered from a radically
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different light.10 The Leveller Movement (1645-49) is recognized by critics as 
extraordinary not because o f its achievements, but because o f the unprecedented nature o f 
its demands in the middle o f  the seventeenth century." The Levellers’ calls for equal 
treatment o f all citizens and universal voting rights are principles o f democratic 
representation commonly accepted at the end o f  the twentieth century;12 they were 
unheard of and quite audacious only three hundred years before.
In the absence o f a Foucauldian-like study that deconstructs the political discourse 
of over sixteenth centuries, we need to allow for the possibility that the Leveller 
Movement was a historical instance along the continuum o f democracy’s conceptual 
journey.13 We can toy with the idea that Aristotle’s view of democracy as the “tyranny o f 
the lawless multitude” may have turned off historical valves with respect to the value and 
appropriateness o f democracy as a form o f governance.14 We find enough references to 
Aristotle’s profound influence on the beginnings o f civilization and long afterwards15 to 
acknowledge this as a serious possibility as to why democracy needed to be “restored” or 
“rehabilitated” in the eighteenth century.16
However, developments prior to the Leveller movement indicate that the idea of 
democratic governance did not just make a come-back but evolved to the point where the 
Levellers’ calls marked a more clear-cut break with past traditions. In Europe, the Middle 
Ages saw the rise o f representative institutional structures serving decision-making 
processes that influenced and restricted the power of lords and kings. Only nobles were, 
however, worthy to have a say in these representative institutions.17 The age of 
absolutism that followed witnessed the effects o f unhindered royal power both in France 
and England; power abuses in levying taxes and in waging wars gave way to revolutionary
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ideas and revolutions aimed at restricting the ‘divine right o f Kings to rule as they saw fit/ 
By the end o f the Middle Ages, there was a strong feeling that within a political 
community, power should rest with a legitimate authority recognized and accepted by the 
entire community.18
The Levellers’ calls for equal treatment o f  all citizens and universal suffrage did 
not, therefore, come out o f nowhere; they did give the debate over the appropriate role o f 
government a distinctive democratic thrust. That debate, formally initiated by Thomas 
Hobbes and launched in the middle o f  the seventeenth century emergence o f nation-states 
continues to this day. The arguments and factors that sustain it are, among others, the 
proper role o f a government, the duties and responsibilities o f both governed and public 
officials, the relationship between electorate and its representatives, and the locus o f 
decision-making.
FROM HOBBES TO MILL: DEFINING DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION
While few theorists o f democracy would dispute the fact that the history of 
democratic thought is hardly a model o f  philosophical consistency and coherence, most 
would agree to start the historical account o f democracy’s making with Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679). Writing at the juncture between the sixteenth century emergence o f nation­
states in Europe and the weakening o f the faith in the absoluteness o f the Christian model 
o f leadership, Hobbes qualifies as the first modem philosopher.
Conversely, while most accounts o f the roots o f  democratic thought start with 
Hobbes, few o f them consider Hobbes’ view o f government fit to be mentioned in pages 
dealing with representation or representative government.19 His famous theory o f the state
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of nature being the state of “war o f  all against all” where “notions o f  right and wrong, 
justice and injustice have no place,” and “force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues” 
cannot be accommodated within a theory o f  the rule o f people by the people at first 
sight.20 But, as Pitkin correctly makes the case, there is more to Hobbesian theory than 
just a bleak image of the future o f  mankind in the absence o f the powerful protection o f 
the Leviathan.
Hobbes’s theory o f government is in fact a theory o f representation with a strong
authoritarian bend. In this vision, human beings cannot escape loss o f life and property
unless they thoroughly renounce their personal power to make choices and yield to the
judgment and will o f the powerful Leviathan.
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from 
the invasion o f foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure 
them in such a sort as that, by their own industry, and by the fruits o f the earth, 
they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is to confer all their power and 
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly o f men, that may reduce all their 
wills, by plurality o f voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint 
one man, or assembly o f  men, to bear their person; and everyone to own and 
acknowledge himself to be author o f  whatsoever he that so beareth their person, 
shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and 
safety; and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his will, and their judgements, 
to his judgement.... A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude o f 
men do agree and covenant, everyone with everyone, that to whatsoever man, or 
assembly o f men, shall be given by the major part the right to present the person o f 
them all, that is to say, to be their representative.21
If we conclude our analysis o f the Hobbesian view o f representation at this 
particular juncture, his theory translates into something that modem critics may recognize 
as an acceptable, albeit incomplete definition o f  representative government. In modem 
terms, this theory can be enunciated as follows: the entire constituency agrees on the 
necessity to have an institutional body or a person entrusted with the exclusive right to
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make decisions that affect the interests o f all concerned. Since everybody agrees with this
arrangement, free elections are superfluous.
The problem is, as some critics point out, that the Hobbesian theory o f
representation is inconsistent, not incomplete,22 and to a good extent deceiving.23 The act
of bestowing all the rights to make decisions about one’s life to the Leviathan may seem
acceptable if, as modem thinkers would add, the Leviathan was committed and pledged to
carry out his obligations, a core issue o f modem representative democracies. But
according to Hobbes, that does not follow. In his view, those who entrust the Leviathan
with power over their lives and well-being are in feet also responsible for any action the
Leviathan might take in their name. The Leviathan is never accountable and has no
responsibilities towards those who entrusted him with their possessions and their lives, a
view repudiated for the next generations o f democratic theorists:
because the right o f bearing the person o f  them all, is given to him they make 
sovereign, by covenant only o f one to another, and not o f him [Leviathan] to any 
o f them; there can happen no breach o f covenant on the part o f the sovereign; and 
consequently none o f his subjects...can be freed from his subjection.24
What so much bothered subsequent theorists o f democratic governance was not
necessarily the immense power acquired by the Leviathan or the virtually unhindered
freedom to use it at his will; it was rather the absence o f any accountability for the course
of action that the Leviathan might take towards his subjects, while being delegated [in
modem terms, elected] by them. Locke (1632-1704) in particular elaborated a view o f the
state of nature fundamentally opposed to the Hobbesian one, in which individual freedom
is a given, and the constitution o f  a larger community under one government is an act o f
individual freedom and general responsibility.
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For when any number o f Men have, by the consent o f every individual, made a 
Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body, with a Power to 
Act as one Body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For 
that which acts any Community, being only the consent o f  the individuals o f  it, and 
it being one body must move one way; it is necessary the Body should move that 
way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent o f the majority, and 
so everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority?5 [emphasis 
in the original]
Elaborating this theory as Hobbes was writing his, Locke pitched a more friendly 
and flexible vision o f the state o f nature that was more agreeable to freedom, property, 
and the will o f  the majority by comparison to the immutable right to follow the will o f  one
person.
Until the mid-nineteen century, when John Stuart Mill laid down a principle for 
limiting government activity contrary to citizen will, a host o f other theories offered 
alternatives to what Dahl calls the “second democratic transformation,” the shift from the 
city-state to the nation-state. This second transformation would eventually lead to the 
acceptance o f the concept of representative democracy (sometimes called ‘representative’ 
sometimes called ‘liberal’) as roughly the most desirable type o f  democracy into the 
twentieth century.26
Two major ways of approaching the dichotomy between governed and 
governments can be identified among the early philosophical writings that make the mold 
o f representative democracy: either the governed are believed to be incapable o f deciding 
or ruling their lives and therefore need good governments to do that work for them (a 
view sometimes called ‘guardianship’), or the government is seen as potentially infringing 
individual liberty and therefore needing to be in check all the time (a view largely called 
liberalism).27 Between these two poles, a host o f variations have tried to solve the tension
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between individual liberty and rights, and their attainment through an institutional body
called state or government.
Rousseau’s Social Contract tried to resolve the dilemma o f  the government versus
the people by completely dropping the government out o f the equation and empowering
the citizens to be their own masters. That end could be achieved, Rousseau (1712-1778)
thought, in a unification o f the wills o f all conducive to the General Will.
Each o f us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme 
direction o f the general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an 
indivisible part o f the whole ... this act o f  association produces a moral and 
collective body, composed o f as many members as there are votes in the assembly, 
which from this act receives its unity, its common self its life, its will. This public 
person, which is thus formed by the union o f all other persons, took formerly the 
name of “city,” and now takes that o f “republic” or “body politic.” It is called by 
its members “State” when it is passive, “Sovereign” when in activity, and whenever 
it is compared with other bodies o f  a similar kind, it is denominated “power.”28
In this arrangement, everybody is free from the constraints of government, but not
from the constraints o f following the general will, a view to be fiercely fought by
American liberals later on.
In order, therefore to prevent the social compact from becoming an empty 
formula, it tacitly comprehends the engagement, which alone can give effect to the 
others - that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to it by 
the whole body: this in fact only forces him to be free; for this is the condition 
which, by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees his absolute personal 
independence, a condition which gives motion and effect to the political machine. 
This alone renders all civil engagements justifiable, and without it they would be 
absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.29
Late nineteen and twentieth century anarchists attempted to follow this trend of
thought, arguing that states were coercive by nature, therefore they should be abolished
and replaced with free associations o f citizens.30 Anarchism, however, never resolved
basic issues o f defection by a minority from the rule o f  a compliant and responsible
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majority, nor did it get into the more mundane matters o f  feasibility, mechanics o f 
association, and o f responsibility.
Between Rousseau and the French Revolution, three historical developments 
helped shape the two main directions o f the representative democracy continuum. The 
Leveller Movement and early American ideas o f  representative government contributed to 
the notion that representation within a democracy can and should be conceived as an 
institution in which governments are responsible and accountable to their constituencies, a 
view called the ‘American model o f democracy’ in the twentieth century. In contrast, the 
rise o f the Whig view o f representation in England launched the concept that 
representatives were not and should not be bound by mandates from their constituents, but 
rather represent the larger national interest in the best way they saw fit. This became 
known as the ‘European model o f democracy.’ We shall return to these models.
The Levellers marked a distinctive and fairly unique moment in British evolution to 
democracy through their ideas about Parliament’s composition and its relationship to the 
people. The Tory traditional view, that the function o f M.P.s was merely to represent 
local interests and seek redress for particular grievances while the King and his ministers 
were responsible for interpreting the national interest was challenged by the Levellers’ 
demand for universal suffrage and equal representation o f all. The Levellers felt that each 
man in England should have the right to send a representative to London to voice 
concerns about their lives, a daring notion for a Parliament traditionally made up of 
members o f the wealthy middle class. Similarly, the Levellers thought that Parliament 
should be the agent o f popular will rather than a mere tool for deciding when and by what
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means the King’s next campaign was going to be fought. These views turned into
demands on the British Parliament and challenged traditional views of governance.31
By contrast, the English Whigs developed a view o f representation that echoed
Rousseau in some respects, and Hobbes in others, and which was as contested as the two
philosophers. An early expression o f  that view was formulated by Algernon Sidney, and
the epitome o f it was given to us by Edmund Burke (1729-97). In essence, this view
argues that Parliament represented the whole nation, rather than aggregate separate
interests. In order for M.P.s to pursue the good o f the nation, they needed to be free to
do what they thought best in the national interest. In 1698, Sidney was writing that
It is not therefore for Kent or Sussex, Lewes or Maidstone, but for the whole 
nation, that the members chosen to serve in these places are sent to serve in 
Parliament. And though it be fit for them., .to harken to the opinions o f the 
electors for the information o f  their judgements...yet they are not strictly and 
properly obliged to give account o f their actions to any...32
In mid-eighteenth century, we find Whig leaders postulating a fairly Hobbesian
view that representatives should be under no obligation to take instructions from their
constituents:
After we are chosen, and we have taken our seats in this House, we have no longer 
any dependence on our electors, at least in as for as regards our behavior here. 
Their whole power is then devolved upon us, and we are in every question that 
comes before this House, to regard only the public good in general, and to 
determine according to our own judgements.33
And in the later part o f the eighteenth century, as the French Revolution was 
starting to loom on the horizon, we find Burke arguing that power “in the hands of the 
multitude ... admits of no control, no regulation, no steady direction whatsoever.”34 
Consequently, Burke argued that power should be naturally delegated to Parliament, the
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only body capable o f pursuing the “general reason of the whole,” that is the national
interest:
Parliament is not a congress o f  ambassadors from different and hostile interests, 
which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents 
and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly o f  one nation, with one 
interest, that o f the whole - where not local prejudices ought to guide, but the 
general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a 
member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member o f Bristol, but 
he is a member o f Parliament.35
Implicit in the Whig view are two important aspects o f the govemment- 
constituency relationship. In the first place, there is an identifiable national interest worth 
pursuing, which takes precedence over all other personal, local or group interests. All the 
composing parts of the whole nation agree that this national interest (what Rousseau 
called the General Will) must be pursued, and they delegate the Parliament to carry out the 
job. Secondly, the Parliament representatives are under no obligation to consult with 
constituencies before making decisions in the national interest, since they are singularly fit 
to make those decisions (a view Hobbes would have gladly endorsed). Neither Rousseau 
nor Hobbes withstood the test o f history; their theories, together with variations on their 
political themes like that o f  the seventeenth century Whig view o f representation came 
heavily under attack by their contemporaries.
Early American views o f  government marry the concepts o f  representation and 
democracy in a formal type o f  government called representative democratic government 
for the first time in history. In 1802, Thomas Jefferson was declaring in a letter to 
Governor Hall that “We have the same object, the success o f representative government. 
Nor are we acting for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race. The event o f  our
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experiment is to show whether man can be trusted with self-government.”36 In 1816, in a
letter to I. H. Tiffany, he stated that
The full experiment o f government democratical, but representative, was and still 
is reserved for us... The introduction o f  this new principle o f representative 
democracy has rendered useless in almost everything written before on the 
structure of government; and in great measure relieves our regret if the political 
writings of Aristotle, or any other ancient, have been lost.37
Evidently, the new nation on the rise on the other side o f the Atlantic was not
interested to inherit the Whig philosophical approaches o f the mother-country, nor was it
prone to continue its dependence on the British island, especially after King George III
tried to impose taxes on the colonists without their consent. One would have thought that
the British had learned from the lessons o f their own history not to try ‘taxation without
representation’ again; just as the former attempt ended with the crisis between the
Parliament and the Crown and led to the severance o f a king’s head, the attempt on the
American colony precipitated the latter’s severance from the mother-British island. The
Declaration o f  Independence formalized the separation by appealing to general principles
o f governance, while the Federalist Papers formalized a view o f representative
government that is fairly close to what America eventually bred by the end o f the twentieth
century.
The concept o f democracy that lies at the foundation o f the American democracy 
allows for the first time in modem history for a system o f checks and balances between 
governments and their constituencies. The Founding Fathers expected members o f the 
legislature to act as delegates o f their constituents and favored frequent elections to 
prevent representatives from acquiring too much independence. Writing o f the House of 
Representatives in 1788, the Founding Fathers found it essential that a representative
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should have “an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. 
Frequent elections are unquestionably the oniy policy by which this dependence and 
sympathy can be effectually secured.”38 And Je ffe rso n  declared that members o f the 
legislature should submit themselves to “approbation or rejection at short intervals,” to 
preempt abuses o f power and the possibility o f  losing touch with the real holders of 
power, the people.39 This was the first time when a philosophy o f governance addressed 
directly and operationally the relationship between constituencies and their government 
representatives, with elections as the measurable dimension of how governments lived up 
to their constituencies’ expectations.
Somewhat paradoxically, the legacy o f  the French Revolution is an approach to 
governance that resembles more the Whig view o f representation than the American one, 
despite the fact that the Revolution pitched popular government against absolute 
monarchical power.
It is the approach rather than the facts o f the Revolution that is important to the 
topic o f representation. Under the leadership o f Abbe Sieyes, the revolutionaries adopted 
the view that the nobility and the clergy had no right to claim themselves as part o f the 
nation since they possessed legal privileges and exemptions that relieved them from 
abiding by the laws o f the land, therefore they made themselves foreigners in their own 
nation. They were equally not entitled to stand for election as representatives o f the Third 
Estate, the estate that was made up o f the largest number of people of the land. In order 
to secure that none o f  those elected to the Third Estate would yield to pressure from the 
nobility, Sieyes induced the Assembly to declare that deputies were not bound by the 
instructions o f  their constituents. This stipulation was included in the Declaration o f the
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Rights of Man and o f the Citizen, in the summer o f 1789. The Constitution o f  1791 
declared that sovereignty resided in the nation, that the National Assembly embodied the 
will o f the nation, and mandated that “the representatives elected in the departments will 
not be representatives of a particular department but o f the whole nation, and they may 
not be given any mandate.”40 This view o f representation led modem critics to argue that 
as soon as the French representatives were given the name o f ‘deputies’ they ceased (in 
theory) to deputize for anyone.41
We can see from this abbreviated history o f theoretical developments that the roots 
o f the controversy between the European and the American models of representation go 
as far back as the seventeenth century. The view that a representative derives his 
legitimacy from the act o f elections and that he is not bound to heed to the instructions of 
his constituents became the European approach to representative government. In 
contrast, the radical American view cherished the notion that representatives are the 
people’s agents. Constitutional provisions prohibiting mandates and instructions from 
constituents to representatives were included in the constitutions o f  Belgium (1831), Italy 
(1848), Prussia (1850), Sweden ( 1866), Austria (1867), Germany (1871), Switzerland 
(1874), the Netherlands (1887), Denmark (1915), and later in the 1948 Constitution of 
Italy and the 1949 Basic Law o f the German Federal Republic.42 The view that 
sovereignty rests with the people and that political representatives are the people’s agents 
remained the American approach.
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UTILITARIANISM AND REPRESENTATION 
Despite the strong influence o f the Whig view o f representation on British and 
European political affairs, the British political system was challenged from within and led 
to the introduction o f  representative governments in Britain and France. Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832), James Mill (1773-1836), and their predecessors, Joseph Priestley (1733- 
1804), Richard Price (1723-1791) and Thomas Paine (1737-1809) challenged the British 
parliamentary system on the grounds o f  the franchise. Their influence can largely be seen 
in twentieth century continental parliamentary arrangements.
In the beginning o f the eighteenth century, the British House of Commons did not 
reflect the social and demographic changes in an increasingly industrial England and a 
disproportionately large number o f landowners represented an increasingly narrow range 
o f constituents. The demographic growth accompanied by the booming o f industrial areas 
created the unrealistic situation in which landowners served in a disproportionately large 
number in the House while the emerging industrial areas were under-represented.43 For 
the Whigs, this situation did not represent a problem: they argued that, as long as some 
industrial cities had representatives in the House, virtually all industrial cities were 
represented. The words o f  a House member arguing this case are worth quoting: “It is not 
more expedient that a large town should be represented rather than a small town because 
its interests will be watched by its own delegates; but because it is more likely to send a 
good representative to the national councils.”44
Two waves o f radical reformers challenged this view o f representation in England. 
One group based their demands for legitimate, equal representation on a belief in natural 
rights o f men resembling American ideas. They were largely inconsequential in the history
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of parliamentary change. The other group developed its own philosophy called 
utilitarianism, which achieved the change that the first group aspired to, but starting from 
radically different premises and assumptions about human nature. Utilitarianism defended 
a structure of representation and interest that translated into a political arrangement similar 
to the American one only based on a different philosophy.
Joseph Priestley and Richard Price were pioneer challengers. They developed 
political ideas based on the writings o f Rousseau and forwarded the view that sovereignty 
rested with the people, therefore all people should be entitled to political representation. 
Thomas Paine added his efforts to theirs in his famous The Rights o f  Man. The 
revolutionary idea that a representative government should be based on a wide franchise 
and that the citizens had the right to revolt against forms of government that did not abide 
by that rule was once again reiterated.45 Their arguments, however, were never really 
popular in England.
It was utilitarianism, a philosophy developed in England, that was to challenge the 
Whig foundation o f government in a more convincing and radical manner than the natural 
rights philosophy, with the ironical results that utilitarians achieved the change that the 
natural rights radicals advocated. Jeremy Bentham and James Mill were the pioneers o f 
this philosophy, with modernized versions o f  utilitarianism to be developed later into the 
twentieth century.
Jeremy Bentham, the father o f utilitarianism, was the first to advocate a simple 
principle of utility according to which laws were good as long as they increased the sum 
total o f the happiness of humankind, and bad if they decreased that happiness. 
Consequently, the best kind o f parliamentary system was one in which legislators, in the
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course o f promoting their own interests and happiness, would automatically maximize the 
happiness o f the whole population.
In order to achieve such a parliamentary body, manhood suffrage was necessary, 
to insure that the personal interests o f the whole were represented in the legislature.
Annual elections were necessary to make sure that M.P.s were in constant contact with 
their constituencies and represented their voices, and did not have the time to develop 
personal, exclusive interests o f their own, a view Jefferson and the Founding Fathers 
found appealing irrespective of philosophical foundation. Any law supported by a 
majority o f  such a legislative body would be in the interest o f the majority and therefore 
would increase the sum total o f happiness in society.46
Bentham's good friend, James Mill, set out these principles in a more clear manner 
in his Essay on Government. Starting out from the basic assumption that men are 
motivated in their actions by self-interest, he argued that any legislative body should 
account for each individual interest in order to ensure that the sum total o f interests was 
represented, therefore increasing the sum o f total happiness in a society. “It is indisputable 
that the acts o f men follow their will, that their will follows their desires, and that their 
desires are generated ... by their interests. [...Hence,] a legislative assembly must have an 
identity o f  interest with the community, otherwise it will make a mischievous use o f  its 
power.”47 In order to prevent representatives from abusing their power, a  structure 
needed to be arranged so that “in his capacity o f representative it would be impossible for 
him to do himself as much good by misgovemment as he would do himself harm in his 
capacity o f  member o f the community.”4* That structure was identified as (frequent) 
elections, which would preempt abuse o f power since “the smaller period o f time during
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which any man retains his capacity o f representative, as compared with the time in which 
he is simply a member o f the community, the more difficult it will be to compensate the 
sacrifice of the interest o f  the longer period by the profits o f misgovemment during the 
shorter.”49 This was the basic tenet o f utilitarianism that changed the premises from which 
the British viewed their Parliament, and the basis to which later views o f representation 
will return.
With the early utilitarians, then, we see the initial elements o f modem 
representative democratic systems. Utilitarian advocacy for a blend o f  procedural and 
(almost) normative requirements for a reformed parliamentary system led to the 
institutionalization o f elections and universal franchise a century and a half later. The 
discourse on the necessity o f universal franchise, however, consumed much o f  the nineteen 
century. It was led by advocates o f  utilitarian principles as well as advocates o f  natural 
rights for all, and eventually led to the introduction of universal franchise in the beginning 
o f the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, the century-long battle for universal suffrage rights seems 
to be one of the many historical accomplishments that tend to be taken for granted. It is 
instructive to pause and reflect on its beginnings for a moment. The fact that early 
utilitarians battled for procedural mechanisms such as frequent elections and universal 
franchise to ensure profits and benefits for all rather than equal rights for all is somewhat 
ironic, since their battle put the very issue o f equal rights under discussion. As James Mill 
reassured his contemporaries that, if given the vote, the poor and the ignorant would go to 
the enlightened, “most virtuous” part o f  the community for advice, he also raised red flags 
regarding the general understanding o f  participation, responsibility, and governance.
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...the opinions o f  that class o f the people who are below the middle rank are 
formed, and their minds are directed by that intelligent, that virtuous rank who 
come the most immediately in contact with them, ...to whom they fly for advice 
and assistance ... to whom their children look up as models for their imitation ... 
There can be no doubt that the middle rank ... is that portion o f  the community of 
which, if the basis o f  representation were so far extended, the opinion would 
ultimately decide.50
It was Mill’s own son, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) who cast the debate over the 
role o f the government and o f  equal rights for all in a light that took the role o f a 
government towards its citizens to a new political dimension. Greatly influenced by the 
ideas that Alexis de Tocqueville brought from America on liberal franchise, Mill advocated 
the extension o f the franchise on the grounds o f  its contribution to the vitality o f  the 
people. Mill believed that a political system which would engage citizens in political 
activity would yield a high degree o f  common good and therefore, is was highly desirable. 
A government, he said, was “an agency o f national education”, and should be judged by 
“its actions upon men ... by what it makes o f the citizens, and what it does to them; its 
tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves.”51 This was hardly a utilitarian 
position which took the controversy over rights and privileges to a different, higher level 
o f political discourse. In the twentieth century, these terms of discourse were dubbed 
“normative.”
Universal suffrage was introduced in Britain only in 1918, after several Reform 
Acts that gradually extended the suffrage but fell short o f including the working class. In 
France, the Revolution o f  1848 brought about the change that the British were still slow in 
adopting. The French introduced manhood suffrage and direct national elections, and this 
system has not been challenged since. In the United States, property qualifications were 
maintained until the mid-1830s, and by the end o f the Civil War they disappeared.
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A challenge to the system o f representation as defined so far came from Marxist 
theory. For Karl Marx and his followers, the “end” o f humanity had a teleological 
character, with the proletariat winning over the capitalist forces of the bourgeoisie and 
effecting the necessary transformation o f the economic basis o f  society. In a capitalist 
society, the function o f the government was to preserve the capitalist system rather than to 
disperse resources equitably. Representation was, therefore, understood to be a 
procedural tool in the hands o f the working class who would bring about a revolution that 
would set everybody free. For Marxists, representative democracy was a sham defined 
and designed to further enslave masses in the name o f some liberal ideal.
Even if at the end of the twentieth century there are few political arrangements in 
the world that openly support an orthodox Marxist view, the reality is that at its time, 
Marxism was a very powerful ideological tool which developed momentum in the hands o f 
a few Russian and East European leaders. History proved that Marxism is not a functional 
political arrangement. However, its appeal was enormous, and its consequences will be 
with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for a long time.
Puzzling as this may sound on the eve o f a new millennium, several early thinkers 
of representative government treated representation in reductionist terms comparable to 
the Hobbesian view. The concept that a representative is someone merely entrusted to 
act, with no further stipulations o f responsibilities or duties towards those who entrusted 
him with that authority, was shared as late in the conceptual journey as the mid-twentieth 
century. Representation was said to occur whenever “one person is authorized to act in 
place of others ... with binding authority in the name o f  others;”52 “...representatives- 
whatever the manner o f their investiture- are authorized in advance to act conjointly in
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behalf o f their constituents and bind them by their collective decisions;”53 and
representative government can be defined as “a form o f government whereby the governed
can be said to be responsible for their governors’ actions.”54 These views were, however,
quietly abandoned by a majority o f political thinkers.
By 1920, America built an image o f its political system as normatively “superior”
to European arrangements. The main elements o f that image were the responsible voter,
the accountable representative, and the constant flow o f constructive communication
between government and the public. That vision was eventually challenged not by an
European, but by an American. Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion (1922), and his later
The Phantom Public called into question assumptions about the citizen’s knowledge of,
interest, and participation in the political process. It also called into question the feasibility
o f having informed citizens and therefore responsible participants in the political process in
a world of mediated information.
The world that we have to deal with politically is out o f  reach, out o f  sight, out o f  
mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined. Man is no Aristotelian god 
contemplating all existence at one glance. He is the creature o f an evolution who 
can just about span a sufficient portion o f reality to manage his survival, and snatch 
what on the scale o f  time are but a few moments o f  insight and 
happiness...[Representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics, 
or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis o f election, 
unless there is an independent, expert organization for making unseen facts 
intelligible to those who have to make the decisions... [PJublic opinions must be 
organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case 
today.”55
The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back 
row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot quite 
manage to keep awake.-.public affairs are in no convincing way his affairs. They 
are for the most part invisible. They are managed, if they are managed at all, at 
distant centers, from behind the scenes, by unnamed powers... In the cold light o f  
experience he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction. He reigns in theory, but in 
fact he does not govern... The actual governing is made up o f a multitude of
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arrangements on specific questions by particular individuals. Government, in the 
long intervals between elections, is carried out by politicians, officeholders and 
influential men who make settlements with other politicians, officeholders and 
influential men.56
Lippmann-like calls to an awareness o f  the difference between the real life 
'democratic process’ and the theory o f  democracy gave rise to intensive studies o f  public 
opinion and its relationship to government action. Those studies did not salvage the 
democratic vision either. At their best, they uncovered the immense conceptual and 
methodological problems o f studying public opinion formation, development, or relevance 
to politics. At their worst, they further weakened the vision of people mandating 
representatives to serve their interests in the government. It will be the task o f  the 
following chapter to look more closely into these difficulties.
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY’S JOURNEY: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS
This brief historical account o f  the evolution o f democratic ideas and o f
representation allows for a  number o f  preliminary observations regarding key elements o f
governance. The debate over the relationship between governments and their
constituencies, and further down the road over political representation, is evidently one of
the oldest in political thinking. From ancient to medieval times, theoretical distinctions
were made between the “divine right” o f kings to rule over their subjects versus the
“delegated right” to rule.
Quality and fairness o f political decisions, and equal chances o f popular
participation in the process o f government, were desiderata before the beginning o f  the
millennium. The prolonged period o f  unaccountable governments during the Middle Ages
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led to a rise in popular consciousness about rights to have a voice heard in the process o f 
government. In the eighteenth century, the debate of “natural law” versus “the state of 
nature” consumed much o f  the political discourse, with the result that many political 
arrangements were conceived in the name o f the general good, but with little leadership 
accountability to the people. In the nineteen century, theorists struggled with the 
“procedural” versus “substantive” conceptualizations o f democratic government, and in 
the early twentieth century, “American” versus “European” models of democracy were 
further differentiated. Most recently, the debate pitches the concepts o f “representative 
government” and “representative democracy” against each other, with arguments about 
their distinctiveness and applicability.57
Historical debates take a lengthy, sometimes encyclopedic approach to the 
development o f the concept o f representation since its inception. Conceptual arguments 
use tools and sources from a variety o f disciplines to come up with the right and 
incontrovertible definition. Methodological approaches attempt to measure the empirical 
validity and applicability o f  existent theories. The nature o f the controversies varies but a 
common thread runs through them all: defining democracy’s core issue o f political 
representation in a way that is accepted by the widest majority.
Rather than make conceptual arguments about “true” meanings, this study takes 
the view that representative democracy has traveled a long enough journey to be 
considered a valid and attractive system o f government. Because o f its attractive features, 
representative democracy has become a model (not to be understood in a positivist sense) 
o f governance to follow, and is a system towards which emerging polities aspire. As such,
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defining characteristics o f representative democracy should be part o f  analyses o f 
emerging democracies.
Current studies o f the direction and progress towards democracy in Eastern 
Europe address typical representative democracy elements o f fairness o f elections, civil 
freedoms, and popular participation in the process o f  government. Elements o f 
government responsiveness to public views, however, have not been addressed 
systematically. It will be the task o f  the next chapters to design an approach to 
government responsiveness that sheds light on progress towards accountability and 
responsiveness in the region.
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CHAPTER III
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
IN TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACIES AND IN EASTERN EUROPE
Before we design the terms of a government responsiveness analysis for Eastern 
Europe, we need to highlight methodological aspects o f  measuring representation in 
traditional democracies, in order to decide what type o f methodological approach would 
be appropriate for the region.
In the study o f traditional democracies, who is the ‘public’ with ‘opinions’ that the 
government must ‘take into account’? How does the ‘public’ express ‘opinions’ in a 
manner that allows the government to incorporate such opinions into ‘policy’? And what 
institutions or tools are available with which to measure the intensity or value o f the 
relationship between public opinion and government policy?
OPINIONS, PUBLICS AND POLICIES: THE CONCEPTUAL DILEMMA
There is conceptual uncertainty and usage inconsistency regarding ‘public’ and the 
‘opinion’ held by such a collection, and the ‘policy’ that it influences. Until the mid-fifties, 
it was popular to talk about the ‘public’ as a collection o f people who shared a common 
interest and interacted based on that common interest.1 While frequently used, such 
definitions told researchers little about common interest formation, the dynamics of 
interest change, the mechanics o f interaction, or the relation o f the public to political 
decisions. Differentiations were made between ‘special publics' and ‘general publics’2, 
and between ‘mass public’ and the ‘attentive public.’3 The concept of opinion underwent 
similar tribulations, especially when it was tied to the concept o f ‘public.’4 With the
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advent o f technology and the dissemination o f  information through television, research of 
opinion formation relative to mass media flourished,5 with the resulting general impression 
that the media had become a tool o f disinformation and propaganda.6
An equally ambivalent conceptualization and usage o f the relationship between 
'policy’ and ‘opinion’ prevailed, with a tendency to analyze policy change primarily as 
legislative action.7 Other indicators o f policy were government intention and purpose, 
actual behavior o f public representatives, and policy outcomes.8 Policy-making was 
occasionally seen as the product o f psychological factors, such as politicians’ perceptions 
about constituency preferences;9 while studies in Europe found that M.P.s were critical 
and skeptical o f voter interest or knowledge o f  political issues, which diminished their 
willingness to heed to publicly expressed preferences for policies.10
These differentiations were useful exercises at their time, but they were o f  limited 
help in finding out more about who the public was, which opinions were relevant, how 
opinions were formed and which opinions mattered politically. As Bernard Berelson 
ironically summarized the situation, “some kinds o f communication on some kinds o f 
issues, brought to the attention o f some kinds o f people under some kinds o f  conditions, 
have some kinds o f effects.”11
THE CONGRUENCE MODEL 
In the mid-sixties, a pair o f American political scientists made an important break­
through in the methodology employed to study the opinion/policy relationship. The 
Miller-Stokes “congruence diamond,” as it later came to be known, analyzed the 
relationship between constituency preferences and the final roll-call vote o f  their
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representatives on given issues using the correlation coefficient. This model gave a new 
impetus to the study o f  the opinion-policy relationship and became the focus o f much 
scholarly dispute.12
The basic model o f  the Miller/Stokes “diamond” focuses on the degree to which 
constituents’ views are represented in the legislature by their elected Congressmen. The 
model explains the dependent variable, the Congressmen’s legislative vote via three 
independent variables, “district sentiment” on a selected policy issue, the “politicians’ 
opinions” on the issue, and the “politicians’ perceptions o f district sentiment” on the issue 
at a given point in time. Between and among these variables, sets o f relationships were 
hypothesized and path-correlation coefficients were calculated. These four distinct 
variables were related to one another according to Figure 1 on the next page.
Miller and Stokes found that the relationship between popular preferences on three 
selected policies (social welfare, civil rights, and foreign policy) and the manner in which 
elected representatives gave their vote in the House o f Representatives on those policies 
(the AD axis) was strong in the case o f elected representatives from the state of Michigan. 
They concluded that causal links existed between constituents’ preferences for the selected 
policies and the manner in which elected representatives represented those opinions in the 
United States Congress.
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Figure 1. The Miller -Stokes “Diamond”
Based on Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (1963), p. 50.
Critiques o f the congruence model followed, with initial emphasis on the 
conceptual difficulties posed by indicators of public opinion and policy. Robert Weissberg 
cautioned that too much emphasis on causality based on a model that used at best relative 
measures o f public opinion preferences and approximations o f government policy 
outcomes was a dangerous road to travel. He argued that the many complications posed 
by concepts and the indicators selected to measure them should be a stimulus to maintain a 
degree of modesty about causality in analysis o f policy-opinion congruence. He argued 
that an analysis o f trends or direction of opinion and policy observed over a period of time 
was a much healthier and realistic analytical approach.13
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One o f Weissberg’s contributions to the question o f congruence was his 
description of the ‘time lag’ between publicly expressed preferences and the leaders’ 
reaction in the form o f  policy. He argued that congruence should not be regarded as a 
static phenomenon, measured at one time. In his view, publics express preferences for 
policies during polls, elections, or referenda, at a given point in time (T l). Thereafter, the 
representatives need time to analyze preferences and decide what they are (or are not) 
going to do about them, say at T2. Finally, between raising the issue in the legislative 
assembly at T3, debating substance and consequences o f policies at T4, and rallying 
enough votes to pass policies that voters prefer at T5, time elapses and congruence (or 
not) with the voters expressed preferences may be observed only at T6. Merely knowing 
public preferences and policy at Tl is not enough for a serious analysis o f how congruence 
occurs.14
Further questions about methodology and the use of the correlation coefficient in 
the congruence diamond were raised. Cristopher Achen argued that the correlation 
coefficient was virtually uninterpretable within the framework o f  democratic theory and 
that its use could generate misleading conclusions. He argued that if the model o f analysis 
did not incorporate a measure of the diversity o f the sampled constituencies, the results 
did not mean anything valuable for the study o f representation. He demonstrated that 
when constituencies are diverse, large correlations resulted. These large correlations were 
interpreted to indicate strong relationships between voter preferences and representative 
action. These large correlations resulted even when voters were not necessarily sensitive 
to a particular issue advocated by the representative, but merely reflected the wide 
diversity o f preferences among the selected group.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
Conversely, when constituencies were relatively homogenous, correlations could 
be small even when representatives favored and voted for issues o f interest to their 
constituents. Consequently, he recommended that the use o f the correlation coefficient 
be abandoned in studies o f representation.15
Converse and Pierce welcomed the diamond model and developed it further, 
sensitive to previous critiques. The major contribution of the French analysts was to 
design a model of representation analysis that incorporated the measurement o f  variance 
between and within district constituencies on given issues. Their acknowledgment that 
“constituency will and constituency interest can sometimes be discrepant [which] presents 
a complication” to any methodological model led them to the use o f a new statistical 
measure to solve the between-within variance: the “eta” statistic.16
The methodological fix that Converse and Pierce elaborated had a strong 
theoretical underpinning. For the “who is to be represented?” question, they advocated 
the use o f the “Anglo-Saxon” system o f  representation, which equated popular 
representation with geographic districts, in opposition to advocates o f “issue 
representation” who preferred a representation system designed around interest 
constituencies. They argued that territorial constituencies eliminate the problem o f 
constituency identification, and made “issue identification” (the “what is to be 
represented” question) more prone to analysis.
They found that even in districts where there was a large degree o f  constituency 
homogeneity on policy questions that directly affected the district (for example, farming 
legislation in an agricultural district), homogeneity dissipated in regards o f  remaining areas 
o f policy dispute, which typically were more numerous than the dominant interest-driven
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policy issue. While one district could display a significant level o f homogeneity on one or 
two issues o f direct interest to the constituency--in which case the message to the 
representative is loud and clear—the district could display significant disagreement on 
issues o f more general or more polarized concerns, such as women’s rights, abortion 
rights, unemployment, etc.17 Their model allowed for randomly distributed political 
differences across the electorate, the so-called within-and-between district variance.
At the policy-making end, their model also accounted for the apparent “paradox” 
o f representation, where constituency interest and representative action may range from 
non-existent to perfect. They argued that between the two poles o f  the congruence model 
there were dynamic intervening processes, the “black box” o f  intervening variables that 
may turn the link into a very weak or very strong one. However, even in the absence of 
an apparent link representation may occur. This paradoxical situation had to do with the 
fact that people selected to run for office were designated by their parties on account of 
the views they held. Those views did conform with some constituency views, even if not 
necessarily their own district constituency. The so-called “representative malgre lui” is in 
effect representing constituency views, and the between-district variance was going to 
account for that type o f representation.
In a detailed critique o f the Converse-Pierce model and theoretical assumptions, 
Heinz Eulau further suggested that a new congruence model should be applied to the 
study representative democracy. He argued that designs o f  congruence models based on 
the theoretical assumption that constituencies send signals to their representatives all the 
time, on all issues were far-fetched and unrealistic. One o f the theoretical foundations o f 
representative democracy is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, to make democratic
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governance possible in large-scale polities, where ordinary citizens cannot participate 
directly due to time and size constraints; hence, the need to entrust representatives with 
the job o f everyday policy-making. “All one can require o f a representative democracy is 
that elites do respond on those (few) occasions when the citizenry or parts o f it are in fact 
aroused by the prior unresponsiveness o f the elites.”18
To this day, disagreement over the appropriate concepts, indicators, and measures 
to look at the relationship between constituencies and their elected representatives 
persists. The diamond model continues to be used by some analysts, with refinements to 
allow for constituency heterogeneity, time lags, and two-way shifts in opinion and policy. 
There is, however, little indication that any one model is close to being accepted by a 
majority o f analysts. Critiques, however, shed light on the dynamic character o f the 
process o f  representation and enhance an understanding o f just how difficult it is to 
capture the essence o f what is happening between publicly expressed support for policies 
and the actual policy-making through elected representatives.
The analyses o f congruence reviewed above yield three main ways o f looking at 
the relationship between opinion and policy. These three ways were conceptualized as 
“models o f representation” as follows:
1) A run-from-below representation model argues that there is a definite 
relationship between public preferences and policy actions taken by the 
government. This view conforms to definitions of political representation which 
emphasize governmental responsiveness.19 A radical run-from-below model holds 
that elected representatives are responsive to voters' demands and that citizens' 
groups are a source o f policy initiative. In the United States, several empirical
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studies have found support for the proposition that public opinion works as an 
exogenous force on policy-making.20 This suggests that, for the American 
democracy, a run-from-below matrix o f  analysis is an appropriate analytical tool to 
study representation.
2) A Responsive Party Model holds that there is a clear relationship between what 
politicians say they will do and what policies actually result. Political parties "are 
the major actors in the system that connects citizenry and the governmental 
process...they are the major actors in representative democratic systems."21 This 
model o f representation o f  public opinion preferences is upheld primarily by West 
European democracies, based on their strong party representativeness tradition. In 
a study based on data from ten Western countries over 40 years, it was found that 
parties compete for voter support on the basis o f programs they present to the 
electorate during the campaign. The winner (one party or a coalition) takes the 
majority of seats in parliament and forms a government. During the government's 
term in office, the program presented to the voters is carried out. At the following 
election, voters get to hold the governing coalition accountable for what has been 
accomplished and what has not.22 This finding suggests that for the West 
European democracies, a responsive party matrix is a more appropriate analytical 
tool in an analysis o f representation than the run-from-below matrix.
3) The Elitist run-from-above model o f  representation holds that public opinion is 
constantly manipulated by elite groups.23 A less radical elitist model argues that 
voters can hold the government accountable only after the fact; the government 
cannot and does not have any meaningful mandate from the voters.24 A third
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run-from-above model stresses that interests rule over elected politics. Votes 
count, but it is resources that will eventually decide.25 A fourth elitist model 
argues that elites set the policy framework to which citizens react.26 
The three types of models are graphically captured below. Figure 2 describes the 
responsive government matrix, with policy following roughly the same direction as 
opinion.
Opinion-Policy Distance




Figure 2. The Responsive Government Matrix
Figure 3 describes the responsive party matrix, with policy-makers setting the tone 
and public opinion following. Policy here can be made by individuals, parties, or larger 
bodies such as legislatures or executive branches, depending on the selected variables.















Figure 4. The Burkean Matrix
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Finally, Figure 4 describes the Burkean, elitist model of decision-making, with 
politicians pursuing policies according to their own vision, without taking into account 
public opinion.
EASTERN EUROPE: TERMS OF ANALYSIS
Responsiveness analyses o f Western governments tend to focus on what specific 
cases fall under which causality models, as the previous discussion highlighted. The 
analysis o f East European governments’ responsiveness to their constituencies ideally 
would do the same.
However, Eastern Europe is neither ripe, nor consolidated politically and 
economically enough to permit an analysis o f representation as sophisticated as Western 
statistical models. As noted on numerous occasions, the unqualified application of 
analytical tools to the study o f the region may lead to distorted conclusions about the 
nature and direction o f democratization, with serious domestic and international policy 
implications. This study takes the view that representation in Eastern Europe needs to be 
addressed in terms o f direction at this stage o f  development of the region.
Did East European publics support the creation o f a market economy after the 
collapse o f the communist regimes? Did East European governments pursue economic 
policies designed to bring about the popularly endorsed system? Was the outcome o f 
policies conducive to a system that continued to enjoy popular support? Given the 
dynamics of popular support for a market economy, how can government action be 
interpreted from the standpoint o f representation?
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In order to observe whether East European societies are moving in the direction o f 
a representative democracy, with responsive and accountable leaders, we need to observe 
public opinion trends on given policies and trends o f policy outcomes. Government 
responsiveness can be inferred if policy and opinion tend to move in the same direction, 
over a period o f  time. If some or all the countries in Eastern Europe are in the process o f 
building representative democracies, we would observe a tendency like the one described 
in Figure 2. If governments, or strong leaders, or strong parties define the direction o f 
policy and publics follow, then we would observe a trend falling roughly under the model 
in Figure 3. Finally, if remnants o f the past are still strong, and governments continue to 
set the tone o f policy with disregard for public opinion trends, the observed tendencies 
would look like the model described in Figure 4.
The interpretation o f political developments and trends in Eastern Europe based on 
any o f the models presented above needs to be extremely cautious, on account o f basic 
assumptions about political maturity and data reliability. As early as 1993, Jane Curry 
remarked that Western notions o f  democracy, controversial though they may be, do not 
overlap with East European views o f the term.27 In 1995, Grzegorz Eckiert called for the 
identification o f new theoretical and analytical tools for the study o f the region, on account 
of its complex and unprecedented circumstances o f transition. And in 1998, Rose and 
Haerpfer cautioned again against the use of “destination models” that analyze the region 
based on idealized goals o f democracy. It was argued that the region is developing 
“incomplete” democracies, and that the critical element o f any analysis of transition should 
be the direction in which these democracies are moving, rather than whether they fit 
Western models.28
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The above reservations were not made by picky Western analysts. Observed 
developments point towards conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the countries in the 
region have attained a degree o f  maturity in their long-term vision for development 
consisting of integration within structures o f  Western democracies. On the other hand, the 
experience of the past decade indicates that there is contusion about the means and 
mechanics of reaching a stage o f  development compatible with European Union or (for 
those countries who were not included in the first round) with NATO membership.
The same duality exists regarding reliability o f public opinion data. While many 
polls have been commissioned in the region on a variety of topics ranging from 
democratization to human rights, it is not always clear what the polls are gauging. A 
question on approval o f  the state o f democratization o f one’s country may be thought to 
gauge public sentiment towards the democratization process. In reality, depending on 
respondents’ views o f what democratization means, it could gauge economic performance, 
freedom, or satisfaction with politics. Studies point out that questions regarding economic 
performance sometimes gauge job insecurity,29 and sometimes satisfaction with the overall 
situation in the country.30
It appears that none o f  the populations under analysis would prefer to have a 
communist regime back in power. It also appears that they want to enjoy better living 
standards, more like their Western neighbors, but they are not sure how to bring those 
standards about. None o f these criteria, however, can help evaluate where the countries 
are economically and politically, nor whether they are “democracies” or close to being a 
democratic regime. This is why considerable disagreement persists among analysts
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studying developments in the region regarding the appropriate analytical tools to be
employed.
Concepts and Definitions 
An important caveat in cross-national comparative analyses is conceptual.
Bringing concepts to a common denominator that is acceptable and recognizable across 
cultures is a notoriously contested task. If the definition of public opinion needs some 
leveling work, the concept o f “government policy outcome” poses far more problems.
With respect to the concept o f ‘public opinion’, the differentiations found in the 
literature are o f limited use. The dichotomies between ‘special’ and ‘general,’ or 
‘attentive’ and ‘general’ publics would be methodologically useful if consistent studies 
showed that only certain categories o f publics vote. The outcome o f  elections, the issues 
of importance, and the approximate pool o f representatives favored by constituencies 
would then be more easily identified by polling a sample o f the category o f publics who 
voted. However, even if substantial research has been done in the area o f voting behavior, 
there are no acceptable results o f the kind suggested above. If  politicians knew who their 
targets were, they would win elections by addressing those audiences only. That, 
however, is not the case.
Some public opinion studies generalize public preferences across subgroups of an 
entire population by employing representative samples of selected populations (the 
equivalent o f a ‘special publics’ category). That approach would not be o f much help in 
finding out who would win general elections, what issues are likely to win popular 
attention, or which policies are o f  interest to whom. Political campaigns are run on broad




political agendas precisely in order to reach as large of a voter population as possible 
because there is no guarantee o f voter turnout. This is why in the late twentieth century, 
politicians tend to pay attention to public preferences expressed through public opinion 
polls sampling the general population, which comprises the country electorate.
One good example o f  the fact that special publics, and therefore special interests 
do not win general elections is the case o f Hungary’s 1994 general elections, where the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) ran on a specialized agenda o f concern for the 
Hungarian minority outside o f Hungary. The party lost the election despite pre-election 
polls showing significant popular support for the issues raised during the campaign.
Studies have shown that the insistence o f party leaders on a narrow issue made them 
unattractive to the general population, even if preliminary polls showed concern for the 
Hungarian minority living outside Hungarian borders.31
Romania’s Party of National Unity Greater Romania (PUNR) is another case in 
which special interests have not won general elections. PUNR’s political agenda is 
primarily concerned with defending the rights o f Romanians in a region o f  the country 
with a large Hungarian population. PUNR does win votes in general elections and gains 
representation in the country’s Parliament, but they never made a government, nor are 
they welcome in governing coalitions. The narrow interests that their party represents 
gives them less legitimacy to speak for the entire electorate.
A preliminary conclusion is that if V.O. Key is right, and “public opinion is the 
opinion that governments find it prudent to heed” then we should consider the views 
expressed by the constituency o f a country through representative sampling o f  the general 
population as the politically relevant opinion. Many polls have been taken, covering many
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topics. Some of them, like CBS or radio talk shows polls, are not “representative,” which 
makes the findings good for general consumption, but not necessarily relevant to those 
representatives who run for reelection, or who are trying to get into office.
The opinion polls used in this study were commissioned by the European Union 
and collected by institutes for public research from the region.32 The polls sampled the 
general population, and asked roughly the same questions regarding the desirability o f the 
introduction o f a market economic system in each country. The opinion polls are followed 
between 1990 and 1997 to assess the direction of public support regarding the selected 
policy issue.
With respect to the concept o f government policy outcome, each element needs to 
be treated separately. Constitutionally, “government” in Eastern Europe is understood to 
be the executive branch. However, with the exception o f the President, who is elected by 
universal suffrage in all the countries under discussion except for Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic, none o f the public servants in the executive branch are. Arguably, that would 
not make them directly representative and responsible to public opinion.
Executive servants are, however, designated to serve the public by, and sometimes 
from, the ranks o f elected representatives. In Hungary, the elected National Assembly, 
which “derives its rights from popular sovereignty,” elects the President, the Prime 
Minister, and other senior public servants. The Prime Minister in turn designates the 
cabinet which is afterwards approved by the elected legislators. In the Slovak Republic, 
the National Council, whose members “shall be the representatives o f the citizens,” elects 
the President, who in turn designates the Prime Minister. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and Poland, the President, elected by universal suffrage, designates the Prime
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Minister, who in turn forms a cabinet that will start functioning only after the endorsement 
of each Minister by the elected body o f legislators.33
In the discussion o f responsiveness o f  representatives, how is, then, “government” 
to be operationalized? As the legislative branch, which is directly elected by voters to 
represent their interests, as the executive branch, which is indirectly designated to serve 
the public by its elected representatives, or as both?
The answer is offered by the Constitutions o f these countries. Bills, laws, or 
policies are submitted to the Parliament for approval both at the initiative o f the executive 
and o f the legislative branches. The exception remains Hungary, where the National 
Assembly drafts not only legislation, but also the program o f government priorities. 
Arguably, assessing “government policy outcome” should then involve observing 
legislative and executive policy initiatives at Ministerial and legislative level.
“Government policy” is here defined as a complex conglomerate o f  legislative and 
executive decisions pursued on the basis o f recommendations made by the people’s 
representatives. “Policy outcome” is the resulting state o f the economy reflected in 
empirical indicators.
Selection o f Issue: Rationale 
Defining which policy issues are “important” to the constituency relative to the 
large number of issues that governments and representatives consider during their term in 
office is always a daunting task. Pierce and Converse find that even if one could design a 
list o f issues ranked by importance to a particular constituency, identifying which 
individual citizens are part o f  that constituency remains a fairly impossible task.34
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The selection o f the policy issue to be analyzed in conjunction with public opinion 
in Eastern Europe was driven by two factors.
First, the general feeling o f the electorate towards the issue had to be strong 
enough to be relevant to the analysis. As the available data shows, concern with the 
disastrous effects o f the command economy was accompanied by strong popular demands 
for the introduction o f the one economic system known to have created prosperous 
countries, the market economy. Although in none o f the countries in the region the word 
“capitalism” was spelled out as the goal of the new societies in transformation, “market 
economy” or “market o f  Western type” were the phrases used in reference to the desired 
economic system in each country. To use a less academic illustration, a popular joke in 
the Communist world read like this: “What is Communism?” “Communism is the longest 
and most painful route from capitalism to capitalism.”35
In Poland, the first post-communist minister o f finance and main architect of the 
Polish reform program, Leszek Balcerowicz, announced the government’s intention to 
“transform the Polish economy into a market economy, with the ownership structure 
changing in the direction o f  that found in the advanced industrial economies.”36 The 
program was widely supported by the population.
In Bulgaria, after 35 years o f ruling the country with old-line orthodox 
communism, Todor Zhivkov resigned, admitting in front o f  the Central Committee that the 
government had been unable to make a break-through in any sector o f their work. Mr. 
Mladenov, his replacement, warned the Communist Party that there was no alternative to 
restructuring Bulgaria’s ailing economy and tightly controlled political apparatus. He told 
the Central Committee that “We have to turn Bulgaria into a modern, democratic and
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lawful country,” just as popular demonstrations were starting to take place in Sophia 
demanding change.37
In Romania, the first post-revolutionary manifesto issued by the Front o f  National 
Salvation stipulated that Romania will seek the transformation o f its economy into a 
"‘market economy.”38 It was met with hails by large crowds gathered in the public squares 
o f Bucharest to witness the December 1989 Revolution.
Table 1 summarizes trends in public opinion support for the creation o f  a market 
economy between 1990 and 1997 in the six countries under study.39 Support in most 
countries was strongest in the beginning o f the transition period, with decline in support to 
be observed in mid to late nineties. Strong support at the outset o f the transition period 
was observed in countries where reforms were introduced at an early stage o f  the 
transition, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Weak support at the outset o f 
the transition period was observed in countries where reforms were slow, such as 
Romania and Bulgaria.
Table 1 .--Public opinion on the creation o f a free market economy____________________





 62 55 47 40 39 44 52
16 19 29 42 33 32 29





 61 55 51 47 42 42 28
20 32 36 36 36 41 50
19 13 13 17 22 17 22
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Table 1 .--Continued.
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Hungary
(right) 62 65 56 46 44 38 37 37
(wrong) 13 11 17 25 24 33 30 31
(don’t know) 26 24 27 29 32 29 33 32
Poland
(right) 61 56 56 53 49 62 60 62
(wrong) 14 21 23 24 23 16 24 19
(don’t know) 25 23 21 23 28 22 16 11
Romania
(right) 35 65 52 71 64 79 64
(wrong) 48 24 23 21 26 15 26
(don’t know) 17 11 25 8 10 6 8
Slovak Republic
(right) 51 40 42 39 40 35
(wrong) 36 44 42 39 42 45
(don’t know) 13 16 16 22 18 21
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 -7  (Brussels: Commission o f  the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. Between 1990 and 1997, the Eurobarometer question 
was "Do you personally feel that the creation o f a free market economy, that is one largely 
free from state control, is right or wrong for (country’s ) future? Except for 1990, the 
‘don't know’s were inferred from the data. It is possible that some fraction o f  this 
percentage represents missing data. Romania was not included in the 1990 survey. 
a 1990 and 1991 figures are for Czechoslovakia.
Even if expressed public and government support for the creation o f a market 
economy seemed to go together in the beginning o f the transition, it remains unclear if 
either publics or governments had a good understanding o f the complexity o f the system
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that they were supporting, or the associated costs needed to bring it about. Public opinion 
studies reveal that “market economy” was often times equated with “the better life o f the 
West” or abundance and consumption, and less often with competition, hard decisions 
about closing down unproductive plants and the associated layoffs, or business and 
managerial skills that needed to be acquired before abundance resulting from economic 
growth could occur.40
Eurobarometer analysts also noted that, although publics supported the creation o f 
a market economy, a third of the respondents did not express an opinion in 1990, at the 
outset o f the transformation period. This was interpreted as a signal that publics were 
poorly equipped to understand and participate in the upcoming transition, and that 
governments needed to provide more education about the principles o f a market economy 
and the implications o f transition in order to maintain popular support.41 Large 
percentages o f “don't knows” are maintained throughout the period in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Poland, which raises questions about the publics’ knowledge about the basics o f the 
system they were supporting, and their preparedness to accept the hardships o f the 
transition.
The state o f the economy was a widespread concern at the beginning o f the 
transition, and the popular demands for the renunciation o f the command economy were, 
as noted above, loud and clear. Observing public support for the introduction o f a market 
economy was an issue of interest to many constituencies, therefore worthy o f analysis.
The second reason for choosing the introduction o f a market economy for the 
analysis o f representation in the region had to do with the governments’ own motivation 
to introduce reform policies. All the governments o f Eastern Europe expressed their
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intention to be integrated within Euro-Atlantic structures such as the European Union and 
NATO. Demands on emerging democracies prescribe the presence o f a functioning 
market economy as a prerequisite for integration. East European governments had to be 
motivated to change their economic system and to become part o f the Euro-Atlantic 
structures that they aspired to. The penchant o f governments to introduce market 
economy policies, laws, and structures imposed itself as the appropriate topic o f analysis.
Additionally, observed indicators o f national growth per Figure 5 below indicate 
that governments have taken actions conducive to a general trend o f improvement o f the 
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Figure 5. Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product in Eastern Europe
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994- 1998).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
East European government efforts at reforming their countries’ economies are 
reflected in the resulting growth of their national economies. Figure 5 summarizes the 
change o f GDP growth across eight years o f transition in the six countries under analysis. 
Figure 5 shows that in some countries which started their reform programs immediately 
after the collapse o f the communist regime, like Poland and Hungary, growth resumed 
relatively fast and stayed positive. Other countries which started their reform policies 
early witnessed a period o f growth, then o f negative growth, only to end the period in 
economic recession, as in the case of the Czech Republic. Finally, Figure 5 shows that 
countries which started their reform programs more slowly, such as Romania and 
Bulgaria, have witnessed fluctuating and inconsistent growth, with negative growth as the 
common element for most o f the transition period. It is indeed fair to say that it is not 
clear at all if these two countries have started transitioning to a market economy, nor 
when they would see a more predictable pattern o f growth.
Analysis
For each country, the direction o f trends in public opinion are analyzed in relation 
to the direction o f trends o f  macro-economic indicators. Trends in public opinion are also 
analyzed in relation to the direction o f European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development indicators o f transition, to observe government progress in the introduction 
of policies conducive to the establishment o f  a market economy.
Finally, since public support in some cases declines as economies grow and seem 
to do well, opinion trends are analyzed in conjunction with additional data such as 
economic security, support for democracy, and election outcomes. We are looking for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
possible explanations for the decline o f  public support that could be attributable to causes 
other than government performance on the question o f a market economy.
Public opinion polls addressing the introduction o f a market economy, GDP 
growth, and unemployment are charted in line diagrams as measures o f policy outcomes. 
The diagrams are then analyzed for direction and distance between opinion support and 
policy trends. Within each country and across the region comparisons are thereafter 
offered.
A section on election results completes the analysis. The intent is to observe 
whether publics punish governments by voting them out o f office, or if they reward them 
by supporting re-elections. Due to the limitations o f the data and o f  the terms o f  analysis, 
a direct link cannot be drawn between the selected policy and the overall response o f the 
electorate. However, if governments tend to be responsive to their publics, we would 
expect to see some political arrangements confirmed in office. If, for instance, public 
support for a market economy is matched by a strong economic performance, we would 
expect to see the government who delivered on the state o f the economy to be re-elected. 
If support for the introduction o f  a market economy is accompanied by poor economic 
performance, we would expect incumbent governments to be voted out o f office. 
Additionally, a discussion o f political circumstances for each case is offered.
The reality is that a sound market economic system needs time to grow and 
develop into a solid, popularly accepted structure. In Eastern Europe, competence in 
designing such a structure is still questionable. Most o f the countries in the region have a 
legacy of forty-five years on average under a totalitarian economy. The good intentions of
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any elected government to design and implement a market economic system cannot and 
should not be expected to yield happy consumers in the first years.
Hypotheses
In the beginning o f this chapter, three possible models o f responsive government 
behavior to popular support for a particular policy were hypothesized based on a rich 
literature. They are the responsive model, where the policy line adjusts in response to 
popular calls for a change o f policy; the elitist model, where the government drives public 
support for a policy; and the non-responsive model, where the government pursues 
policies irrespective of public support.
As noted in the above preliminary observations, the dynamics o f  public support 
and o f government action on policy are somewhat more complex than three possible 
models in Eastern Europe. Governments can act on policies without successfully 
delivering the expected results, with resulting decline in public support for reform; does it 
follow that governments were unresponsive? Governments can pursue policies that end 
up being unpopular due to insufficient institutional skills, or other factors related to lack o f 
preparedness for a market economic system: does that mean that governments did not 
originally take their cues from the public? If  governments take their lead from the public 
and attempt to reform the economy but the task proves too daunting and complex to 
produce the desired results o f  growth and well-being, should that count against their 
responsiveness to constituencies? Finally, publics may think they support policies without 
having a clear image of the possible implications o f those policies; does it mean that 
policies should not be pursued unless the public shows signs of maturity and knowledge
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on the subject matter? None o f these questions would be answered in the affirmative even 
in an advanced market economy. A note o f  caution in the interpretation o f  events in 
Eastern Europe should therefore be in place at the outset o f any analysis o f  government 
responsiveness.
A minimum of four hypotheses can be formulated to explain the dynamics of public 
support and government responsiveness in the region.
First, in accordance with the responsive model, publics support a market economy 
and governments heed to that public voice. Governments take action and formulate 
reform programs intended to introduce a market economy. Public opinion polls and 
EBRD transition indicators should be high, indicating strong support for policy and high 
levels o f government action to implement policies o f economic reform. If  the outcome of 
policies is resumption o f economic growth, we can infer that policies were designed to 
enhance the collective well-being o f the nation. Increased GPD, good levels o f foreign 
investment, and associated low levels o f  unemployment and o f inflation are good 
indicators o f a growing economy; increased GDP per capita and growth o f  nominal wages 
should indicate an increase in individual well-being.
Since growth and collective/individual well-being result from these programs, 
publics continue to support them in order to maintain the levels o f growth. Opinion polls 
should indicate continued support for a market economy, even if fluctuations may be 
noted, to allow for the impact o f transition hardships on the public mood.
If all o f the above follow largely the direction hypothesized, we can infer that 
Eastern Europe is moving away from a tradition o f government ego-centrism into a 
direction o f  government responsiveness and possibly accountability to their constituencies.
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Even if programs o f reform are not always selected in the right order, o f sufficient depth 
or intensity, or implemented at the right speed,42 if the outcome o f years of transition is 
resumption and maintenance o f  growth, then East European governments must be talcing 
the introduction o f a new economic model seriously. That outcome in itself should count 
as a government commitment to represent the aspirations o f  millions o f voters in the 
region.
If recorded indicators confirm this line of reasoning, publics should confirm 
governments in office during elections, to reward them for responsiveness. An analysis o f 
electorate vote o f confidence will conclude the analysis.
Second, if the elitist model is more prevalent in Eastern Europe, we should observe 
that governments pursue policies irrespective o f public support. In this case, we should 
observe strong public support for a market economy and weak transition indicators. If  
that were the case, we can assess that publics expressed their choice towards the economic 
system, but governments chose to follow their own judgement. This type of behavior 
would be highly reminiscent o f old leadership patterns, and a note o f caution should be 
made about the direction o f the country in which such governing tendencies prevail.
For the elitist case, publics would vote governments out, to reward them for not 
heeding to their voices.
A third possibility allows for a dynamic model o f representation, where public 
support and government responsiveness move together in the same direction and 
eventually result in diminished support for policies. This hypothesis is somewhat counter­
intuitive, but not to be ruled out o f the existing possibilities.
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If this hypothesis is correct in the East European case, we should observe support 
for a market economy m aintained  at high levels together with high indicators o f  transition 
until the economy starts to grow. As soon as growth is resumed, per macro-economic 
indicators, publics could turn their attention towards other policies that need sustained 
attention. Public support level can diminish since constituencies do not see the economy 
as the main concern of the transformation o f their countries.43
If the above is true, we should expect public support to diminish as economic 
growth resumes, and we may see policy-makers voted in or out o f office, depending on 
public perception of the next priority elements o f transformation. A look at additional 
opinion polls will be necessary, to see in which direction the public moves in terms o f 
priority policies, and how the govemants who lost elections dealt with those issues.
Finally, it is possible that economic growth and satisfaction with personal well­
being may not weigh as much in people’s opinions as Western models hypothesize. In that 
case, corruption scandals, dissatisfaction with politicians and public morals, 
disillusionment with the works o f democracy, or other issues may weigh more for East 
European constituencies than is usually believed. It is possible to observe increased levels 
of growth associated with a decrease in popularity for a market economy despite evidence 
of individual growth of well-being.
Indicators
For the question on the introduction of a market economy, policy outcomes 
translate into indicators o f a healthy economy, including growth o f Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), low unemployment, good proportion of private sector share o f  GDP, and
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reform o f enterprises, markets, and financial institutions. These indicators are available 
from the annual transition report o f the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
Assessments of the success o f  the economic transition from a state-run economy to 
a market economy have been made during the past ten years by various commissioned 
studies and policy papers.44 These studies have used a combination o f  growth, 
privatization, unemployment, inflation, and trade patterns indicators, to evaluate where 
each country was in the beginning o f  the transition, and in which direction they moved 
during the nineties. Overall, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak 
Republic are considered the most advanced towards a market economy, with some studies 
considering them “consolidated markets”. Bulgaria and Romania are evaluated to have 
started the implementation of reforms more slowly, with Romania originally ahead o f 
Bulgaria in the early nineties, then lagging behind by the end of the period.
Within each category, opinions differ regarding degrees of advancement o f  a 
market economy within and between countries. Some analysts consider Poland more 
advanced than Hungary, for instance, or Bulgaria ahead o f Romania. These evaluating 
differences arise from the use o f  methodology to assess the introduction o f the market 
economic system. Unfortunately, measures and ratings are different enough to make their 
combined use irrelevant from a comparative perspective.
The decision to use the ratings o f  progress towards a market economy by the 
Transition Report o f the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the 
present chapter is justified by several considerations.
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First, the Transition Report is an annual publication that has employed the same 
measures and indicators for growth and change in the region since 1994.45 This gives the 
researcher the possibility o f comparing trends across a longer period o f  time, within 
country, and across a region.
Second, by comparison with similar studies, the Transition Report takes a more 
ample comparative look at three distinctive elements of a market economy: privatization, 
liberalization, and institutional change. It looks simultaneously at the rate and depth o f 
privatization (differentiating between large and small scale privatization, and restructuring 
degrees), at the degree and pattern o f liberalization of markets and trade (looking at price 
liberalization, trade and foreign exchange systems, and competition policy), and at 
financial institutions reform (with ratings in banking reform, securities markets, and non­
bank and other financial institutions). Third, the EBRD ratings are considered reliable by 
institutions such as the World Bank, who use them in their own evaluations o f future 
programs to be developed in specific countries.
A few preliminary clarifications regarding the terminology and methodology 
employed by the Transition Report are necessary. Numerical indicators ranging from 1 
(lowest) to 4 (highest) rank progress in a  particular category. The indicators are intended 
to represent cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally planned economy to 
market economy in the following four categories: private sector share o f  GDP, enterprise 
restructuring and privatization, markets and trade liberalization, and financial institutions 
reform. The indicators do not reflect the rate o f change in the course o f  each year.
For each category, the following clarifications are necessary. The “private sector 
share" of GDP represents EBRD estimates based on available statistics from official and
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unofficial sources. The underlying concept o f  private sector value added includes income 
generated by the activity o f private registered companies as well as by private entities 
engaged in informal activities wherever reliable information was available.46 The 
classification system for transition indicators build on the judgement o f the EBRD’s Office 
o f the Chief Economist.47
For the enterprise restructuring category, three indicators are calculated to reflect 
progress in large- and small-scale privatization, and in governance and enterprise 
restructuring. A score o f “1" indicates little private ownership or progress in 
restructuring. A score o f “2" indicates that comprehensive programs are designed and 
ready to be implemented, but that action is delayed on implementation. A score o f “3” 
indicates that 25 per cent o f large-scale enterprises are privatized, a comprehensive 
program for small-scale privatization is being implemented, and sustained actions to 
promote corporate governance effectively are being taken. A score o f “4" indicates that 
more than 50 per cent o f state-owned enterprises and farm assets are in private hands, 
privatization o f small companies is complete, and substantial improvement in corporate 
governance can be observed.
For the markets and trade liberalization category, three indicators are calculated to 
reflect progress in price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, and competition 
policy. A score o f “1" indicates that the state still formally controls prices, imports and 
exports, and that there is no competition legislation or institutions. A score o f “2" 
indicates that prices, imports and exports are somewhat relaxed but most o f the important 
categories are still state-regulated, and that competition policy institutions and legislation 
are set up. A score o f “3" indicates substantial progress in price liberalization, removal o f
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almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions are removed, and 
some enforcement actions to reduce abuse o f market power and to promote a competitive 
environment. A score o f “4" indicates comprehensive price liberalization, including utility 
pricing which approaches economic costs, removal o f all import and export restrictions 
(except agriculture) and tariffs, full current account convertibility, and significant 
enforcement actions to promote a competitive environment.
For the financial institutions category, two indicators are calculated to reflect 
progress in banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and in securities markets and 
non-bank financial institutions. A score o f “ 1" indicates little progress in either area. A 
score of “2" indicates significant liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation and 
the formation o f securities exchanges. A score of “3" indicates substantial progress in 
establishment o f bank solvency and o f  a framework o f supervision and regulation, and 
substantial issuance o f securities by private enterprises. A score o f “4" indicates 
significant movement o f banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards, and 
securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards.
In the following country-by-country analysis, all the transition indicators are listed 
in tables showing the rate o f  progress towards the establishment o f a market economy. 
Since the Transition Report was initiated only in 1994, there are no available indicators 
calculated according to this methodology for the first four years o f transition, a  period in 
which major economic changes were initiated. As a result, the line diagrams generated for 
these indicators are relatively uninteresting since they begin and end around the same 
value. Superimposing a public support curve with one transition indicator curve was 
therefore found to be o f limited use; similarly, superimposing eight curves o f transition
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
indicators with the public support curve proved to lack clarity and usefulness. Cumulating 
all eight rating indicators to create one indicator o f transition also proved to be an 
unrealistic option since it would oversimplify the available data.
Consequently, two indicators were selected to reflect policy outcome curves in the 
line diagrams: GDP per capita and unemployment rates. The GDP per capita curve is a 
good indicator o f the health o f  a country’s economy, which in turn is primarily a function 
o f sound economic policies. (The private share o f GDP curve was found to follow 
roughly the direction o f the eight transition rating indicators; consequently, by using it we 
could approximate the general direction o f  policies during the transition period.).
The use o f the unemployment rate indicator is justified by the vast literature which 
argues that a healthy and growing economy is not necessarily an economy without 
unemployment, but rather one in which unemployment is maintained low at a low level. 
The restructuring o f the communist economies was bound to bring about losses o f  jobs; it 
was also bound to create jobs if the privatization of that same sector was done 
simultaneously and efficiently. The use o f the unemployment indicator in conjunction with 
growth o f GDP per capita will prevent hasty conclusions about the health o f the economy 
or the direction o f the new economic system.
Several key lessons have been learned since the Transition Report was launched. 
First, just as there are many forms o f a market economy, there are many paths o f getting 
there. That is well illustrated by the varied ways in which countries considered front- 
runners in the process o f transition, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
have approached their transitions. Strategies o f transition vary from shock therapy to 
gradualism, with resulting resumption o f growth.
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Second, there are important common features o f well-functioning economies and 
o f effective transitions, such as liberalization o f markets and trade, and massive 
privatization.48 The EBRD transition ratings help identify the development of such 
features within countries and across the region.
Third, while liberalization and privatization may be acted upon relatively quickly, 
by relaxing state control over the regulation of the economy, other aspects o f a well- 
functioning market economy take substantially longer, such as the development of 
institutions and business practices required for the maintenance o f  a well-functioning 
market economy. “For markets to function well there must be robust entry into, and 
disciplined exit from markets to ensure that the most efficient and innovative producers 
are those that operate in the market.”49
Finally, transition and development are two different things. While transitions are 
difficult and complex processes which are usually associated with social costs, stress, and 
hardships, development entails economic growth and the advancement o f standards of 
living.50 For most o f the period under discussion in this analysis, Eastern Europe has gone 
through a period o f transition which does not necessarily guarantee growth, nor popular 
satisfaction.
At the end o f the nineties, the EBRD Transition Report concludes that the 
imbalance between the development o f markets and of institutions to sustain those 
markets is starting to be felt across the region. While recognizing that the costs of 
transition are the highest for those who should be the beneficiaries o f reform, that is the 
constituencies, the EBRD report acknowledges that East European governments have still
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to deal with the resulting growth o f poverty and the increasing inequalities in income and 
wealth brought about by unsound practices o f privatization and corruption.
In many East European countries, popular resentment towards reform stems from 
the fact that people with political influence, many times former communist bureaucrats, 
have made fortunes for themselves by the appropriation o f well-functioning state- 
enterprises. The term “economic tunneling” is also starting to be used in conjunction with 
the practice o f acquiring privatized enterprises, stripping them o f money which is 
afterwards diverted illegally to private use, thus driving the enterprises into bankruptcy.31 
Corrupt practices, coupled with insufficient attention to reform o f social services, and to 
providing a sound strategy for alleviating the impact o f unemployment on masses o f 
people can lead to a decline o f support for economic reform and a market economy.52
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45. The realization that the process o f  transition yielded markedly different experiences in 
different countries, and that there was more than one way to transition to a market 
economy, induced the need for a  comprehensive analytical approach to the 
transformation processes in the region. The Transition Report was commissioned in 
the early nineties by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
promotes the transition o f the region to a market economy and is an investor in the 
region. In 1994, the annual Transition Report was launched. Its goal is to chart the 
progress o f transition from the command to the market economy and to identify and 
analyze the challenges o f the coming years. The report is comparative and employs 
World Bank and IMF economic indicators to infer ratings o f progress in the areas o f 
enterprise privatization, liberalization o f markets and trade, and institutional and legal 
reform. See Chapter I, note 30.
46. The methodology and conceptualization for each indicator in the Transition Report 
have been maintained throughout the period. Transition indicators definitions are 
given in conjunction with Table 2.1, “Progress in Transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Baltic States, and the CIS,” found in each volume.
47. Detailed descriptions o f country-specific progress in transition are provided in the 
country-by-country transition assessments at the back o f Transition Reports for 1998 
and 1999. The classification system builds on the first Transition Report, in 1994. 
Pluses and minuses indicate countries on the borderline between two categories.
48. Transition Report 1996, p. 2.
49. Transition Report 1998, p. iv.
50. Transition Report 1996, 1997, 1998, chapters 1.
51. The term has been recently coined by Czech economist and presidential advisor for
the economy, Jiri Pehe, but the reference to “tunneling” occurs in conjunction with 
economic analyses in other countries as well. See “Czech Economic, Political Failure 
Related,” Commentary by Jiri Pehe in FBIS-EEU-1999-0607 (26 May 1999), 
http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
52. Transition Report 1998, pp. 2-11.
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
THE CZECH REPUBLIC
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
After starting the transition to a market economy in 1989 from the most 
advantageous position o f all the countries in the region, the Czech Republic ended 1999 in 
economic recession, behind all the other front-runner countries in the race to transition to 
a market economy.
If by 1995 the Czech Republic witnessed a growing economy, characterized by 
macro-economic stability and balance, strong internal currency, growing investments, low 
inflation and unemployment, and a transition that was remarkably less painful than 
anticipated,1 starting in 1996, the GDP was in constant fall until the Czech economy fell 
behind the economies o f Poland and Hungary, in 1998 and beyond. While throughout 
most o f the early nineties, the Czech government was applauded by Western institutions 
for its economic reform program and consistency, recent EU reports evaluating progress 
towards accession into the European Union are critical of the sluggishness o f the Czech 
government to implement needed institutional structures for compatibility with EU market 
pressures.2 Figure 5 traced the curve of GDP percentage change, with a steady ascending 
line between 1991 and 1995, and negative growth until 1998.
In 1989, the economic situation o f  then the Czechoslovak Federation was 
characterized by a balanced budget, low inflation, and insignificant external debt. The 
proximity of the country to developed countries interested to invest, together with what
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was considered a good reform strategy by the government put Czechoslovakia ahead o f 
Poland and Hungary for the first years o f  transition to a market economy.3
Between 1990 and 1992, the Czechoslovak Federation witnessed economic 
growth and the launch o f market economy reforms, although the Czech Republic remained 
steadily ahead o f the Slovak Republic with respect to GDP growth, unemployment rates, 
and inflation. The contribution o f the private sector to the creation o f  jobs also varied 
from republic to republic, with the Czech Republic leading in this sector as well.4
The story of the Czech Republic starts with the “velvet divorce” from the Slovak 
Republic at the end o f 1992. The peaceful separation o f  the Czechoslovak Federation into 
two states on January 1, 1993 was facilitated by several factors. The rise o f nationalist 
ferment in Slovakia became more evident after the collapse of the communist regime; 
Slovaks have long held that “rule from Prague” curtailed their national rights to self- 
determination. The political ambition o f  the leading nationalist figure and subsequent 
Prime Minister o f Slovakia, Vladimir Me£iar, was also a driving force in the maintenance 
o f a rhetoric o f national self-determination. His electoral campaign o f  1992 centered 
around increased political autonomy and full independence for Slovakia, which won him 
public sympathy and votes. The decision not to hold a referendum on the future o f the 
federation after the 1992 elections further curtailed the possibility that the Czechoslovak 
Federation would remain one state.5 Slovak popular support for more state involvement 
in the economy also ran counter to the general trends towards a market economy in the 
Czech Republic.6
The Federation eventually split in the aftermath o f  the 1992 elections. The Civic 
Forum, the group of political dissidents who negotiated the demise o f  the communist
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government in 1989, not only lost the elections, but did not gain representation in the 
parliament. This election surprise signaled the public desire for change. The separation of 
the Federation was negotiated by the winners o f  the elections, Vladimir Meiiar, the winner 
o f the Slovak elections, and Vaclav Klaus, the winner o f  the Czech elections. Their failure 
to negotiate a settlement on the make-up o f  the Federation led to the agreement on the 
separation o f the Federation into two sovereign states.7
Each country pursued thereafter its own economic policies which, although 
emphasizing different priorities, continued to be characterized by economic growth. The 
Czech Republic remained steady in its pursuit o f  mass privatization, liberalization o f the 
economy, and a policy of encouraging investment, whereas the Slovak Republic pursued a 
more left-oriented line, with the state more involved in economic decisions than the 
Czechs, or Western lending institutions, would have preferred.
TRANSITION BEGINS: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS
The transformation o f the Czech Republic from a command economy to a market 
economy has been placed by economists in the “fast track” privatization and liberalization 
category, together with Poland. A market-oriented reform process was initiated during 
1990, and a comprehensive program was adopted in January 1991. The program 
stipulated that rapid privatization and liberalization were its two main goals for the first 
stage o f  transition to a market economy. Symbols o f  the state-run economy were 
disbanded, such as the State Planning Commission which was abolished before the 1990 
parliamentary elections. Small-scale privatization and price liberalization were launched as 
early as January 1991 .*
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A sell-off o f state assets was pursued in two waves o f privatization. The first wave 
was launched by the Czechoslovak Federation in May 1992, and completed by mid-1993. 
It involved the distribution o f shares in state firms through a voucher-based privatization 
scheme which created shareholders in both republics.9 The balance o f the assets was sold 
through direct sales and public tenders. The second wave of privatization started with the 
distribution of vouchers in September 1994. Internal debates over the most appropriate 
method o f privatization delayed the completion o f the second wave. In mid-1995, the 
government approved amendments to the privatization law which, in effect, canceled the 
second wave of privatization.10
A third wave o f privatization commenced in the latter part o f 1995, which 
consisted primarily of the consolidation o f ownership of many enterprises. This type of 
privatization was led by the Investment and Privatization Funds (IPFs). IPFs, primarily 
run by of banks and other financial institutions, have emerged as a result o f  the first two 
waves o f privatization. They are dominant shareholders, holding at least two-thirds o f the 
voucher points assigned between 1992 and 1995. In 1996, it was estimated that IPFs 
controlled approximately 30% o f the existing shares, with holdings concentrated in 10 of 
the largest funds. Since IPFs were restricted in the amount o f holdings they could have 
(no more than 20% of the shares o f any one company, and the holding o f one company 
could not represent more than 10% o f the IPF’s portfolio), some funds converted into 
holding companies which did not have to comply with the maximum holdings per 
company."
The Transition Report indicators o f progress towards a market economy (Table 2) 
show that the Czech government pursued a steady policy line of reforms on restructuring
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and modernizing its economy. These indicators mean that, with respect to privatization, 
the Czech Republic had over 50% o f state-enterprises and farm assets in private 
ownership and had completed the privatization o f small companies as early as 1993. They 
show that significant and sustained actions were taken to promote corporate governance 
effectively, to liberalize prices and eliminate state procurement at non-market prices. They 
also show that trade restrictions were largely removed, promoting thus a  free market 
exchange in and out o f the country. In general, indicators show that some measures were 
taken to promote a competitive environment and that substantial progress was registered 
with respect to banking securities reform. The legal framework for encouraging 
investment was reasonably clear and well administered, with no discrimination between 
foreigners and domestic investors.
Given the Czech government’s commitment to reform, reflected in good ratings of 
transition from a command to a market economy, its relative advantage starting on the 
road to a market economy in 1990, and the amount o f  foreign support that went into the 
Czech Republic’s economy, why did the economy witness a decline in the latter part o f the 
nineties?
Table 3 lists selected macro-economic indicators for the period 1991-1998. Most 
o f these indicators follow an ascending curve o f economic performance until 1995, and a 
descending curve between 1996 and 1998. Domestic growth and direct foreign 
investment were at their peak in 1995. Unemployment in 1995 was also close to its 
lowest rate in eight years (2.9 %; the lowest rate registered during this period was in 1992, 
with 2.6%), whereas the situation is reversed between 1996 to 1998 (unemployment going 
up to 5.2% in 1997, the highest rate in seven years o f  transition).
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Table 2.—Czech Republic: Indicators o f  progress in transition to a market economy
1994 1995 19& 1997 - m ----------------------
Private GDP share 65% 70% 75% 75% 75%
Large scale privatization 4 4 4 4 4
Small scale privatization 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Governance and restructuring 3 3 3 3 3
Price liberalization 3 3 3 3 3
Trade system 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Competition policy 3 3 3 3 3
Bank reform 3 3 3 3 3
Securities reform n/a 3 3 3 3
Investment law n/a 4 4 n/a n/a
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f  progress calculated by 
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
Levels o f GDP growth and unemployment are directly related, with GDP rates 
going up and unemployment rates going down until 1995. Conversely, GDP growth rates 
went down between 1996 and 1998, and unemployment rates went up. This indicates that 
national growth was related to the creation of jobs.
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TjftteT—CzeciniegublM^
1991 1992 1993 1994 
(Percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP at constant prices -11.5 -3.3 0.6 3.2 6.4 3.9 1.0 -1.0
Consumer prices (average) 56.6 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 11.0
Gross average monthly
earnings in industry (annual
average, adjusted
for consumer prices)3 -39.9 8.5 3.0 5.8 
(% o f  labor force)
9.0 8.9 5.0 n/a
Unemployment 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 
(in billions o f  U.S. dollars)
2.9 3.5 5.2 n/a
Trade Balance -0.5 -1.9 -0.3 -0.9 -3.7 -5.9 -4.6 -3.0
Foreign Direct Investment n/a 1.0 0.6 0.7 2.5 1.4 1.3 1.0
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 213. 
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.
The gross average monthly earnings in industry indicates fluctuations in personal 
earnings, a phenomenon that is not surprising for transition economies. This statistic also 
shows a decline in average wages after 1996, although more data is needed to observe if 
the trend remained on the decline. Overall, this statistic indicates that wages grew during 
the period under discussion, even if the growth was neither steady, nor consistent. As will 
be noted below, this statistic does not indicate that the government followed a policy of 
wage restraint, which was highly recommended by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in order to improve the trade and current accounts.
The balance between exports and imports was negative throughout the period, 
indicating that imports remained the dominant element o f foreign trade. If this imbalance
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was at relatively modest rates until 1994 (under one billion dollars), starting in 1995 it 
jumped three-fold (close to four billion dollars). This trade deficit indicates that massive 
amounts o f foreign currency were going out o f the country as a result o f  increased 
domestic demand for foreign products. This phenomenon further depleted the national 
reserves and weakened the economy.
Finally, inflation (as measured by changes in consumer prices) decreased between 
1992 and 1997, when the Central Bank was forced to let the koruna float. Details o f this 
action will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
It appears that some o f  the problems that the Czech economy encountered since 
1995 go back to the implementation o f policies designed to introduce a market economy 
environment. The IPFs and the voucher scheme were two such mechanisms that are 
regularly mentioned in the literature o f  transition as having produced the opposite results 
than expected or designed.
As mentioned previously, most IPFs were still state-owned banks and other 
financial institutions who acquired large shares in formerly state-owned enterprises. 
However, upon acquiring the shares in state-owned enterprises, IPFs failed to follow the 
recommendations put forward by economic advisors for rapid restructuring. IPFs 
continued to subsidize the former state enterprises, which was in itself a disincentive for 
more profitable and competitive production. A net decline in profitability o f  IPF-owned 
enterprises was registered at the end o f 1996. According to the Ministry o f Industry, the 
tax profits in companies with more than 100 employees fell by 40%, and the rate o f return 
on equity in non-financial organizations fell to 4.1%. General concerns were also 
expressed regarding potential conflicts o f interest between the IPFs, the financial
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announced that the relationship between IPFs and the main banks would be reviewed.12
By 1998, the muddled situation o f  these IPFs became so evident, and subject to so 
much international criticism, that the Czech Parliament approved a law setting restrictions 
on IPF administration and functions. These measures were intended to strengthen fiscal 
discipline and make the funds more transparent in order to regain credibility.13
The voucher privatization scheme was also designed with short-term goals in 
mind, without thinking o f the long-term implications of the policy. Originally leading to 
steady and massive privatization and an increase in the private share o f  GDP in the first 
half o f  the nineties (see Table 2), the voucher scheme also had downsides that were not 
thoroughly evaluated before it was launched.
It appears that a large share o f the population who acquired vouchers sold them 
for instant cash to IPFs, which did not pressure the newly privatized firms into 
restructuring. The banks continued to subsidize the enterprises through loans, which was 
a disincentive to modernize and become efficient economic entities. As a result, former 
state enterprises ended up being largely owned by investment funds controlled or owned 
by state-owned banks, which continued to do what they knew to do best: subsidize loss- 
making economic entities.14
Finally, the economic decline was enhanced by the decline o f the Czech currency. 
Throughout the first half o f the nineties, the currency was the most stable one in East- 
Central Europe. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus argued that it was even more stable than 
the currencies o f Western Europe.15 The increase in the trade deficit (see Table 3) and 
speculative attacks against the currency in 1997 caused it to fall. While the Central Bank
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intervened by raising the interest rates sharply and introducing temporary restrictions on 
access to foreign currency, in May 1997 the Bank was forced to let the koruna float after 
effective devaluation.16
Other causes o f  economic decline and recession are related to market pressures 
inherent in a free market system. The imbalance between supply and demand for Czech 
products on the domestic market, associated with an increased demand for foreign 
products, contributed to slower growth rates o f domestic production. The difficulty of 
Czech producers to penetrate new markets and the weak demand for Czech products in 
Western Europe further hit domestic production rates.17
While the Czech government took the position that these macro-economic 
developments could not have been foreseen, international advisors to the government 
argued otherwise. The Czech Republic enjoyed significant degrees o f technical assistance 
from international organizations which gave them advice on how to counter these 
deleterious but inevitable results o f competition in an international environment. Agenda 
2000, to mention just one o f  these available sources o f expert advice, recommended that 
wage pressure be kept under control and enterprise restructuring be sped up, so that 
domestic products become competitive in external markets as well.18
It appears that the government failed to act in time. Table 3 shows that wage 
pressure was not kept under control. Between 1992 and 1996, the annual average o f the 
gross monthly earnings in industry increased constantly. In 1993, some restraint seems to 
have been recorded, with five percentage points drop from the previous year. However, 
this drop may reflect the shift in statistical calculations caused by the break-up o f  the 
Federation.
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The same failure to act on recommendations was observed with respect to the 
recommendation to speed up restructuring o f enterprises. As o f 1997, the restructuring of 
enterprises was considerably behind, according to the Transition Report. This delay was 
partly due to the control that IPFs retained over the most promising o f  the domestic 
enterprises. Legislation passed in 1996 and 1997 finally dealt with the influence o f IPFs 
on the restructuring of the economy, but steps were still needed to implement the 
legislation.
The trade balance deficit in Table 3 supports the hypothesis that market pressures 
have contributed to economic decline in the latter part o f the nineties. The much higher 
volume o f imports relative to exports coincides with the beginning o f the economic decline 
and recession period in 1995. Until 1994, the trade balance was negative, but was at a 
modest level o f under one billion dollars (with the exception of 1992, when it surged up 
almost two billion dollars). Starting in 1995, the negative balance quadrupled, reaching 
almost six billion dollars in 1996.
Finally, flaws o f leadership and o f the reform program, and lack o f political vision 
were considered cumulative effects that led to the poor showing of the economy after 
1995. Between 1992 and 1996, the Klaus government seems to have created the 
conditions for recession by not acting on recommendations, and by not insisting on the 
efficient implementation o f the government’s reform program. The manner in which the 
restructuring o f the industrial sector took place in mid-nineties was acknowledged by 
government insiders as well, who described restructuring as having had the most negative 
influence on economic output.19 The weakness o f the banking system that was neither 
fully private nor state-controlled, and whose rules o f functioning were evasive and subject
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to interpretation was another element o f  domestic economic instability.20
Alter 1996, the lack o f political consensus and economic vision o f the Zeman 
government contributed to and maintained the recession. The lack o f economic vision on 
an industrial policy compatible with the EU was considered the one main downfall o f  the 
administration that followed Klaus.21
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS 
How did the outcome o f economic policies affect public support for a market 
economy? Is there an observable relationship between policy outcomes and public 
support for the introduction o f a market economy? Does that relationship reveal patterns 
o f government responsiveness to their publics?
Figure 6 below traces the curve o f  Czech public opinion support for a market 
economy, and two indicators o f policy outcome: the rate o f GDP growth per capita, and 
the rate o f  unemployment. Figure 6 points to puzzling results. Between 1991 and 1995, 
while the economy was experiencing economic growth, illustrated by growing rates o f  per 
capita GDP, and relatively low levels o f unemployment, public support dwindled and was 
in constant fall after 1991. In other words, as the economy was improving as a result o f  
the introduction of market economy mechanisms, the public did not seem to believe that a 
market economy was the right system for the country any longer.
What factors account for the steady decline o f public support for a market 
economy, and how should we interpret the relationship between public support and 
government policy? If the decline in support may be justified between 1996 and 1998 on 
account o f the decline in economic performance discussed above, what factors account for
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the decline in support between 1991 and 1995, at a time when the economy was 
performing well and very well?22
Czech Republic - Market Transition
1990 1991 1992 1993 199* 1995 1996 1997 1996
pubic opinion - s -  Unomptoymant GOP par copto
Figure 6. Czech Republic: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 213, and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: 
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).
The direction o f  the curves in Figure 6 points to a minimum o f three alternative 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between public opinion and government policy on 
the issue o f market reform in the Czech Republic.
First, drawing on the literature o f dynamic representation, as public preferences 
change, policy changes to adjust to public demands. As the public favors a certain policy, 
policy starts to move in the direction o f meeting popular preferences. In the Czech case, 
majorities of respondents supported the introduction o f a market economy between 1990
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and 1993, albeit with support felling by ten percentage points during this period. Policies 
of liberalization and de-centralization started being implemented, per transition indicators, 
to meet public expectations. The outcome o f the packet o f policies was a better 
performance o f the economy, reflected in increased GDP (per capita), modest increases in 
personal monthly earnings (for industry employees), and low levels o f  unemployment.23
However, this model cannot adequately explain the reasons why, at a time when 
policy outcomes continued to move in the direction o f meeting public preferences 
(between 1993 and 1995), public support for a market economy continued to drop. 
Dynamic representation is predicated upon the idea that policy adjustments to meet public 
preferences take place over a period o f time, and that levels o f policy compatible with 
levels o f public support will only be noticed after a time lag since the observance o f public 
preferences. Figure 6 however, points to a different phenomenon. As policy adjusts to 
meet the original public preference for the introduction o f a market economy, public 
support shifts to the point where equal, then more respondents think that the introduction 
o f a market economy system (therefore the associated policies needed to implement it) is 
wrong, rather than right for the future o f the country.
Figure 7 below illustrates the dynamic o f public opinion change on the question of 
whether the introduction o f  a market economy is right for the country.
In the beginning o f the period, as large numbers o f respondents believed that the 
market economy was the right answer for the future o f their country, few respondents 
believed that it was wrong. As time elapsed and policies were introduced, lesser numbers 
believed that a market economic system was right, and more that it was wrong for their
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Czech Republic 
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Figure 7. Czech Republic: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction o f 
a Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f  the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
country. Finally, the proportion of respondents who did not know what to answer with 
respect to the introduction of a market economy was larger in the beginning o f the period 
than at the end o f the period. This rightfully indicates that in the beginning o f the 
transition, there were more questions about the core principles o f a market economy 
among the population, as World Bank and transition experts found. A steady rate of 
twenty percent or more of respondents not willing to venture a response on the question 
o f a market economy was maintained for four years o f the period under discussion. This 
steadiness may indicate that as market mechanisms were introduced, people had more 
questions about the viability or appropriateness o f  the selected mechanisms for the 
introduction o f a market economy.
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Overall, the dynamic representation model o f  analysis is o f limited use to explain 
the dynamics of public support and government policy outcomes in the Czech case.
A second hypothesis suggests that there is a reverse relationship between policy 
outcomes in the transition to a market economy and public support for the introduction of 
a market economy. This is a counterintuitive hypothesis worth exploring, given that as 
indicators o f a growing economy go up (Table 3), public support goes down.
This hypothesized reverse relationship is commonly attributed to the hardships of 
transition, the costs o f unemployment, and the decline in personal standards o f living 
brought about by competition, privatization, and restructuring. According to this 
hypothesis, as market economy mechanisms are introduced, associated social costs such as 
high unemployment are witnessed. Higher unemployment, determined by the shut down 
o f unprofitable enterprises and privatization creates insecurity at the personal level. This 
insecurity is conducive to diminished support for the conditions which brought about 
unemployment, in this case market economy policies adopted by the government.24
A closer look at the direction o f  curves in Figure 6 offers a different picture. As 
unemployment goes markedly down between 1991 and 1992, and afterwards fluctuates 
around three percent until 1995, public support remains in constant fall. This seems to 
indicate that there is no direct relationship between unemployment and public support for 
a market economy. It is not rational to hypothesize that the public does not support 
policies that keep unemployment on a steady and low level, compatible with other market 
economies.
Additional information regarding personal standards o f  living confirm the view that 
there is no direct relationship between public support and costs o f transition in the Czech
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Republic case. Table 3 indicated that the gross average monthly earnings in industry 
witnessed positive growth throughout the entire period under discussion, with the 
exception o f 1991. The Czech Republic, among the other countries in Eastern Europe, 
had better purchasing power and lower inflation rates which allowed the economy to 
grow, and the citizens to be comparatively less stressed than the citizens o f countries like 
Romania or Bulgaria, for instance.
Table 4 below also shows that the Czech public did not feel threatened by the costs 
of transition. Even if in the first year o f  transition (1990) markedly more respondents 
believed that their personal financial situation would get worse (61%) rather than better 
(6%), the trend changed starting in 1991, with more respondents believing that their 
personal financial situation would either get better or stay the same (a cumulated 58%), 
than those who believed that it would get worse (34%). From 1990 until 1996 (the 
available data), the category o f respondents who believed that their personal financial 
situation would get worse was in steady decline (from 61% to 26%).
Table 4.—Czech Republic: Public opinion on financial situation in the household for the
next 12 m onths
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Will be better 6 21 25 28 23 25 21
Will be same 27 37 37 37 43 43 45
Will be worse 66 34 33 31 28 25 26
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. 1990 and 1991 figures are for Czechoslovakia. In 1990, 
the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how will your own financial situation 
change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the next 12 months, do you expect the 
financial situation o f your household will get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same.
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get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ 
categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and ‘get a lot worse’ categories were 
cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped from questionnaires.
The high percentage o f respondents who believed that their situation would get 
worse in 1990 is an understandable phenomenon for the beginning o f  the transition. In 
1990, few people had an understanding o f market economy mechanisms, or how those 
mechanisms would impact their personal lives. On the other hand, the steady decline in the 
rates o f respondents who believed that their situation would worsen between 1991 and 
1996 indicates low levels of stress regarding the changes that were being brought about by 
the new economic system.
On the other hand, Table 4 shows a fair split among the three categories o f people 
who believed that their personal situations would get better, stay the same, or get worse. 
The category with the largest percentages throughout the period (except for 1990) is the 
middle category, o f respondents who believed that their situation would not change in the 
following year. These numbers indicate that Czechs got used to the patterns o f 
transformation o f their economy, since they did not feel threatened in their personal 
financial situation, and they did not see the transition getting worse for their households.
The steady increase in the rates o f respondents who believed that their personal 
situation would stay the same also point to two alternative hypotheses regarding public 
perceptions: either people felt that the course of the economic transformation was 
predictable enough and they had nothing to fear for their future; or they felt that “nothing 
will ever change”, therefore there was not much they could do about what was going on in 
their country. Studies have repeatedly pointed towards an increased public apathy in
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Eastern Europe in general, reflected in lower levels o f voter participation, and a tiredness 
associated with democratic politics.25
The latter o f the two hypothesis may merit attention at the end o f the 90s, where a 
case could be made about public apathy resulting from a protracted period o f political and 
economic instability. This hypothesis does not, however, explain early steady rates o f 
respondents who believed that their situation would remain unchanged. The more likely 
hypothesis is that Czechs did not feel threatened by the economic changes in their country.
This hypothesis, in turn, supports earlier thinking about the relationship between 
public support for the introduction o f a  market economy and the associated costs o f 
transition. There is little data to substantiate a hypothesis that the steady decline o f public 
support for a market economy observed in Figure 6 is the result o f social costs of 
transition that Czechs incurred. Low unemployment rates and steady increases in average 
monthly earnings for a large segment o f  the working community, the industrial sector (per 
Table 3), as well as confidence about the future (per Table 4) indicate that in the Czech 
Republic, the public did not feel threatened by the introduction o f a market economy. If 
they did not feel threatened in their personal situation by the macro and micro-economic 
changes that the country was going through, what factors can better explain this steady 
decline o f support?
A third possible explanation for the decline o f  public support for the introduction 
o f a market economy is another counter-intuitive hypothesis, which has been formulated 
by Adam Przeworski in 1993, with respect to the Polish case but as a  reflection of general 
trends in the region. Przeworski argued that East European publics hold somewhat 
irrational beliefs with respect to the future o f the economy, indicative o f individual
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myopia. He argued that publics support the introduction o f reforms in order to see the 
economy do better, even when reforms have a deleterious impact on their personal lives. 
They lessen their support as soon as beneficial reform outcomes are felt, and the economy 
is in better shape. Since they understand the need for difficult reforms and personal 
sacrifice in order for the economy to get better, they accept reform programs even when 
they are harsh, create substantial unemployment, and lower standards o f  living. People 
believe that these short-term effects o f the introduction of a market economy system are 
necessary, and accept difficulties in the expectation o f future personal well-being. Once 
the economy starts doing better, they think that reforms worked, therefore there is no 
need to continue them. He likened East Europeans with a patient who starts feeling better 
as a result o f treatment, and then does not finish the “medication” despite the doctor's 
prescription.26
If we apply this hypothesis to the Czech case, the following line o f reasoning 
results: Czechs supported a market economy as long as the economy was in bad shape.
As soon as the economy started doing better, Czechs felt that it was time to abandon 
continued reforms since their country was on a better course already and lowered their 
support.
This is an intriguing hypothesis which poses major analytical problems o f 
compatibility with known models o f analysis. It also suggests that individual lack o f 
understanding o f the requirements o f a market economy, which has been repeatedly 
noticed by transition specialists, may be the strongest inhibitor o f continued public support 
for transformation in the region.
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If Przeworski’s hypothesis applied across the region, we should notice decreased 
levels of public support in the Czech Republic as the economy got better, and increased 
levels o f public support for the introduction o f market economy reforms as soon as the 
economy started to decline, in 1995. What we see instead is decreased levels o f public 
support for the introduction o f a market economy irrespective o f how the economy is 
doing. In other words, if up to a point this hypothesis seems to explain the relationship 
between public support and government policies, when the outcome o f policies reverses 
(decline o f  economic growth), public support does not reverse as well (public support 
does not grow). The Przeworski hypothesis is also o f  limited use in explaining the Czech 
case.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT 
Having tried to interpret the situation o f the Czech Republic with the analytical 
tools offered by a broad literature of representation, we are forced to admit that existing 
models can only partially help explain the dynamics o f  government responsiveness and 
public opinion support. If  there is little doubt that the Czech governments between 1990 
and 1998 took action to follow the lead that their constituencies gave them with respect to 
the introduction o f a market economy, a large question mark remains regarding the decline 
of public support for the introduction of this economic system despite government action.
A better perspective over this paradoxical situation is offered by the literature on 
elections. An analysis o f the dynamics o f public support versus the outcome of 
government policies from the perspective o f after-the-fact responsiveness offers less 
quantifiable, but nevertheless strong indications for the decline o f public support for
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market economy policies, as well as popular perceptions o f government actions. These 
indications are in keeping with the observations o f EBRD and World Bank specialists 
regarding public expectations and disappointments, institutional weaknesses o f  the 
economic system in the making, and widespread corruption.
In essence, the after-the-fact model o f representation is an elitist model. It argues 
that politicians run electoral campaigns, convince voters to elect them in office, then 
proceed with the implementation o f their electoral promises. Before the next elections, 
voters have little or no possibility to reward politicians for their actions in office. When 
new elections take place, politicians perceived to have ignored, or not acted in conformity 
with their original promises are voted out o f  office.
In the Czech Republic, constituencies voted out o f office, or weakened the 
position o f incumbents to allow them a lesser executive power in virtually all rounds o f 
parliamentary elections. Table 5 below shows the decline of support for the main party 
that replaced the Civic Forum at the helm o f the Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS), throughout two consecutive parliamentary elections.
Parties 1992 
% o f vote seats
1996 
% o f  vote seats
1998 
% o f  vote seats
Social Democrats 6.5 16 26.4 61 32.3 74
ODS 29.7 76 29.6 68 27.7 63
ODA 6.0 14 6.4 13
Communists 14.1 35 10.3 22 11.0 24
Data from RFL/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 29 (17 July 1992), pp. 1-8; FBIS-EEU- 
96-150 (2 August 1996), pp. 16-17; FBIS-EEU-98-128 (September, 1998), pp. 14-15.
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The results presented in Table 5 are oversimplified for the purpose o f analysis and 
do not reflect all the political participants in the elections between 1992 and 1998. The 
after-the-fact model o f representation allows for the following analysis in the Czech case:
Voters did not have adequate political or social leverage mechanisms to relay to 
their representatives their dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by the government, or 
the manner o f  politics altogether. As a result, they expressed their dissatisfaction by 
voting incumbents out o f  office in 1992, giving them insufficient votes to form another 
majority government in 1996, thus forcing them into a coalition that did not work, then 
finally voting incumbents out o f office in 1998.
In the 1992 elections, the highly praised and much acclaimed Civic Forum which 
successfully negotiated the peaceful dissolution o f the Communist regime in 1990 did not 
get representation in the country’s legislature. The most often quoted reasons for this 
failure were the tiredness with the elitism of the Civic Forum, and a public perception that, 
as a party, the intellectuals who initiated and negotiated the political change in 1989 were 
in actuality removed from the everyday realities and needs o f their voters.27 As a result, 
policies pursued by a party perceived to be removed from its constituents ended up being 
unpopular even when the public believed that the policies were actually necessary for the 
country. When the confidence in the bond between voters and political leadership is 
weakened, support for whatever policies are pursued drops irrespective o f  outcome of 
policies. “Transition weariness” was the common denominator for the outcome and 
surprises o f the 1992 elections, and later of the 1996 elections.
In the 1996 elections, tiredness with the politics o f  the Klaus government, political 
infighting, corruption scandals, and disunity among the top leadership, led to a public
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posture of “I have had enough already.”28 Since 1996, the phrase “the malady o f Czech 
politics” has meant a communication crisis in which “everyone does his thing” with no 
consideration for a national goal, or to building consensus on issues of middle to long­
term relevance to the country. Vaclav Klaus came to be perceived as an astute politician 
who, apart from being a good economist, was more interested in calling the political shots 
than in building the future o f the Czech Republic. His arrogance, while being no secret in 
1992 when he was voted in office, became his most notorious characteristic, despite the 
many good things he accomplished for his country. Transition indicators show that the 
most serious and remarkable measures to introduce a market economy in the Czech 
Republic date back to the Klaus administration.
In the 1998 elections, political cleavages were further exacerbated by the desire to 
gain representation in the Parliament, and to secure enough votes to create a majority 
government. The term “political tunneling” was launched in 1999, to describe the 
phenomenon where “at crucial moments, top politicians put their own interests and those 
of their parties above national interests.” “Deformed individualism” and “Bolshevik 
thinking” were other phrases designed to capture as much o f the voter dissatisfaction with 
the works o f their new political and economic identity as possible.29
Additional civic manifestations emphasize the notion that the Czech public is 
generally dissatisfied with the works o f the new system and unprepared to recognize or 
accept the responsibilities of the new system. Recently, a civic group called Impulse ‘99 
called on the government to resign, underlining the reasons for their request. The lack of 
government interest in finding out how the Czech public felt about the manner o f post­
communist politics, generally characterized as self-absorbed and insensitive to the public
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voice, the absence o f  communication between government and constituencies, and a 
general public sense that post-communist politics turned out much like communist politics 
determined Impulse ‘99 to adopt the banner “Thank you, now go.”30
Figure 8 below traces public support for the introduction o f a market economy 
versus public satisfaction with the works of democracy. Figure 8 indicates that there may 
be a strong relationship between public perceptions o f democracy, as a political system, 
and public perceptions o f market economy, as the supporting economic system.




Figure 8. Czech Republic: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with 
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f  the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
Dissatisfaction with transition economics does not have to be associated with 
dissatisfaction with democratic politics but in the Czech case it seems to be. Levels o f
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public satisfaction with the works o f democracy remain below a majority percentage even 
at their peak, in 1993. Moreover, levels of dissatisfaction with both the political and the 
economic system brought about by the 1989 changes are related after 1993, going in the 
same direction at roughly the same levels. This observation supports the hypothesis that 
in the Czech Republic, public support for economic policies went hand-in-hand with public 
support for elected govemants, and not necessarily with the outcome o f  policies per se.
One last comment is worth making. According to Figure 8, public support for 
democracy was on the rise until 1993, and on the decline afterwards. Since 1993 is the 
year when the Federation broke apart, it is fair to consider the possibility that the general 
public dissatisfaction with the works o f  democracy was also related to the failure to keep 
the Czechoslovak Federation together. While that is a significant possibility, it not enough 
to account for the steady growing dissatisfaction with democracy and a market economy 
as registered in this chapter.
CONCLUSIONS
From a representative democracy perspective, the Czech case can be best 
explained by an elitist model o f  representation. Figure 6 in effect shows that government 
policies have not been sensitive to the public mood over the course o f the transition, or to 
the associated disillusionment with politics. In a representative democracy, the decline o f 
public support for an originally popular policy, which is widely believed to be the only 
answer to an existing crisis, would be a strong signal to political representatives to listen 
to their constituencies' voice. In the Czech case, continued decline in public support 
seems to indicate that an adequate dialogue was not established between the political
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leadership and the voters, and points o f discontent only exacerbated with time. The 
literature on elections highlights many intangible inhibitors o f public support for the 
introduction o f a market economy which point in the direction of public apathy, but also in 
the direction o f a reaction against a leadership insensitive to the public need for 
information and adequate preparation for change.
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CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
HUNGARY
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
At the end o f  1999, Hungary was viewed as the most promising market in Eastern 
Europe, favored by foreign investors over Poland due to its higher stage o f  economic 
development.1 This could have hardly been predicted in 1990, or even in the mid-nineties. 
The unforseen and difficult twists o f  the transition to a market economy, accompanied 
until the mid-nineties by unexpected rates o f GDP decline, high inflation, unemployment, 
and recession would have made such a premonition next to impossible. After years of 
declining trust in the direction o f  the economy, and o f  their country, hope and confidence 
seem to be making a modest come-back among the Hungarian population. The governing 
coalition voted in power in 1998 enjoys high approval rates after a year and a half of 
administration.
Of the other East European countries that underwent a seemingly successful 
transition to a market economy, Hungary had the most liberalized economy prior to the 
change o f 1989.2 Some private ownership and business was allowed by the communist 
regime as early as 1980, conducive to a minimum of market-oriented practices in services 
and tourism. A degree o f decentralization was allowed in the area o f  large industrial 
organizations between 1980 and 1986. Wage policy deregulation followed in 1988, and 
imports were liberalized in January 1989.
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When the train of regional political transformation reached Hungary in 1989, the
first post-communist, liberal government o f Joseph Antall promised the population rapid
and irreversible economic growth, conducive to higher standards of living and to a
modem, Westem-like society.3 Election promises regarding the improvement o f standards
o f living did not materialize during his administration, nor during the administration o f the
Socialist Party, which followed at the government helm in 1994. Sustained transition
hardships on the population led to a steady decline o f  popular confidence in a market
economy and in democracy in general. The imbalance between the costs o f transition to a
market economy and the costs o f social programs to offset the burdens o f the population,
unclear economic policies, over-emphasis on preferential political and economic priorities
and, not in the least, political infighting and disunity have all contributed to a much poorer
economic showing in the first half o f the nineties than anticipated.
Hungary’s post-communist economic development followed what is largely called
“gradual” transition to a market economy.4 Except for thorough and immediate
liberalization o f trade barriers in 1989, Hungary was much slower at adopting other
market economy rules-of-thumb, such as price and wage liberalization, large-scale
privatization, and restructuring o f state-owned enterprises. In fact, concern with the social
costs o f rapid passage to a market economy ‘rules’ was the major inhibitor o f the first
reform program, the Kupa program (named after Mihaly Kupa, the first post-communist
Finance Minister o f  Hungary). The underlying philosophy o f  the transition to a market
economy of the Kupa program merits quoting:
There are only two solutions: Either you focus on a very rapid transition to 
markets expecting that the profits generated by the private sector will then be 
distributed to those abandoned along the way, or you proceed more prudently,
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committing yourself not to exclude anyone from this process o f  transition. Since 
the actual state o f our economy does not permit the first solution, we have adopted 
the second, placing priority attention on the social aspects o f reform.5
Public opinion polls show that the Hungarian population was highly appreciative o f
this approach at the time. The highest support for a market economy registered between
1990 and 1998 was recorded during 1991, the year when these statements were made (see
Chapter 3, Table 1).
The gradual transition to a market economy advocated by Kupa and Antall was
characterized primarily by a strict monetary policy, to be assured by the creation o f a
Central Bank; wage regulation, so that inflation be kept under control; and subsidies to
prices and to industry, to prevent massive bankruptcies. 1991 was defined as the year o f
privatization and the definition o f property rights, 1992 as the year when inflation would
be lowered and the convertibility o f the forint would be prepared for, and 1993 as the year
when growth would resume.6
By 1993, however, growth did not resume (although it was in sight), the general
public mood was characterized by political and social exhaustion, and the appropriateness
o f the gradual approach to the transition to a market economy was more questionable than
ever. Figure 5 showed that between 1991 and 1993, the economy witnessed negative
growth, even if it managed to reduce the handicap somewhat in 1993.
Misplaced political priorities and the inability to reach consensus among the
members of the coalition government are the factors found to have contributed to the
decline o f the economy and the popular dissatisfaction with the course o f reform. The
first post-communist government was made up o f a coalition o f  liberal parties, the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Smallholders’ Party (ISP), and the Christian
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Democratic Peoples’ Party (CDPP) who advocated a return to the political line followed 
by the Horthy regime before World War II. Their political strategy was focused on three 
main directions: the well-being o f the countryside gentry, sometimes accompanied by 
neglect for the needs and appropriate policies for the rest o f  the Hungarian social strata; 
reclaiming the glory of a larger Hungarian state; and insisting on a return to Christian 
values and social norms.
The over-emphasis on the role and benefits o f one particular social stratum in post­
communist Hungary was one instance o f misplaced priorities. The political persistence on 
the need for restitutions o f  land property confiscated by the communist regime led to 
making the current land owners insecure about their future.7 Additionally, the 
implementation o f the restitution law was fraught with delays and bureaucratic obstacles, 
leading to a postponement o f the first auctions of land until 1993. In the words o f a 
political analyst, by the end o f 1993 the entire program was going “nowhere.”8
Reclaiming the policy o f the Horthy regime was another instance of misplaced 
priorities. The open advocacy o f a return to the Horthist territorial lines of the Hungarian 
state (which included parts o f Romania and Slovakia) strained relations with Serbia, 
Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and hurt Hungary domestically and internationally.9 These 
positions, taken as Hungary was officially applying for EU and NATO membership, 
reinforced the impression that the government was paying lip-service to the requirements 
o f membership in both international bodies. One important requirement of membership is 
that member states abandon territorial claims beyond the borders which they had when 
entering either NATO or the EU. Another requirement is that member states have good 
relations with their neighbors. It took Hungary until 1995 to sign the good neighbor
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treaty with Romania, and even longer to sign the treaty with Slovakia.
Prioritizing foreign policy over domestic economic policy was another instance o f 
misplaced government focus. While the Antall government was assiduously pursuing a 
policy o f Euro-Atlantic integration, domestic analysts were pointing ou t that the 
administration did not have an economic program to take Hungary into any o f the desired 
Western institutions.10 Some analysts even contended that the government was pursuing 
economic policies guided by foreign economists, in order to gain their approval and 
recommendation in the pursuit o f European integration, rather than in order to secure a 
successful transition domestically." For instance, they considered that the liberalization of 
imports under the conditions o f the collapse o f the COMECON markets left domestic 
producers exposed to hard foreign competition and eventually led to sustained trade 
imbalance and high inflation. A more strategic liberalization o f  imports could have been 
designed to accommodate integration requirements as well as domestic growth goals, and 
would not have hurt the domestic producers so badly.
Finally, the inability o f the coalition members to reach consensus on most policies 
greatly contributed to popular dissatisfaction with post-communist politics. Political 
infighting, together with the perceived attempt that the government was trying to replace 
the communist ideology with an ideology o f  nationalism and religion accompanied a 
fifteen percent drop in popular support for the creation of a market economy within a 
three-year span.12
The absence o f cohesion among coalition members was not aided by strong 
leadership either. Antall was frequently accused o f setting priorities by himself, not 
consulting with the other governing partners before making decisions or announcing them
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publicly, and sometimes ignoring the coalition altogether. By the beginning o f 1992, the 
health o f the coalition was seriously weakened and the polarization o f political opinions 
led to a split within the governing coalition.13
It took the voting out o f  office o f  the liberals o f Joseph Antall (who died before he 
saw the collapse o f his administration) and the voting in power of the Hungarian Socialists 
for a market economy strategy to be formulated. In 1994, the Hungarian Socialist Party 
won the lion’s share o f the popular vote and formed a majority government in coalition 
with the Alliance o f Free Democrats. The coalition immediately enacted an agreement 
with the IMF conducive to the stabilization o f the economy.
The agreement came at a high price: the IMF imposed a severe austerity package 
in return for additional credits. With the adoption o f the austerity program and the 
finalization o f privatization legislation in 1995, the signing o f a new IMF program for 
development in 1996 and the convertibility o f the forint in 1996, the harmonization of 
competition laws with EU requirements in 1997,14 Hungary’s woes seemed to come to a 
halt and economic growth to resume through the end o f the nineties. In 1998, Hungary 
was formally invited to start accession talk with the European Union. By that time, the 
population’s trust in the introduction o f a market economy decreased to below the fifty 
percent threshold and the public was reported to be apathetic about politics and 
democracy in general.15
TRANSITION BEGINS. GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS 
The Transition Report indicators o f  progress towards a market economy, Table 6 
below, summarize the progress o f  the Hungarian government in establishing market
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economy legislative structures and institutions between 1994 and 1998, a progress that is 
remarkable and puzzling in many ways.
^ibl^^^lungar^^ndicatorsofjjjroggsyntn ttisitio inc^M rarke^conon^
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share 55% 60% 70% 75% 80%
Large scale privatization 3 4 4 4 4
Small scale privatization 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Governance and restructuring 3 3 3 3 3.2
Price liberalization 3 3 3 3.2 3.2
Trade system 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Competition policy 3 3 3 3 3
Bank reform 3 3 3 4 4
Securities reform n/a 3 3 3.2 3.2
Investment law n/a 4 4 n/a n/a
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by 
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
These rankings do not differ significantly from those o f the Czech Republic. 
Hungary had over 50% o f state enterprises and farm assets in private ownership by 1994, 
instead of 1993 as the Czech Republic. The privatization o f small companies was 
complete by 1993 as well, and standards o f performance typical o f advanced industrial 
economies were in force as early as 1994, together with effective tradability o f  land.
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Significant and sustained actions were taken to harden budget constraints and to 
promote corporate governance effectively through privatization combined with tight credit 
and subsidy policies by 1993.
Despite a slow start, substantial progress on price liberalization was made by 1993, 
moving in the direction o f comprehensive price liberalization starting in 1996.
The trade system was liberalized by 1993, with the removal o f most tariff barriers 
starting in 1994, matching the progress o f  the Czech Republic. Some actions were taken 
to reduce abuse o f market power and to promote a competitive environment throughout 
the period, but with no progress beyond these attempts.
In banking reform, despite earlier assessments which argued that the Hungarian 
market resisted privatization and reform o f their banking system,16 the Transition Report 
indicators consider that Hungary was ahead o f  the Czech Republic starting in 1996. From 
1996 on, Hungary moved from mere progress in the establishment o f bank solvency and o f 
a framework for prudential supervision and regulation, to significant movement o f  banking 
laws and regulations towards BIS standards, well-functioning banking competition, and 
effective prudential supervision. Transition indicators, however, do not gauge progress in 
bank privatization per se, which accounts for the difference in views regarding the 
efficiency and solvency of Hungarian banks.
In the area o f securities reform, Hungary also went further than the Czech 
Republic to secure substantial issuance o f  securities by private enterprises, to establish 
independent share registries, secure some protection to minority shareholders, and to 
assist the emergence o f non-bank financial institutions.
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The legal framework for encouraging investment was clear and well formulated, 
with no discrimination between foreign and domestic investors. In this respect, both 
Hungary and the Czech Republic are ranked on an equal footing.
Table 6 indicates that the Hungarian government also pursued a policy line o f 
economic reforms intended to lead to the introduction o f  a market economy, in response 
to initial popular demand for a market economy. More importantly, it indicates little 
variation between the outcomes o f policies in a gradual approach to transition to a market 
economy, such as the case o f Hungary, versus outcomes o f policies in a more rapid 
approach to transition, such as the case o f the Czech Republic.17
Overall, one would have expected that Hungary would have been equally, if not 
more prosperous, than the Czech Republic, rather than suffering the economic decline of 
the early nineties. In turn, the expected public reaction to a growing economy should have 
been support for the administration pursuing market economic reforms, in anticipation of 
future growth and improvements in standards o f  living. Transition indicators, however, do 
not shed light either on the reasons for the economic decline, or for the revitalizing o f the 
economy in 1997.
Macro-economic indicators listed in Table 7 give insights into the dynamics o f 
economic growth throughout the period. These indicators also show that the Hungarian 
economy did not grow at the same pace as the Czech Republic’s economy.
Despite the good and very good progress in transition illustrated by the transition 
indicators, transition policies did not amount to positive economic growth until 1994. It 
should be noted, however, that GDP per capita, when measured in U.S. currency, grew 
steadily, although in small steps until 1994.
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Table 7.—Hungary: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 
(Percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP at constant prices -11.9 ■ u> 1 o b\ to VO 1.5 1.3 4.4 4.6
Consumer prices (average) 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 15.0
Gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing
(annual average, adjusted
for inflation)3 -9.4 2.9 2.2 4.7 
(% o f  labor force)
-6.9 -2.0 3.8 n/a
Unemployment 7.4 12.3 12.1 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.4 n/a
(in billions o f  U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance 0.2 0.0 -3.2 -3.6 -2.4 -2.6 -1.7 -2.4
Foreign Direct Investment 9.1 10.1 11.3 11.2 15.3 16.8 21.4 24.4
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 217. 
a Calculated by author from ERBD data
The macro-economic indicators that best describe the impact o f transition policies 
on the population, inflation and unemployment respectively are high throughout the entire 
period. This indicates that the pursuit o f the gradual approach led to a protracted loss of 
purchasing power and high job insecurity at the individual level.
Additionally, the gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing are fairly 
unpredictable, with modest increases during years o f recession, and dramatic decreases 
during years o f growth. Since until 1996 (the available data) the share o f industry in GDP 
was over three times larger than the agriculture share in GDP,18 we cannot attribute the 
incremental increases in manufacturing earnings to shifts in the agriculture production or 
trade. The growth o f average monthly earnings must have been the result o f  policies in 
the industrial and manufacturing sectors.
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The government favored subsidies for some sectors o f activity, to offset the social 
costs of transition. It is highly possible that the inconclusive growth in earnings was due 
to government subsidies to loss-making industries, to counter the effects of transition on 
the population employed in industry and manufacturing. Government subsidies prolonged 
the recession and delayed the recovery o f the manufacturing sector by avoiding the 
necessity o f restructuring or privatization. In effect, subsidies deepened the recession 
rather than easing the pain of the electorate. A more determined approach to restructuring 
could have turned loss-making industrial and manufacturing entities into productive units 
and would have spurred the growth o f the national wealth at an earlier date.
The trade balance and foreign direct investment taken together, and in relation to 
the growth o f the national wealth, also suggest interesting insights. While the trade 
balance was in excellent equilibrium and direct foreign investment was ten times higher 
than in the Czech Republic between 1991 and 1992, national growth was still negative but 
the plummeting growth rate was slowed dramatically.
Conversely, as the national wealth experienced positive growth, twice as much 
foreign investment was coming into the country by comparison to the first two years o f 
transition, and twice as much wealth was going out o f  the country, per negative trade 
balance between 1993 and 1998. It appears that even if domestic production was starting 
to grow, less domestic goods were exported and more foreign goods were imported. This 
imbalance is a source o f trade deficit.
In addition, the privatization o f land led to an increased possibility for foreign firms 
to acquire land in Hungary and set up new enterprises. The products o f these enterprises
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were sold domestically, but primarily abroad, leading to a drain o f currency and a weak 
domestic market.
The power o f foreign companies to acquire land and set up new enterprises 
imbalanced domestic producers further. The possibility for domestic producers to set up 
and market their products successfully dropped, while an intolerance o f foreigners rose 
steadily among all categories o f  Hungarians. In 1997, eighty-nine percent o f Hungarians 
believed that foreigners should not acquire assets in Hungary without restrictions, while 
seventy-nine percent believed that Hungary would end up in foreign hands. Sixty-five 
percent o f Hungarians believed that market competition should be restricted, eighty-four 
percent believed that domestic producers and buyers should be favored in the process o f 
privatization of state enterprises. Towards the end o f the nineties, an image o f  fear o f the 
influence of foreign direct investment in Hungary emerges.19
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS
How did the outcome o f  economic policies affect public support for a market 
economy? Is there an observable relationship between policy outcomes and public 
support for the introduction o f  a market economy? Does that relationship reveal patterns 
o f government responsiveness to their publics?
Figure 9 below traces the curve o f public opinion support for a market economy, 
the curve of GDP growth per capita, and the curve o f unemployment.
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Figure 9. Hungary: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 217; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: 
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).
Figure 9 permits the following analysis o f representation. First, as high levels o f 
popular support for a market economy were maintained (between fifty and sixty percent 
until 1992), government policy slowly started to move in the direction o f meeting popular 
demands. GDP per capita grew at a slow pace during the first four years o f  transition. 
GDP at constant prices experienced positive growth for the first time in 1994, one year 
later than the Czech Republic, and two years behind Poland (see Fig. 5 and Table 7).
Second, in the process of moving in the direction o f meeting popular demands, 
deleterious policy outcomes such as high unemployment and inflation (see also Table 7) 
also resulted. Both amounted to negative impacts on popular support for the policies 
which produced such outcomes. This is illustrated by the steady decline o f support for the
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introduction o f a market economy after 1991, when the rate o f unemployment sky­
rocketed.
Third, starting in 1993, policy and opinion move almost in parallel, indicating a 
meeting o f  minds o f popular expectations and government action. Policy was originally 
pulled up by support for market economy policies until 1993. After 1995, policy is ahead 
of public support, but both curves go in the same direction and the distance between them 
remains small. This indicates that the public continued to support market economy 
policies, albeit not at the same rate as in 1990. It also indicates that policy stayed the 
course o f transformation and moved to meet popular demands.
This analysis allows for two preliminary conclusions. First, the Hungarian 
governments between 1990 and 1998 tended to be responsive to their publics and adopted 
policies resulting in the introduction o f the desired market economy. Second, necessary 
difficult transition decisions resulted in deleterious effects on the population such as high 
unemployment. These effects, together with the faulty implementation o f economic 
policies discussed previously, corruption, and other political disunity led to a decrease in 
public support for a market economy.
These deleterious factors, however, do not seem to have amounted to popular 
rejection o f the market economy per se. The curve o f public support did not continue to 
go down, as in the case o f the Czech Republic. Instead, it stabilized around thirty-five 
percent after 1995, and remained at that level through the end of the period.
Additional data confirms and complements these conclusions. Figure 10 below 
traces the curves o f public opinion on the question o f whether a market economy was 
right or wrong for the country. Figure 10 shows that as high percentage levels o f
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Hungarians believed that the free market system was right, low percentage levels believed 
that it was wrong, in the early nineties. As costs and hardships were experienced, fewer 
Hungarians thought that a market economy was right, and more that it was wrong. 
Finally, when the economy stabilized and growth resumed, levels o f approval and 
disapproval of a market economy stabilized as well, between thirty and forty percentage 
points, with slightly more Hungarians believing that the market economic system was 
right, than that it was wrong. The situation o f the third category, o f Hungarians who did 
not know how to answer the question, will be discussed in the next section.
Hungary 
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Figure 10. Hungary: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction o f  a 
Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
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Figure 10 also suggests that even if more Hungarians were in favor o f a market 
economy than against it, the Hungarian society was polarized on the question of the 
appropriateness o f the system for the country. Less than ten percentage points separate 
supporters from non-suporters o f the system. This indicates that the benefits o f the system 
were not as equally spread across the social spectrum as the government originally 
intended. This polarization also supports the views found in the literature about the fear 
o f Hungarians o f a take-over o f their country by foreigners.
Additionally, Table 8 below supports the preliminary conclusion that deleterious 
effects o f the transition, such as personal economic insecurity, were a major factor in the 
decline o f popular support for a market economy. Questioned about the odds that their 
personal financial situation would improve in the next twelve months, consistently larger 
percentages o f Hungarians believed that their personal situation would get worse than that 
it would get better between 1990 and 1996.
Table 8 displays a  sustained contrast between the percentage o f  Hungarians who 
believed that their situation would get better, and those who believed it would get worse. 
The proportion o f ‘better’ to ‘worse’ is 1/12 in 1990, 1/2 in 1991, 1/4 in 1992, roughly 
1/3 through 1994, 1/5 in 1995, and roughly 1/3 in 1996. The maintenance o f this trend 
throughout six years (granted, the harder years) supports the conclusion that transition 
costs resulted in high economic insecurity, which is in itself the strongest deflector o f 
public support for reform.
The Hungarian case is somewhat more predictable than the Czech case, in that 
decline o f public support for a market economy can be linked to negative outcomes of 
economic policies, such as high levels of unemployment, inflation and negative growth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
Table 8 ,—H ungary : Public op in ion  o n  financial s itua tion  in household
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Will be better 6 20 13 17 15 11 15
Will be same 18 31 27 28 23 19 26
Will be worse 74 39 52 46 51 63 53
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 -7  (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. In 1990, the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how 
will your own financial situation change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the 
next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation o f  your household will get a lot 
better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a 
lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and 
‘get a lot worse’ categories were cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped 
from questionnaires.
Analysts o f the region have long held that fear o f unemployment overwhelms the 
effects o f all other economic variables combined, and makes people turn against reform.20 
Unemployment alone can thus account for the fact that, despite resumption o f economic 
growth in 1994, the Hungarian population was skeptical about a market economy and no 
longer supported it as strongly as in the beginning o f the transition.
This phenomenon o f gradual decrease o f support, however, is understandable, and 
was predicted by World Bank and other economic analysts. Skepticism arising from the 
difficult conditions of a transition should not count against the governments’ willingness to 
take the chance o f becoming unpopular by introducing a system that was both desired by 
the population and assumed to produce better standards o f living in the future. The 
element that counts in an analysis o f representation is the direction o f policy and opinion 
considered together. From that standpoint, the Hungarian case points towards a 
responsive government.
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GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT 
Does an analysis o f after-the-fact voter behavior offer additional insights into the 
relationship between the Hungarian governments of 1990 and 1994, and their publics? 
Table 9 lists the results o f  three consecutive parliamentary elections, and the voters’ 
reaction to these administrations.
Tabl^^fEingar^>arliam entar^lectiorw «sult^l990^98^B̂ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Bi>̂ ^ B̂ ^ ^ ^ B 
Parties 1990 1994 1998
%  o f  vote Seats % o f vote Seats % o f  vote Seats
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) 42.9 164 11.7 37 17
Hungarian Socialist Party (MszP) 33 32.9 209 32.2 134
Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) 23.8 92 19.7 70 7.9 24
Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) 11.4 44 8.8 26 13.7 48
Christian Democratic (KDNP) 5.4 21 7.1 22 2.6 0
Young Democrats (FTDESz) 5.0 21 7.0 20 28.2 148
Hungarian Life and Justice (MIEP) 5.5 14
Data from Keesing’s Record o f  Word Events, News Digest for April 1990, p. 37380 and 
News Digest for May 1994, p. 40015; Edith Oltay, “The Coalition Government,” Report 
on Eastern Europe, No. 48 (29 November 1991), p. 51; Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander 
Motyl, and Charles Graybow, Nations in Transit 1998; Civil Society, Democracy and 
Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (Freedom House: 
1998), pp. 278-279.
Table 9 shows strong popular support for market economy-oriented parties in the 
first post-communist elections o f 1990. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz), and the Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) who ran on a  
platform of economic reforms came in first, second and third. The Socialist Party (MszP), 
formerly the communist party won weak popular support, gaining a small number of seats 
in the parliament. The HDF, SzDSz, the FKGP and the Christian Democratic Party
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(KDNP) formed a coalition government and started introducing the first market reforms. 
As a result o f  these reforms, policy and opinion started moving in the same direction 
towards the end o f their term in office, per Figure 9.
In 1994, the HDF was clearly voted out o f office, gaining only a fourth o f  the 
popular support that brought them to power in 1990. They lost to the Socialist Party and 
the Free Democrats, who also formed a coalition government and continued the 
introduction of market reforms through 1998. Figure 9 shows that throughout the four 
years o f  the Socialists’ administration, policy and opinion moved together in the same 
direction.
Despite government responsiveness in the area of economic reform, the Socialists 
also lost re-elections in 1998. However, they lost by a small margin and gained enough 
representation in the parliament to be a strong opposition to the winning coalition 
government o f the Young Democrats. In effect, the number o f voters who voted for the 
Socialist Party was virtually the same in 1994 and in 1998 (32.% versus 32.2%). Why did 
the voters punish incumbents in the Hungarian case? Since both the HDF and the Socialist 
administrations showed responsiveness to the public’s demand for the introduction o f a 
market economy, and their concerted policies eventually brought about economic growth 
and international praise for the manner in which the transition took place, how can we 
interpret the voters’ dissatisfaction with incumbents in these two elections?
If we look at these two administrations’ decisions on the manner in which to 
proceed with the transformation o f the economy, versus electoral promises, factors other 
than economic policies stand out as possible explanatory variables. It appears that the 
mechanics o f the introduction o f market economic measures, the lack o f  systematic
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information and education o f the public on the hardships of transition, and the pace of 
reforms versus popular expectations all contributed to a tarnished public image of these 
administrations, and turned the public against them. Political infighting and “crazy 
parliamentary debates” further exhausted public patience, while corruption scandals, many 
times associated with dubious deals with foreign companies lowered the public’s trust in 
the incumbent administration.
First, the mechanics o f the introduction o f a market economy were not well 
considered. The 1990 government led by Antall formulated a vision for where the 
Hungarian economy should be by 1993. A vision, however, does not translate into a 
sound economic program. Several economic analysts pointed out that the implementation 
of the economic program was short-sighted and uncoordinated with domestic and 
international factors of economic development. The policy o f  restitutions did not 
coordinate with a policy o f property security for current real estate owners, creating 
nervousness and insecurity at all levels. The slow reform in the banking sector did not 
coordinate with the booming o f small and medium-sized enterprises which needed credits 
in order to be able to compete on the newly created market. The liberalization of trade did 
not coordinate with a policy o f either protection, or efficient restructuring o f domestic 
enterprises, to avoid the destruction o f  domestic production.
Finally, privatization was done, as in many other places across the region, in a 
faulty manner, creating a false image o f  the amount of former state property transferred to 
private hands.21 During the period o f  greatest privatization (1992-1993), public support 
for the introduction of a market economy dropped twenty percentage points and never got 
back to the levels of the early nineties. In 1995 and 1996, Prime Minister Horn himself
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admitted that the mechanisms o f implementation o f a market economy had been faulty, 
which delayed the anticipated well-being for the majority o f the population.22
Second, the public was caught unprepared by the tremendous changes o f the early 
nineties. The public was not informed, nor educated on issues such as the difficulties 
laying ahead in the process o f transition,23 or the associated costs o f transition. Both the 
1990 government of Antall’s liberals and the 1994 government o f Horn’s socialists kept 
the Hungarian population marginally informed about the likely negative effects o f the 
policies they were pursuing. The large and increasing percentages o f Hungarians who did 
not know how to respond to the question on the introduction o f a market economy 
observed between 1990 and 1997, per Figure 10, confirm this lack o f information. If  the 
polarization of the population on the policy issue is understandable, with a third in favor 
and a third against the market economy, having a third of the population not 
knowledgeable about the issue indicates a serious problem o f communication between 
proponents of policy and recipients o f its results.
Third, the pace o f  reform versus popular expectations added to the general 
weariness against the economic transformation process. Prime Minister Antall fostered 
the promise of a better life for a majority o f the population during his administration. The 
slow pace of reform, the negative GDP, the high inflation and unemployment did not bring 
about any of the promised well-being during his administration. On the contrary, after two 
years, he was considered to be a Prime Minister who pursued policies to please one 
segment of the society while ignoring the others. He was also thought to have discredited 
the notion of democracy and o f market economy by underperforming.
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Prime Minister Horn also promised rapid improvements in living standards, against 
the advice o f his party’s chief economist, Lazio Bekesi. Bekesi went as far as to publish 
his protest against the “populist” electoral strategies o f  his party, warning that promising 
the social security o f the Kadar years was political demagoguery meant to take advantage 
o f the public nostalgia for those times in order to win over as many voters as possible. In 
the medium-term, he warned, the Hungarian economy would witness more contraction, 
and social welfare would have to be curtailed since there were no more funds to support 
expensive social programs.24
The Socialist Party won the 1994 elections, but within six months, Prime Minister 
Horn was forced to admit that the social welfare system could no longer be sustained at 
the current levels. The loss o f  a majority o f votes in 1998 can be traced back to his 
recognition of failure on the issue o f  social safety net, as well as on several other failures 
to meet electoral promises.
Overall, public dissatisfaction with political leaders translated into lowered support 
for a market economy and for democracy as well. Figure 11 shows that the public 
satisfaction with democracy maintained itself at low levels throughout the entire period, 
oscillating between the twenty and thirty percentage point line. The public apathy and 
dissatisfaction with politics in general, mentioned so often in the literature is evident in this 
figure.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154











martat ■conomy -a -  damocracy
Figure 11. Hungary: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with 
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
CONCLUSIONS
Of the front-runner countries in the race to transition to a market economy, 
Hungary remains the country that took the longest to experience positive GDP growth.
At the end o f ten years of transition, it is also the country considered to be the best 
environment for foreign investment among the other East European countries.
In terms o f government representation o f constituency interests on the question o f 
the introduction o f a market economy, Hungary points in the direction of a responsive 
governing style. Two consecutive administrations pursued, with higher or lower degrees 
o f success, the introduction o f policies conducive to the creation o f a market environment, 
per transition indicators, and to economic growth, per macro-economic indicators.
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However, the slowness o f reforms and the long time Hungarians had to wait to experience 
economic growth contributed to a decline o f popular support for the policy pursued.
Even with the 1999 positive evaluations o f the economy, it remains unclear if the 
general population is comfortable with the economic direction o f their country. Polls 
show widespread dissatisfaction with the disproportionate amount of foreign investment 
vis-a-vis domestic investment in the country, and with the low degree of control 
Hungarians feel they have over their economy. It remains to be seen whether the 
improvement o f the economy will generate more public trust in a market economic system 
and will restore trust in democracy.
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CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
POLAND
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
At the outset o f political transformation across Eastern Europe, Poland was the 
country with the most publicized and widely known economic and political crisis across 
the region. It had the highest external debt among East European countries ($40 bn), and 
an economic crisis accompanied by serious social implications. It also had a strong grass­
roots movement against communism and towards economic and political transformation 
that none o f the other communist countries in the region had. It was called “Solidarity” 
and it consisted o f trade unions which were demanding political and economic reform.
At the end of the nineties, Poland is the only country in Eastern Europe whose 
governments resolved to respond to grass-root calls for change by undertaking a shock 
therapy approach to transition. It also remains the only country in the region that did not 
lose popular support for the introduction o f  a market economy, resumed economic growth 
at a very early stage in the transition period (1992), and is headed in the direction of 
integration in the European Union at a steady pace.
Poland’s economic crisis started in late seventies, with a combination o f large 
foreign debt, budget deficit, wage pressure, and overextended investments. Trade union 
strikes and the formation o f Solidarity ensued, forcing the government into an open 
political crisis and a military coup d’etat in 1981. Martial law was imposed throughout 
Poland between December 1981 and July 1983, and all trade union activities were
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suspended. Continued worker unrest and violent clashes with security forces during mid­
eighties weakened the legitimacy o f  the communist government and forced Jaruselski’s 
government to consider reforms. In October, 1987, the government announced plans for 
economic and political reforms, and it decided to start talks with Solidarity and other 
social groups.
The last communist government, headed by Mieczyslaw Rakowski (appointed 
Prime Minister in September 1988), tried to reform the economy, only to see it sink 
further towards the end o f 1988.1 The main characteristics o f the reform program were 
the abandoning o f the central planning system, the enhancement o f  enterprise autonomy, 
and a reform o f the tax system. The reforms did not bring about the end o f economic 
recession, but created a popular and government attitude that was more prone to change 
and reform in Poland than in the other East European countries.2
By the late eighties, it became clear that the political status quo could no longer be 
maintained in Poland. Lech Walesa, then leader of the Solidarity movement, negotiated an 
agreement with the communist government o f President Wojciech Jaruzelski for broad 
political and economic pluralism. Free elections were scheduled in July 1989.3 The 
Solidarity movement secured all but one o f the 100 seats in the Senate, and all 161 seats 
that it was permitted to contest in the Sejm.
With Jaruzelski’s agreement to resign in September 1990 and permit direct 
presidential elections, the formal demise o f  the communist system was sealed in Poland. 
Lech Walesa ran for President and won. Walesa’s first nominee for Prime Minister, Jan 
Olszewski, failed to form a government. He then proceeded to appoint a radical 
economist for the position o f Prime Minister, Jan Bielecki.
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The program undertaken by the government headed by Jan Bielecki was the most 
ambitious and radical among East European countries. Most remarkably, it was backed 
by public support despite open government acknowledgment that reforms would come at 
a high social cost.4 Against the background o f hyperinflation, a budget deficit that was 
more than 8% o f  GNP, and a noncompetitive economy, the Bielecki government declared 
that it would “transform the Polish economy into a market economy, with the ownership 
structure changing in the direction o f that found in the advanced industrial economies/'5
The Bielecki government started applying a program o f economic reforms 
designed by Lescek Balcerowicz, the first post-communist Finance Minister and artisan of 
the Polish economic recovery plan. The so-called “Balcerowicz Plan” combined 
aggressive liberalization measures which resulted in the stabilization o f  the economy 
within six months. Reduction o f  government spending, stabilization o f  the exchange rate, 
wage restraints, reduction of government subsidies, and reduction o f  tariff and non-tariff 
barriers helped increase domestic competition, led to the convertibility o f the zloty, 
reduced the budget deficit to the 5% limit imposed by international lending institutions, 
and boosted trade.6
These measures were designed to stimulate growth and create an attractive market 
for foreign investment. Figure 5 showed that positive GDP growth resumed in Poland as 
early as 1992, and that GDP continued to grow throughout the end o f the nineties.
Foreign direct investment also grew steadily, reaching $4 bn in 1998 (per Table 11 below).
Measures to privatize and restructure the Polish economy also helped GDP 
growth. Legislation introduced in the late eighties allowed state-owned enterprises to 
transform themselves into joint-stock companies. The distribution o f privatization
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vouchers, much along the same lines as the Czech vouchers, led to the creation of 
investment funds and other types o f institutional investors in 1990. The “privatization 
offensive” undertaken by the Minister o f Ownership Transformation, Janusz 
Lewandowski. in 1991 led to the commercialization of some big state-owned enterprises. 
Privatization through liquidation, small privatization, and “spontaneous” worker 
privatization also added to the overall outcome o f increased share o f  GDP resulting from 
the private sector.7
Such economic measures led international lending institutions to grant Poland a 
debt forgiveness o f up to 50%. The Paris Club adopted a resolution on March 15, 1991, 
according to which three-fifths o f 50% o f the debt Poland was carrying was to be forgiven 
immediately. The rest o f the debt forgiveness was to be granted contingent upon Poland’s 
coming to an agreement with the IMF to restructure its economy, and its fulfillment o f the 
second IMF accord. Such decisions sent a strong signal throughout the region that if 
governments were determined to switch to a market economy, the international lending 
organizations would be willing to help.8
Two irreconcilable positions dominated Polish politics throughout the nineties.
One advocated a radical approach to reform, which was characterized by austerity 
measures, allowing the market forces to operate freely, and getting the government out o f 
economics. This was the position fostered by Balcerowicz, Walesa, and the Solidarity 
Post-Electoral Action (AWS). The second position favored more state intervention into 
economic decisions, and a more protectionist industrial policy and trade. This is the 
position fostered by Mazowiecki (first post-communist Prime Minister), the Socialist Party
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(SLD), the Peasant’s Party (PSL), and the Movement for the Reconstruction o f  Poland 
(ROP).
Between these two positions, Poland witnessed a highly unstable political 
environment in the early nineties, with governments failing to acquire enough 
parliamentary support to pass legislation, or failing to convince political groups to form 
majority coalitions. As a result, between 1990 and 1992, Walesa changed the government 
composition six times, and won himself a  reputation o f being an “authoritarian” politician. 
This reputation cost him the presidency when he ran for re-election.
Despite polarization in the early nineties on the pace and depth o f reform, the 
remarkable aspect of the Polish program o f  economic transformation remains its continuity 
across the political spectrum. Given the frequent changes in governing coalitions and a 
fairly tumultuous political life, the Poles maintained the line of the Balcerowicz program in 
their approach to reform.
Popular disenchantment over the manner o f  politics and the implementation o f  
reforms led to the voting out o f Solidarity, and to a victory of the Socialist Party in the 
parliamentary elections o f 1993. In their electoral campaign, the SLD promised a reversal 
o f the logic o f transformation o f the previous years, more spending on social programs, 
and more state intervention in privatization and restructuring decisions. In light o f  the 
socialist electoral platform, a return to a state-interventionist strategy was predicted and 
expected by foreign investors.
With all the rhetoric o f change, and the accompanying gloomy forecasts o f  a  slow­
down o f the reform in Poland,9 the economic strategy followed by the SLD government 
was very much along the lines o f  the Balcerowicz’s program. In presenting the program
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o f  the leftist governing coalition to the Sejm, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
announced the maintenance o f a policy line o f  state financial discipline.10 Marek 
Borowski, the first minister o f finance under the socialist coalition simply carried out the 
1994 budget that had been drafted by his reform-oriented predecessors. Grzegorz 
Kolodko, the second minister of finance and a severe critic o f the Balcerowicz program, 
continued the language and practice o f discipline in public spending, curtailment o f  budget 
deficit, and the opening o f the Polish markets to foreign investment. Whether due to 
accords signed with international financial institutions, or to the fact that after four years 
o f  liberalization the tide o f economic transformation could no longer be reversed, the 
socialist government chose to continue the program o f economic reform that returned 
growth to Poland.
Overall, unlike other East European countries, Poland managed to stick to its 
original plan o f economic transformation throughout the nineties, to end 1999 with the 
same finance minister who started the reform, Lescek Balcerowicz. This consistency, with 
ail the deviations and flaws o f implementation, won the country the reputation o f reliability 
in the eyes o f international institutions, foreign investors, and eventually o f its own 
constituencies. Even when governments were being changed every other month in the 
early nineties, seemingly on account o f insensitive economic policies towards some social 
layers, from Balcerowicz to Olszewski, Pawlak, Suchocka, and then to the leftist 
governments o f Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Kolodko, all Polish governments chose to 
continue the radical plan o f  introduction o f  market economics through a policy o f  shock 
therapy.
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TRANSITION BEGINS: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS 
As a result o f the economic trends described above, when the EBRD transition 
indicators started being calculated, the progress o f the Polish government towards reform 
looked promising. Table 10 below summarizes these ratings.
^bl^^^olm id^ndicator^fgrogcsyi^ransitio iU ^jnarketeconoin^
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share 55% 60% 60% 65% 65%
Large scale privatization 3 3 3 3.2 3.2
Small scale privatization 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Governance and restructuring 3 3 3 3 3
Price liberalization 3 3 3 3 3.2
Trade system 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Competition policy 3 3 3 3 3
Bank reform 3 3 3 3 3.2
Securities reform n/a 3 3 3.2 3.2
Investment law n/a 4 4 n/a n/a
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f  progress calculated by 
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
An analysis o f  Poland’s ratings compared to Hungary’s and the Czech Republic’s 
reveals that, in many respects, Poland was actually behind the other two countries in the 
introduction of reform policies.
With fifty-five percent o f  national wealth coming from the private sector, Poland 
was on a par with Hungary and behind the Czech Republic in 1993, but behind both in
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1997 in the private share o f  GDP category. This is surprising because economists have 
long held that the growth o f  the Polish economy was largely due to its private sector. If  
this argument applied across all countries, or at least across those countries that are 
considered front-runners in transition policies, both Hungary and the Czech Republic 
should have experienced growth about the same time as Poland, if not sooner. On the 
contrary, both took much longer to experience growth than Poland. Additionally, both 
ended the period with a higher share o f  GDP coming from the private sector than Poland 
(75 and 80 percent to Poland’s 65 percent).
A similarly puzzling situation is reflected in the ratings o f large-scale privatization. 
Poland lagged behind the Czech Republic and Hungary, with a mere 25 percent o f large- 
scale enterprises privatized or in the process o f being privatized, to the latter’s more than 
50 percent of state-owned enterprises in private ownership.
In small-scale privatization, all three countries have similar scores, moving from 
complete privatization o f small companies to establishing standards o f performance typical 
o f advanced industrial economies.
Why did Poland resume growth so much faster than the other two front-runners if 
in terms o f privatization, it was actually behind them? A comparison o f progress in the 
other transition ratings does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the growth 
differentials among these three countries, nor does it explain the relative success o f the 
Polish economy over the economies o f Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Ail three countries had similar ratings o f promoting corporate governance (3 
rating), with Poland and the Czech Republic one year behind Hungary in terms o f moving 
towards actual improvement in corporate governance in 1997. Price liberalization was
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substantial for all three, with state-procurement at non-market prices largely phased out. 
Poland followed Hungary in the implementation o f comprehensive price liberalization, 
with utility prices approaching economic costs in 1997. The Czech Republic remained at a 
lower level o f  price liberalization.
With respect to the trade system ratings, all three countries witnessed similar 
progress by removing import and export restrictions, and all significant export tariffs. All 
three countries also moved towards standards o f performance norms o f advanced 
industrial economies, removed most tariff barriers and became members in the World 
Trade Organization.
In competition policy, all three countries had the same level o f progress, 
introducing some enforcement actions to reduce abuse o f  market power and to promote a 
competitive environment.
In banking reform, Poland followed Hungary starting in 1997, but with more 
modest achievements in moving towards banking laws and regulations compatible with 
BIS standards, and effective supervision and substantial financial deepening. With respect 
to the establishment o f  bank solvency, full interest rate liberalization, and the start-up o f 
lending to private enterprises, Poland and Hungary were on a par, with the Czech 
Republic lagging behind.
Both Poland and Hungary reached the same level o f  progress towards securities 
reform, moving from the establishment o f independent share registries, secure clearance 
and settlement procedures, towards securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO 
standards.
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All three front-runners established a clear framework for encouraging investment. 
No legal discrimination was allowed between domestic and foreign investors.
Overall, Poland’s transition ratings taken individually indicate that the government 
undertook reforms to take the economy on the path o f transformation to a market 
economy. Poland’s transition ratings taken comparatively indicate that the country was 
behind both Hungary and the Czech Republic in the introduction o f some reforms.
Despite this finding, at no point during the period under discussion was the growth o f 
either Hungary or the Czech Republic equal to or higher than Poland’s.
While this appears to be a counterintuitive situation, we need to recall that 
transition indicators describe stages o f reform in individual sectors towards an ideal point, 
a functioning market economy. They do not gauge the degree to which these indicators 
contribute towards resumption o f growth; nor is there a methodological assumption that if 
indicators are fairly advanced, growth should automatically follow. There is, however, a 
methodological caveat regarding the distinction between indicators o f development, which 
gauge the enhancement o f the national economy and o f the individual standards of living, 
and indicators o f transition.
Additionally, an important element o f distinction between the situation of Poland in 
the beginning o f the transition and the situation o f  the other two countries was their 
starting point. Poland started its economic transformation with a large external debt, sky­
rocketing inflation, large unemployment rates, and wage pressure. Elements o f private 
sector industry existed, however, which helped the country in its development of a vibrant 
private sector after 1989, in services and small, family-run enterprises. The Czech 
Republic and Hungary started out from low external debt, virtually no official
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unemployment, a partially liberalized economy, and some modicum o f  private enterprise. 
Their transition ratings reflect their more advanced starting point in the transition. 
However, the relative slowness o f reforms in Hungary (the gradual approach), and the 
sometimes inconsistent approach to reform in the Czech Republic resulted in more 
fluctuating trends in these two countries, and less constant economic growth than in 
Poland.
Additional macro-economic indicators listed in Table 11 below offer a picture o f 
the dynamics of economic growth and other economic indicators that offer insights into 
the reasons why the Polish economy grew more, faster and a steady pace than the 
economies of the other two countries.
^bl^^^Poland^M^cro-economicindicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 
(Percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP at constant prices -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 5.2
Consumer prices (average) 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.0
Gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing 
(annual average, adjusted
for inflation)3 -6.8 -5.7 0.1 4.3 4.9 7.0 6.6 n/a
Unemployment
(% o f  labor force) 
11.8 13.6 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 10.5 n/a
Trade Balance
(in billions o f  U.S. dollars) 
0.1 0.5 -2.3 -0.8 -1.8 -8.2 -11.3 -14.0
Foreign Direct Investment 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.1 2.8 3.0 4.0
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 223. 
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.
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Steadiness o f trends suggesting a coherent approach to the reform o f the economy 
is the one characteristic o f the evolution o f Poland’s economic indicators that was not 
noticeable in the economic indicators o f the other two countries.
Inflation rates, gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing, and GDP growth 
maintained a steady course throughout the period, with inflation going down, monthly 
wages going up, and national wealth going up. Unemployment rates increased in the first 
part o f the transition, a phenomenon to be expected in the conditions o f the reorganization 
o f the foundations upon which the economy was built, then stayed on a declining slope 
through 1998.
These trends concur with earlier positions that Poland maintained a steady 
approach to the reform o f its economy. The approach can also be characterized as being 
comprehensive, since it resulted in healthy and far-reaching results, ranging from sustained 
economic growth, individual earnings growth, better purchasing power, and higher 
employment rates.
It should be noted, however, that throughout this period, Poland’s inflation rates 
were the highest among the front-runner countries. Given its starting point in the 
transition, this reality should not overshadow the efforts made by the government to 
maintain a tight fiscal policy. In fact, after lagging behind Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, Poland finished the period ahead o f Hungary, and on a par with the Czech 
Republic with respect to inflation rates.
Similarly, unemployment rates were much higher in Poland than in the other two 
countries throughout the period under discussion. In this regard as well, Poland crossed
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the finish line on a par with rates o f  unemployment in Hungary, but with twice as much 
unemployment as the Czech Republic.
Fluctuating trends can also be observed. The trade balance and the foreign direct 
investment indicators show less consistency in outcomes o f economic policy. The trade 
balance was in good equilibrium through 1992. Afterwards, the economy experienced the 
phenomenon of “overheating”, meaning that the economy was consuming more than it 
was producing. The surplus o f imports over exports has been credited to the growth in 
consumer demand faster than the economy could satisfy the consumer appetite.
Moreover, the lower quality o f the Polish products over imported products led to more 
consumption o f imported versus domestic goods, a phenomenon that we have observed in 
the other two countries as well. Some analysts have likened the disproportion between 
consumer appetite and the economic ability to satisfy it with “living above one’s means,” a 
phenomenon distantly resembling the consumption patterns o f the Gierek era."
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS 
How did the outcome o f economic policies affect public support for a market 
economy? Figure 12 below traces the curve o f public opinion support for a market 
economy, the curve o f GDP growth per capita, and the curve o f unemployment.
Figure 12 shows that public opinion support for a market economy in Poland 
remained strong throughout the period under discussion, even when the unemployment 
rates were soaring. O f all the countries under discussion, Poland’s public support never 
sank below the fifty percent line, a strength that is all the more remarkable given the 
country’s high unemployment rates.
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Figure 12. Poland: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 217; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1-7 (Brussels: 
Commission of the European Community, 1991-1997).
Is there an observable relationship between policy outcomes and public support for 
the introduction o f a market economy? Does that relationship reveal patterns o f 
government responsiveness to their publics?
The public support and economic growth lines in Figure 12 suggest that there is a 
direct relationship between these variables, with public support pulling the policy line 
upwards. The trends observable in the Polish case come the closest to the responsive 
government model described in Chapter 3, Figure 2. Strong public support for a policy 
led policy to largely follow the direction of public support. The relative distance between 
the two lines became narrower after an observed time-lag. As policy makers reduced the 
distance between policy outcomes and public support for those outcomes, they engaged in
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responsive behavior characteristic o f a representative democracy system. O f the front- 
runner countries in the race to transition to a market economy, Poland is thus the first 
country that fits the responsive government model.
Additional data supports the finding that strong public support was present and 
justified the tough economic policies that were implemented in order to bring about the 
desired economic system. Figure 13 below shows consistency o f the dynamics o f public 
support for a market economy.
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Figure 13. Poland: Dynamics o f Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction o f a 
Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7  (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
As noted, public support for the introduction o f a market economy was 
consistently high in Poland, within ten percentage points below or above the sixty percent 
threshold. Conversely, the percentage o f  Poles who did not believe that a market
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
economy was the right system for their country was consistently low throughout the 
period. Similarly, the percent o f  Poles who did not know how to respond to this question 
was low, and declined steadily after 1994. This suggests that the public was relatively 
informed about the implications of a market economy, and made an informed choice on 
the questionnaire. At the height of public uncertainty about the economic direction o f the 
country, after the 1993 elections which brought the socialists to power, over twenty 
percentage points still separated those who believed that the market economy was the 
right policy to pursue versus those who did not believe that to be the case.
It remains interesting to point out the differences in policy outcomes and public 
support across the three countries with respect to the introduction o f a market economic 
system, especially in light o f  the ratings o f transition indicators. These differences help 
explain why, on occasion, hypotheses explaining the dynamics o f  public support in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic do not necessarily apply to Poland.
Poland undertook a shock therapy approach to economic reforms early in the 
transition, maintained that approach throughout the entire period under discussion, and 
was the first among these countries to resume economic growth. It also maintained its 
public support for this approach to reform throughout the period. Despite the resumption 
o f growth, transition ratings place Poland behind Hungary and the Czech Republic with 
respect to private sector share o f GDP, and lagging behind them on a few other indicators 
(per previous discussions).
Hungary started with a gradual approach to economic reform, did not resume 
growth for several years, went through a recession and diminishing standards o f living, 
and eventually witnessed substantial decrease o f public support for the introduction o f a
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market economy. Despite the recession, transition indicators place Hungary ahead of 
Poland on several counts, and largely on the same footing with the Czech Republic.
The Czech Republic started reforms at (what economists consider) a rapid pace, 
but applied them in an inconsistent fashion. After a short period o f  growth, the country 
sank into recession. For economic policies, but more likely for political reasons, the 
country steadily lost public supporters for a market economy, and for a democracy in 
general. Transition ratings also place the Czech Republic ahead o f Poland on several 
counts.
While economists offer a variety o f  reasons to explain the differences in the 
outcomes o f these three economic strategies, a majority agrees that the strongest variable 
in Poland’s favor was the consistency with which the reform program was implemented. 
Since this is a subject which deserves another volume of attention, we shall return to the 
issue o f the dynamics o f public support for the economic programs o f the three countries.
A minimum of two hypotheses explaining the difference in the dynamics of public 
support between Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can be found in the literature. 
The first hypothesis is unrelated to the dynamics o f popular support and government 
policies: the point o f departure in the transition, commonly referred to as “the starting 
point” gets credit for this difference.
Briefly stated, this argument is based on the hypothesis that if the point of 
departure in the transition to a new economic or political system is relatively weak, 
meaning that the economy is in bad shape, the political system is not liberalized, and the 
general situation o f the country is generally poor, the public’s expectations for a better life 
within a short time after the transition started are low. Conversely, if the starting point is
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relatively good, the economy has witnessed some liberalization measures, and a degree of 
political freedom exists, the public is more likely to expect wealth and a well-functioning 
system fast.
Applied to the three countries under discussion, Poland fits the first hypothesis, 
while Hungary and the Czech Republic fit the latter. Poles started out from a difficult 
economic situation in 1989. Their level o f expectation for a better life was low, and then- 
level o f patience to wait until the economic situation got better was high.
In Hungary and the Czech Republic the situation was reversed. The economies of 
these countries were in fairly good shape at the outset o f the transition. When the political 
change occurred in 1989, Hungarians and Czechs had higher expectations about the future 
o f their personal economic situation. The immediate results o f transition policies must 
have come as a shock to many people, and resulted in disappointment about the emerging 
system commensurate with the expectations. This disappointment translated into lowered 
support for the economic and political system believed to have caused the decline o f 
personal and national well-being.
This approach helps explain why Poles had a better sense of endurance o f  the post- 
1989 events, while Czech and Hungarians had less endurance which translated in 
diminished support for both political and economic developments. Table 12 below 
supports the hypothesis that the level o f  expectations for a better life o f the Polish public 
was modest. Fewer Poles believed that their personal financial situation would get better 
during the following twelve months than those who believed that it would stay the same or 
get worse. Between 1995 and 1996, when the benefits o f economic growth started to be 
felt throughout a larger social stratum, slightly more people believed that their situation
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would get better than that it would get worse. The fact that the largest proportion of 
respondents consistently thought that their situation would not change suggests a degree 
o f modesty about Poles’ expectations for the future. Even with these low expectations, 
Poles continued to support radical reforms, because they believed that reforms would 
eventually bring abundance for large majorities.
Table 12.--Poland: Public opinion on financial situation in the household
___________________ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996_____________
Will be better 24 17 21 24 15 25 24
Will be same 31 33 30 37 37 39 40
Will be worse 24 32 34 23 30 17 23
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 -7  (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. In 1990, the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how 
will your own financial situation change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the 
next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation of your household will get a lot 
better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a 
lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and 
‘get a lot worse’ categories were cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped 
from questionnaires.
A second hypothesis explaining the relative differences between the three countries 
is relevant from the point o f view o f the dynamics o f  public support for the particular 
policy. The level o f  public knowledge about the implications o f  the upcoming transition is 
considered a major discriminator between the levels o f  public support for reform in these 
three countries.
Comparatively, Poles were much better informed about the difficulties o f the 
transition period than were either the Hungarians or the Czechs. The Polish government
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repeatedly pointed out to the population that the reforms would be hard, that bad and 
worse times would come before better times could come, and that bad times were a sign 
that good times were ahead. The government also admitted that unemployment, loss o f 
purchasing power, and fewer and weaker social programs were going to be inherent in the 
transition before the country could experience growth from which a majority would 
benefit. Figure 13 also supports the hypothesis that the Polish public was knowledgeable 
about the implications o f a market economy, with rates of people who did not know 
whether a market economy was good for their country o f under thirty percent, and going 
steadily down after 1994, to reach ten percent in 1997.
Hungarians, on the other hand, expected a milder impact o f reform policies, 
especially in light o f the political rhetoric surrounding the choice o f the gradualist 
approach. They were unprepared for the high rates o f unemployment that soared once 
reforms started to be implemented, and were largely uniformed about the costs of 
transition and the consequences o f reforms on the general population. Figure 10 showed 
sustained high rates o f  undecided people on the question o f market reform, with rates 
going steadily up between 1991 and 1997.
The level of public knowledge about the implications o f the upcoming transition 
also helps explain why hypotheses for the dynamics o f public support for the introduction 
o f a market economy in Hungary and the Czech Republic do not apply to Poland.
In Hungary’s case, the decline in public support for a market economy was 
credited to the hardships o f transition, such as high and unexpected unemployment rates. 
These accompanying liabilities raised the Hungarians’ insecurity about their personal 
situation and undermined support for a market economy.
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In Poland, however, the rate of unemployment was also high, even more so than in 
Hungary, while public support for the introduction o f a market economy was maintained, 
even during the times of the highest unemployment rates in 1993. This has only been 
explained as a result of the fact that Poles knew that unemployment would go up and were 
not surprised when it did, even if they did not enjoy it.
One final point merits attention in the discussion o f dynamics o f popular support 
and government policies. As the next section will show, despite sustained public approval 
o f a market economy and o f democracy, the Polish public also used the polls to vote 
incumbents out. A legitimate question imposes itself: if the Polish public approved o f the 
economic policies o f the government, why were incumbents voted out? In other words, if 
the government was responsive to their publics by introducing an economic system desired 
by wide majorities, why did the government get a no-confidence vote? As we shall see, 
popular approval of post-1989 politics was as important in Poland as we noted in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. To this final analysis we now turn.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT 
That popular disillusionment with politics existed in Poland as well is plainly 
illustrated by the voter “punishment” of incumbents for their performance in all three 
elections held between 1991 and 1997. Table 13 below lists election results in 
parliamentary elections for 1991, 1993, and 1997.
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Table 13.—Polish parliamentary election results (1991-97)
Party 1991 1993 1997
% o f vote seats % o f  vote seats % o f  vote seats
Solidarity 11
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 60 20.4 208 192
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 252
Freedom Union 68
Peasant Party (PSL) 15.4 168 30
Movement for Reconstruction 11
Democratic Union (UD) 13 83 10.6 78
Union o f Labor (UP) 7.3 43
Confederation for an Independent 
Poland (KPN) 5.8 22
Non-Party Bloc in Support o f Reforms (BBWR) 5.4 18
Data from Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Charles Graybow, Nations in Transit 
1998; Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly 
Independent States (Freedom House: 1998), p. 441.
Note: For 1993, seats in the Sejm and in the Senate are cumulated; percentages are for 
Sejm only. Union o f Labor (UP) is a party established in 1992, and composed o f  
Solidarity o f Labor (SP), Social-Democratic Movement (RDS), and Wielkopolska. For 
1997, seats in the Sejm and in the Senate are cumulated.
The most notable rejection o f an incumbent party occurred in 1991, when 
Solidarity was one o f  28 other parties who gained minimal representation in the 
parliament. After the resounding success that Solidarity had in the July 1989 negotiated 
elections, when they won all but one o f the seats that could be contested, the results o f the 
1991 elections were desultory and posed a great question mark regarding its causes.
The two years that passed between the 1989 and the 1991 elections weakened 
Solidarity. As in many other cases in the region, the group’s unity disappeared as soon as 
the common enemy, the communist party, was removed from politics. Solidarity members
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started disagreeing among themselves, and with their leader Lech Walesa, on a wide 
variety of issues, from political appointments to economic policy-making. Some Solidarity 
members wanted to see their organization withdraw from politics and return to a focus on 
workers’ issues. Others advocated the creation o f a political wing o f the trade unions that 
would enjoy union support. Some members advocated a more state-interventionist 
approach to economic reform, while others, including Lech Walesa, insisted on fast and 
radical reform. Many o f these factions eventually transformed themselves into parties or 
organizations, further splitting Solidarity’s chances for wide public support.
The poor showing o f  the Solidarity group in the 1991 elections was due as much 
to internal political infighting as to the overall state o f divisiveness in Polish politics at the 
time. The resulting popular tiredness with the bickering o f the emerging political system 
translated into a rejection o f  the incumbent party.
The fact that the Democratic Union o f Tadeusz Mazowiecki won the largest share 
o f the popular vote in 1991 (a lackluster thirteen percent o f  the popular vote) suggests a 
vague popular endorsement o f a more cautious approach to economic reform.
It is interesting to note the manner in which the electorate seemed to swing 
between Mazowiecki and Walesa during the first years o f transition. Mazowiecki came 
into conflict with Walesa many times on the pace and radicalism o f reforms. Walesa’s 
more radical approach seemed to be the one that the electorate preferred, when he was 
popularly elected for President in 1990. The fact that Mazowiecki did not even come in 
second in the first round o f the 1990 presidential elections was a blow to him and his 
supporters. Only a year later, voters chose to give Mazowiecki’s party one more chance 
to form a government that would approach reform in a different, more moderate manner.
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During the parliamentary elections o f 1991, his party won 83 seats, to Solidarity’s 11 seats 
in the Sejm.
That chance did not materialize in a different approach to reform, nor did it lead to 
a less fragmented political environment. On the contrary, during the two years in which 
the Democratic Union was the major governing partner, many coalitions were attempted, 
three Prime Ministers were changed, and little agreement was forged on a variety o f 
political and economic issues. Eventually, Walesa chose to dissolve the parliament and 
call early elections.
The sweeping victory o f the Socialist Party in the 1993 elections again seemed to 
suggest popular endorsement for a more moderate approach to economic reform, the one 
advocated by the SLD during their election campaign. However, at no time did the SLD 
renounce the principle o f a market economy. They did announce that they would try to be 
more sensitive to all the social layers affected by the transition, even if they had to modify 
previously agreed-to deals, such as Poland’s agreements with the IMF.
As noted in previous sections, the fact that the Socialists did not actually reverse 
the economic policy o f their liberal predecessors amounted to continued economic 
growth, and resulted in continued support for a market economy.
The Socialist victory in 1993 seems to have also been more a rejection of post- 
communist politics and a sign o f  favoring parties that acted and behaved in a  more civil 
manner than a rejection o f the specific program o f  transformation o f the coalition. The 
years o f constant political contestation, party infighting, disagreement among members o f 
the ruling coalition, and among members o f one and the same party paid off. Analysts 
pointed out at the time o f the 1993 electoral campaign that the SLD impressed voters with
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their public image. The party pitched an image o f unity and decency in politics, and a 
clear vision o f where they wanted to take the country against the endless infighting o f  the 
incumbent parties. That image, together with promises for a more sensitive approach to 
reform for the disadvantaged social layers turned them into a better political alternative to 
the on-going political struggles that the public witnessed until 1993.12
The 1997 elections seemed another instance o f “punishing” incumbents, but it was 
less clear what they were punished for this time. The Socialists no longer won a majority 
of the popular vote, leaving room for the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), the political 
wing o f Solidarity, to form a government. AWS won a majority of votes and entered into 
a majority coalition with another liberal oriented party, Balcerowicz’s Freedom Union.
On careful consideration, the Socialists were not really voted out o f  office. In 
1997. they won sixteen seats less than in 1993. A loss o f  sixteen seats for four years o f 
government is not a significant enough loss to indicate a popular vote of non-confidence 
for any party.
Not the same can be said about the SLD’s major coalition partner, the PSL, who 
won five times less seats in 1997 than in 1993 (30 to 168). This loss o f 138 seats suggests 
strong voter rejection of the extreme attitude and proposed policies o f this party. In 
effect, if the PSL were less radical in its interventionist agenda, they might have won a few 
additional seats which would have enabled them to form a new SLD-PSL coalition 
government.
The 1997 vote suggests that the number o f  Polish voters who supported the SLD’s 
left-oriented approach to politics and reform stayed roughly the same between 1993 and 
1997. The explanation for the loss o f a majority in 1997 is not necessarily voter rejection.
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The explanation for the general election result must lie elsewhere.
Two observations regarding the Polish political life are helpful in understanding 
voter behavior. On the one hand, it has been repeatedly pointed out that there is little 
substantive difference among the platforms o f parties who advocate market reform and the 
introduction o f a market economy (the so-called right-wing forces).13 There is also little 
political agreement on creating a unified political force to represent that point o f view in 
elections. As a result, voters had difficulty understanding who it was preferable to vote 
for, what the differences among political platforms were, and who would best represent 
voter interests. The 1991 elections exemplified this public disarray, with twenty-eight 
small, and therefore weak, political parties voted in the parliament.
Secondly, due to the fragmentation o f the right-wing forces, the left did not really 
have a serious challenger until 1997. On numerous occasions, and particularly around the 
1993 elections, analysts pointed out that the weakness o f the right-wing forces in Polish 
politics have thrown voters in the arms o f  the Socialist Party. At some point, the right 
wing forces must have heard those criticisms. Between the 1993 and the 1997 elections, 
five small right-wing parties united under the umbrella o f  the Solidarity Electoral Action 
and ran on a unified platform. At the time that this platform was adopted and signed, the 
big surprise was not the existence or the contents o f  the platform, but the fact that all the 
parties involved in the AWS agreed to it and signed it.14
These observations entitle us to hypothesize that voter behavior was highly 
dependent on public satisfaction with post-1989 politics. Figure 14 below shows that 
Polish public satisfaction with democracy was lower than satisfaction with the introduction 
o f a market economy, although at the end o f  the period, the two lines come nicely to meet
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each other between the fifty to sixty percent approval rates. It is also worth noting that 
the two lines have an interesting parallelism about them, with the market economy line 
(again) pulling the democracy approval line upwards. Both lines see their lowest point in 
the same year, 1994, the first year after the take-over by the socialist government.






1990 1991 1992 1993 1904 1995 1996 1997 1968
market economy - e -  democracy
Figure 14. Poland: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with 
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. I - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
That public disappointment with post-communist politics was present in Poland as 
well is illustrated by the figures we used above. The important element o f Polish politics 
remains, however, the fact that in spite o f public disappointments, support for the 
introduction of reforms never faltered. It also did not lead to such undermining o f  both 
the notion of a market economy and o f democracy per se as we have noted in the case of 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The fact that the Polish economy performed so much
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better than the economies o f  the other two countries remains the main distinguishing 
factor that explains the maintenance o f public support for the system, but not necessarily 
for the people implementing it.
CONCLUSIONS
Poland is the first Eastern European country in which the government behaved in a 
responsive manner towards its publics, in a manner suggesting that the political system is 
moving towards a representative democracy. Strong public support for the introduction 
of a market economy pushed the government into sustaining a radical and effective 
program o f reform which returned growth to Poland. Throughout this process, the Polish 
public did not lose confidence in the principles o f a market economy, even when reforms 
came at high social prices. Nor did they lose confidence in democratic principles, even 
though disappointment with post-communist politics was reflected in a low approval 
rating for the manner in which democracy was performing in their country.
Disappointment with post-communist politics led the public to vote incumbents 
out of office on a few occasions. That disappointment did not amount to turning the 
public against the policies o f  the government in power is illustrated by the sustained 
support for market economic policies, even on the eve o f the 1993 elections, when voters 
rejected Solidarity and every party that was associated with it in favor o f a socialist 
government. That disillusionment did not amount to turning the public against democracy 
is illustrated by the parallelism o f public support for a market economy and support for 
democracy in general.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI
1. David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The 
Case o f Poland,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 75-145.
2. For a good summary o f Poland’s economic and political crises o f the eighties, see 
Preworski, pp. 134-137.
3. Walesa negotiated the restoration o f  the legal status o f Solidarity and provisions for 
the first free elections in June 1989. The agreement provided for open contestation o f 
35% o f the lower chamber seats (the Sejm), with the Communists assigned to have 
38% of the seats, and the remaining seats to go to parties formerly aligned with the 
Communist Party. Solidarity was allowed to contest all the seats in a new upper 
chamber, the Senate, which would have limited veto power over the lower chamber. 
The Communists, however, did not get the necessary 50% threshold o f  public 
support, per agreement, causing them great embarrassment.
4. Preworski thinks that the large public support for the introduction o f a market 
economy despite the evident and continued worsening o f personal economic 
situations was due to the successful public campaign that the government organized 
to convince voters o f the upcoming benefits o f  the system. Poles became convinced 
that their situation could not get better before getting worse, so they put up with 
reforms and their deleterious effects in the expectation of future rewards. As a result, 
even when things were getting really difficult, Poles were convinced that the economy 
was going in the right direction. Preworski, pp. 158-161.
5. “IMF.”
6. Ben Slay, “Poland: The Rise and Fall o f  the Balcerowicz Plan,” RFURL Research 
Report, Vol. 1, No. 5 (January 31, 1992), pp. 40-47.
7. For a good summary, see Ben Slay, “Poland: An Overview,” RFURL Research 
Report, Vol. 1, No. 17 (April 24, 1992), pp. 15-21.
8. Wojciech Bienkowski, “Can Poland Deviate from IMF Requirements?” RFURL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 31 (July 31, 1992), pp. 49-53.
9. The Polish representative to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
resigned, declaring that he did not want to lend his reputation to “a government o f 
economic disaster,” while Adam Michnik predicted the socialist government’s defeat 
in reversing the economic logic o f  the previous four years o f transformation. See 
“Economy under SLD-PSL Rule Analyzed,” FBIS-EEU-97-189 (September 6,
1997), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
10. “Prime Minister Cimoszewicz’s Address to Sejm,” FBIS-EEU-96-032 (February 14,
1996), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
11. “Economy under SLD-PSL.”
12. Krzysztof Jasiewicz, “Poland,” European Journal o f  Political Research, Vol. 26 
(1994), pp. 397-408.
13. “Poland: Polish Political Parties’ Goals ‘Similar in General,’” FBIS-EEU-97-261 
(September 18, 1997), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
14. “Poland: Columnist Criticizes ‘Solidarity’ Electoral Action Program,” FBIS-EEU-97- 
160 (June 9, 1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
189
CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS:
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Slovak Republic is the only front-runner East European country in this study 
which witnessed continued economic growth during transition, while reverting to more 
centralized and state regulated policies. In fact, the Slovak Republic (hereafter Slovakia) 
is the only front-runner country to experience growth accompanied by a regression of the 
transition process. Despite economic growth compatible with the other front-runner 
countries, at the end o f six years o f transition Slovakia was not on the list o f countries 
invited to start EU accession talks, and not a new NATO member like her neighbors, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These consequences, coming at the end o f six 
years o f government policies oriented towards state intervention in economic and political 
developments prompted the electorate to vote out of office the political group which 
fostered these policies: The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, headed by Vladimir 
Me£iar.
Political developments after the September 1998 national elections, which brought 
an end to the Me£iar government, marked a turning point in the country’s official 
orientation. Between 1999 and the year 2000, the country pursued an aggressive policy of 
Euro-Atlantic integration, determined to catch up with the Czech Republic and the other 
East European countries who had already been invited to start EU accession talks. The
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beginning o f the year 2000 found Slovakia starting EU accession talks, and struggling to 
restore domestic and international credibility.
While the West European countries and the United States embraced the political 
changes in Slovakia and promised to assist the country in its efforts to integrate into the 
larger family of democratic states, it is becoming increasingly clear that the six years of 
MeCiar rule have affected the country in deeper and more substantial ways than 
anticipated. Economic growth and social benefits have been maintained artificially high, in 
a manner reminiscent o f the state-controlled approach, and the country is only starting to 
understand that the introduction o f a market economy entails preliminary austerity 
measures that some social layers are not prepared to support.1 This may undermine the 
efforts o f the current government and propel MeCiar into power again.
In the beginning o f the transition to a market economy and a democratic political 
system, Slovakia had, like the Czech Republic, a double duty to accomplish: to establish 
its statehood and to complete the political and economic transition. While Slovakia did 
not inherit established state and government structures like the Czech Republic, the 
mechanisms of a market economy had already been activated during the three years in 
which the republics were in a  federation (1990-1992). As a result, the economic health of 
the country improved each year between 1990 and 1995, although positive growth was 
only witnessed after the separation o f the two republics (see Figure 5).
Politically, however, the two republics stood apart. Slovakia did not have a 
Vaclav Havel to guide her with his personality and gain domestic and international 
credibility. Worse still, Slovakia had fewer former dissidents to lend it credibility and 
popularity within international circles. Instead, Slovakia had Vladimir MeCiar and his
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“Movement for a Democratic Slovakia,” (hereafter HzDS) whose influence on the 
country’s development negatively marked most o f the period under analysis. Even after 
the voting out o f Meciar after the 1998 parliamentary elections, he seems to have 
remained a serious concern to those who are attempting to build democracy in Slovakia.
While the story o f Slovakia between 1993, when the country came into existence, 
and 1998 is not solely about Me£iar’s politics, his influence on the political, economic and 
social life o f  the new state should not be underestimated. Unfortunately, that influence has 
been likened to the politics and methods o f the former communist regime, characterized by 
increasingly centralized and one-sided decisions that impacted on the economic and social 
life, restrictions o f freedom of speech and association, and attempts to discredit or 
eliminate any political alternative that did not bow to the will o f the central government.
Me&ar’s influence on the socio-political background o f Slovakia goes back to 
1989 when, together with the Civic Movement, MeCiar’s “Public Against Violence” had a 
joint influence on the collapse o f communism in Czechoslovakia. After winning the battle 
over the communist government, Public Against Violence set out to advocate an even 
higher, and more identity-driven goal: independence for Slovakia. MeCiar was an 
outspoken advocate o f full autonomy for the Slovak Republic from Czechoslovakia, and 
even got himself fired in early 1991 for his strident calls for autonomy.2
The process o f disintegration o f  the Czech and Slovak Republics had, in many 
observers’ view, more to do with politically charged and populist campaigns from MeCiar 
and his political group, than with a real need or overwhelming popular choice for a 
separation o f the two republics. It is not clear that without MeCiar’s public campaign the 
Federal Republic o f Czechoslovakia would have split. It remains clear that the drive for
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separation came from within Slovakia, specifically from MeCiar’s group.3
After the July 1992 declaration o f Slovakia’s sovereignty by the Slovak National 
Council, political developments merely sped up the separation o f the Federation. The 
Czech Republic displayed no other resistance against the declaration of sovereignty than 
President Havel’s resignation from his position o f President o f the Czechoslovak 
Federation. Within two months o f the declaration o f sovereignty, Czech Prime Minister 
Klaus negotiated the terms of the dissolution o f  the Federation with Meciar, at the time 
the Prime Minister o f the Slovak Republic. By September, 1992, Slovakia adopted a new 
Constitution, and in November, at the third attempt and by a margin o f three votes, the 
Federal Assembly approved legislation to permit the constitutional dissolution o f the 
Federation. On January 1, 1993, the Slovak Republic came into being.4
Up to that point, MeCiar’s influence on the fete o f Slovakia was, arguably, 
beneficial. His popular campaign and personal charisma, his appeal to a higher sense of 
national pride and identity rallied a large enough number o f Slovaks around his political 
movement and national ambitions.
As soon as the national identity was established, however, the tone o f politics 
changed, with an increasing emphasis on personality, centralization o f decision-making 
processes, and caution regarding Euro-Atlantic integration. Starting in 1993, MeCiar’s 
critics, even from within his own party, got fired from executive positions and, one by one, 
established their own political groups. As a result o f  firings, and o f further deflections 
from the HzDS in protest against Meiiar’s autocratic politics, the HzDS lost the majority 
in the legislature in the fall of 1993, and was forced into an alliance with another extreme- 
right nationalist party, the Slovak National Party. Resignations and deflections continued
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into 1994, and in March, the National Council (the Slovak legislative body) passed a vote 
of “no confidence” in the HzDS government.
For the following six months, a new coalition government was sworn in, with 
former Mediar supporter turned political enemy, Joseph Moravcik as Prime Minister. This 
government was to act in an interim capacity, until the September elections to the National 
Council. The Morav£ik administration used its six months in office to adopt a policy of 
closer integration with West European states, to improve relations with Hungary, and to 
revitalize the program o f privatization previously slowed down by Mediar. This policy line 
stood in contrast to Meciar’s orientation towards Russia, and his "going slow on 
privatization’ line. It also ran counter against his policy o f slowing down the emancipation 
of minorities, exemplified by his lack o f  support for the language law which was 
subsequently voted down, and the failure to negotiate common grounds on the treaty of 
neighborhood
Despite these developments, HzDS emerged the winner o f the September 1994 
elections. Its return to power was followed by a period of increased state control over the 
pace and manner of privatization, and o f  the development o f a market economy.5 Prime 
Minister Meciar annulled all decisions on privatization made by the Moravcik 
administration in late 1994. In 1995, he prompted and supported a law relating to state 
interest in “strategic” companies, which would not be privatized.6 Banks were added to 
this so-called “negative” list in 1996, together with 45 other companies in which the state 
intended to maintain a ‘"golden” share. Further involvement in the development o f the 
market economy occurred in 1997, when a law on the “Revitalization o f Enterprises” was 
passed, which identified enterprises eligible for state aid in the form o f  tax deferrals and
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debt forgiveness. This law induced over 1,000 enterprises to apply for state aid, 
weakening market discipline and prolonging false expectations about the manner in which 
a market economy functions.7
The period after Mediar’s return to power in 1994 was also marked by increased 
political instability.8 The growing enmity between Mediar and the President o f  the 
country, Michal Kovad, culminated with a vote o f  “no confidence” in the President in 
1995. In the same year, the abduction o f one o f Ko vac's sons to Austria, and his 
subsequent detention on charges o f international embezzlement led to several months of 
political polarization and increased instability. Additionally, in 1996 and 1997, the HzDS- 
dominated government introduced several bills that were aimed at limiting civic freedoms. 
These bills sparked domestic and international protests regarding Slovakia’s lack o f 
development towards democracy.9 The evident hold o f the HzDS dominated government 
over the electronic media, particularly the state television, accelerated public unrest and 
dissatisfaction with Mediar’s manner o f governance.10
The final straw in the autocratic handling o f  politics during the last years o f Mediar 
government was the holding o f a national referendum on Slovakia’s membership into 
NATO and on direct presidential elections. The question on NATO membership was 
proposed by Mediar’s HzDS. The question on direct presidential elections was proposed 
by President Kovad." The referendum was spoiled by then Minister o f the Interior,
Gustav Krajdi who, acting on Mediar’s orders, excluded from the ballot the question on 
direct presidential elections. President Kovad called on the population not to vote unless 
their ballots included the question on direct presidential elections. The referendum was 
consequently boycotted, with less than ten percent turn-out. The Constitutional Court
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
195
ruled that the turn-out was too low and the referendum was declared invalid.12
The failed referendum was considered by many domestic and foreign analysts as 
the highest manifestation o f undemocratic practices in Slovakia after 1993.13 
Domestically, civic demonstrations against the government continued. Opposition parties 
started preparing for a major coalition to run united in the 1998 elections. Despite the 
introduction o f  last minute amendments to the election law intended to stifle the chances 
o f political coalitions to win representation, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) was 
formed of five smaller parties. They garnered a majority o f the popular vote in the 
September 1998 parliamentary elections.
The parliamentary victory o f SDK, together with the mid-January 1999 
constitutional amendment to provide for direct presidential elections sealed the end o f the 
Meciar rule. MeCiar ran for president, and lost to Rudolf Schuster, the Chairman o f  the 
Party for Civic Understanding, a new party on the political scene. Both Western 
European countries and the United States saluted the change o f administration and 
welcomed Slovakia’s entrance into a new stage o f political and economic development.
TRANSITION BEGINS: GOVERNMENT ACTION TO MEET POPULAR DEMANDS 
The above summary highlights the political and economic developments in 
Slovakia between 1993 and 1998. Against the background o f  these developments, 
government action to meet popular demands for the introduction o f a market economy 
appears substantial, per Transition Report indicators in Table 14 below. These indicators 
also indicate that Slovakia is the East European country in which we observe the largest 
number o f reversed trends o f transition indicators, particularly starting in 1997.
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^ b l^ 4 ^ S lo v a l^ e£ u b Iic^ n d ic a to re o ^ m er^ ^ n tra n sitio iv t^ ^ n a rk e ^ c o n o m v
19^4 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share 55% 60% 70% 75% 75%
Large scale privatization 3 3 3 4 4
Small scale privatization 4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Governance and restructuring 3 3 3 2.8 2.8
Price liberalization 3 3 3 3 3
Trade system 4 4.2 4.2 4 4.2
Competition policy 3 3 3 3 3
Bank reform 3 3 3 2.8 2.8
Securities reform n/a 3 3 2.8 2.8
Investment law n/a 3 3 n/a n/a
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by 
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
From the standpoint o f privatization, despite political disagreements over the pace, 
depth and intensity of the process o f privatization, Slovakia fared well and very well, 
especially if we consider transition progress comparatively. In the private share o f GDP 
category, Slovakia started 1994 on an equal footing with two of the three front-runner 
countries, and ended the period in third place. In 1994, the country had 55 percent o f 
GDP coming from the private sector just as Hungary and Poland, and was slightly behind 
the Czech Republic (with 65 percent o f private GDP). By the end o f the period, Slovakia 
had caught up with the Czech Republic (with 75 percent of GDP from the private sector), 
ran ahead o f Poland (who had 65 percent o f  GDP from the private sector), and was 
slightly behind Hungary (which had 80 percent o f GDP coming from the private sector).
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By the beginning o f the year 2000, it was estimated that an approximate 85 percent of 
GDP was coming from the private sector.14
The problem with Slovakia’s privatization seems to have been less the pace but the 
manner in which the process was accomplished. The state’s involvement in which 
enterprises were privatized and which were sold was evident since the 1995 law o f 
essential enterprises. That law allowed the government to have a veto power in the 
privatization of over 30 large state enterprises irrespective o f its number o f shares. The 
inclusion o f banks on the list o f essential companies in 1996 made the banking sector even 
weaker and non-competitive. The 1997 law on the Revitalization o f  Enterprises inhibited 
attempts at restructuring and modernization, since the state basically promised and bailed 
out non-competitive loans. Since the banks were under government control as well, loans 
to non-performing economic entities continued, weakening both the banking and the 
industrial sectors.
Another problem with the mechanics o f privatization was the lack o f transparency 
and fairness o f various privatizations. The manner in which some famous privatizations 
took place have drawn the attention o f the EU. In documentation assessing the readiness 
o f countries aspiring to EU membership, Slovakia was criticized for its non-market-based 
mechanisms of price formation and resource allocation. Examples o f these practices were 
tithe continued use o f non-competitive and secretive sales in the privatization process, the 
refusal to sell a number o f State-owned enterprises that would benefit from privatization, 
and the political involvement in the enterprise restructuring process through the Enterprise 
Revitalization Act.” The “repeated use o f protective administrative measures” by the
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government was deemed incompatible with EU policies, and the existence of a functioning 
market economy in Slovakia was questioned.15
With respect to large scale privatization, Slovakia started the period on par with 
Hungary and Poland, with a “3" rating indicating that more than 25 percent of large-scale 
enterprises were in private hands, or getting ready to be privatized. By mid-1998, 
however, Slovakia had caught up with the Czech Republic and Hungary, with a rating o f 
"4" indicating that the percentage o f large-scale enterprises privatized or in the process o f 
privatization had risen to 50 percent, and left Poland behind. As pointed out previously, 
among the 50 percent left out o f the privatization process, there was a large number o f 
State-owned enterprises which could have benefited from privatization and created 
needed revenue for the government.
All four countries ran the same scores in the small scale privatization category 
(between a rating of “4" in 1994, to ratings o f “4.2" thereafter) during the entire period, 
indicating that standards of performance typical o f advanced industrial economies had 
been attained, and that there remained no state ownership o f small enterprises.
The above indicators o f  privatization suggest continued growth o f the private 
sector. This is somewhat ironic given the fact that the privatization policy in Slovakia had 
been reversed or stalled many times during this period.
Starting with the indicators o f governance restructuring, markets and trade, and 
financial institutions reform, we notice the phenomenon o f reversal o f  policies mentioned 
in the beginning of this analysis, particularly starting in 1997.
In governance and restructuring, while all the other front-runners stayed the course 
o f undertaking sustained actions to promote effective corporate governance, with a “3"
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rating for the entire period, Slovakia went from sustained actions to promote effective 
corporate governance (developed by 1994), to a weakening o f legislative enforcement and 
to introducing measures that restricted competition (“2.8" rating starting in 1997).
Fluctuations in trade and foreign exchange policies can also be observed, with 
Slovakia being compatible with all the other front-runner countries until 1997 (rating of 
“4” in 1994, and o f  “4.2” thereafter), when it went briefly back to a lower rating (“4").
The brief, one year reversal o f policies, from attaining standards o f performance norms o f 
advanced economies to re-introducing some tariff barriers reinforces the observation that 
1997 was the year o f  evident negative change in the policies o f  the government.
In the area o f financial institutions reform, the reversal o f policies is even more 
evident, with Slovakia being compatible with the other three countries with respect to 
bank and securities reform until 1996 (“3" rating indicates substantial progress in the 
establishment o f bank solvency, interest rates liberalization, and the establishment of 
lending mechanisms for the private sector; and substantial issuance o f securities by private 
enterprises). Beginning in 1997, Slovakia went back to a lower rating in both categories 
(“2.8"), indicating a more limited use o f directed credit, and a renunciation o f important 
aspects of the regulatory framework for the issuance o f securities.
With respect to price liberalization and competition policies, Slovakia was 
compatible with the other front-runner countries (“3" rating), slightly behind Hungary and 
Poland regarding price liberalization.
Overall, the assessment o f the European Union in 1998 was that “a sufficiently 
convincing track record o f consistent economic reforms is missing” in Slovakia.16 The
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absence o f reform consistency is also reflected in the macro-economic indicators in Table 
15 below.
Table 15.—Slovak Republic: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 
(Percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP at constant prices -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 5.0
Consumer prices (average) 61.2 10.1 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 7.5
Gross average monthly earnings in manufacturing
(annual average, adjusted
for inflation)® -44.9 6.3 -0.8 4.9 6.0 8.9 5.8 n/a
(% o f  labor force)
Unemployment n/a n/a 12.2 13.7 13.1 11.1 11.6 n/a
(in billions o f  U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance n/a n/a -0.93 0.06 •■0.23 -2.29 ■•1.47 -2.12
Foreign Direct Investment 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.05 0.22
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 226.
1 Calculated by author from EBRD data.
While economic growth was constant until 1995, with positive growth registered 
for the first time in 1994, growth slowed down and witnessed a dip in 1998. Analysts 
have long maintained that economic growth was artificially stimulated with bank credits to 
non-performing enterprises, foreign borrowing and high levels o f public investment. The 
growth slow-down is attributed to the stalling o f  privatization and the increasing 
government interference in the process o f privatization starting in 1995, and to the 
unsustainable fiscal and external deficits. The trade balance remained negative throughout 
the entire period under discussion, and jumped to -2.29 in 1996.17
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Inflation rates also fluctuated throughout the period, although these rates are low 
comparable to other countries in the region. The lower inflation rates were attributed to 
high domestic demand (especially in light o f increasing monthly earnings which allowed 
for increased consumption), to adjustments o f  administered prices, to indirect tax 
increases, and to the introduction o f  import surcharges.18 Unemployment rates stabilized 
around 11 percent after 1996. These rates are compatible with Hungary’s rates, and lower 
than Poland’s for most of the period.
Table 15 also displays encouraging signs o f macro-economic indicators such as the 
average monthly earnings in manufacturing, the low inflation and relatively low 
unemployment. However, these positive macro-economic signs seem to have been 
artificially stimulated by governmental measures, per post-MeCiar economic analyses o f 
the state o f the economy.
The only indicator in Table 15 that hints at the fact that macro-economic indicators 
were artificially stimulated, and that there was not much depth to the government 
economic policy is the rate of foreign direct investment. According to Table 15, foreign 
investment was barely present in Slovakia, especially by comparison to the other front- 
runners. Slovakia seems to have been unable to convince foreign investors o f the 
attractiveness o f its economy and services, given the government interference in the 
economy and the regression of transition. The rate of foreign direct investment is the 
lowest in Slovakia among the front-runner countries, and indicates caution and superficial 
investment in the economy.19
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GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULAR SUPPORT: ANALYSIS 
How did the electorate react to government policies, and what type o f relationship 
can be observed between policy outcomes and public support for the introduction o f a 
market economy? Figure 15 below traces the public opinion support for the introduction 
o f a market economy line, the GDP per capita line, and the rate o f unemployment line. As 
in the three previous cases, the GDP per capita line has an ascending direction. Like the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, the curve of public opinion support for the introduction o f a 
market economy has a descending direction, although the lowering o f support is not nearly 
as dramatic as in the other two cases. The rate o f unemployment is higher than that o f the 
Czech Republic, but lower than those o f Poland or Hungary.
Slovak Republic - Market Transition
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Figure 15. Slovak Republic: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 226; Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7  (Brussels: 
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).
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At first sight, the case o f Slovakia resembles that o f Hungary. Unemployment is 
high, which contributes to a lowering o f support for the introduction o f a market 
economy. As beneficial outcomes o f  policies, such as increased GDP per capita take time 
to mature, the population gets weary o f transition costs and dwindles in its original 
support for a market economy. By the time economic growth trickles down to social 
layers, the population is no longer as supportive of a market economy as in the beginning 
o f the transition, or is less convinced o f its appropriateness for the country. As the policy 
line goes up, the popular support line goes down.
On more carefiil examination, the public support for the Slovak government 
policies should be judged based on their activity while in office, after 1993. If  we observe 
the dynamics o f public opinion after Slovakia actually became an independent country, 
public support did not decline as categorically in Slovakia as in Hungary. More 
importantly, public support cannot be assessed as having declined, since between 1993 and 
1997 support fluctuated around the 40 percent line, and was merely five percentage points 
lower in 1997 than in 1993. This finding does not merit the qualification that public 
support for the introduction o f a market economy declined in Slovakia, since the 
fluctuations are minimal, and are normal given the changes that the country, as the entire 
region were experiencing.
From this perspective, the diagram in Figure 15 resembles more the Polish case 
than the Hungarian one. The public support line maintained itself at about the same, fairly 
high level (roughly forty percent), while the policy line followed an ascending direction, 
towards meeting the public support line in a model resembling the responsive government 
model. Even if the available data does not permit the observation of trends beyond 1997,
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up to that point, the Slovak government seems to have been responsive to public 
preferences. This finding is all the more remarkable given that unemployment, the 
traditional deflector o f  public support for a market economy was relatively high during the 
same period.
However, post-1998 analyses o f the state of the economy and o f  societal trends 
between 1993 and 1997 point out that both economic growth and popular support for 
government policies were artificially stimulated and maintained. Economic growth was 
stimulated with excessive levels o f  public investment, foreign borrowing and bank credits 
granted under non-market conditions, which produced a surge in economic growth. 
Analyses in 1998 revealed that the economy was close to an imminent collapse when the 
change of regime occurred.
Similarly, the maintenance of public support in Figure 15 may reflect other social 
phenomena than support for the introduction o f  a market economy. Popular support for 
government policies was skillfully maintained in Slovakia throughout the entire period 
with populist campaigns, nationalist slogans, and with the use o f  pro-govemment rhetoric 
through the channels o f  the state-dominated national television. More importantly, public 
support was maintained with expensive social programs which further depleted 
government resources while creating the perception that the introduction o f a democracy 
and a market economy was an easy and affordable development.
An immediate inference that can be drawn from the results o f  these post-1998 
analyses is that the diagram in Figure 15 does not reflect real trends. The ascending 
direction o f the economic growth line does not necessarily reflect the growth o f  a market 
economy, but the results o f artificial stimulation o f selected economic sectors, which
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amounted to growth for a short period. The popular support line does not really reflect 
support for the market economy, but rather support for a particular government and its
policies.
That economic growth was not healthy, nor nearly as steady or as consistent as it 
might look is shown by the reversal o f  trends as soon as the government who stimulated 
artificial growth policies was out o f office, after 1998. In fact, economic slow-down was 
witnessed even before the government was voted out, starting in 1997. The budget, trade, 
and fiscal deficits inherited by the government voted in the 1998 elections were so 
appalling that austerity measures were needed immediately, and were introduced in a fairly 
radical manner.
Additional public opinion data indicate that the so-called support for the 
introduction o f a market economy should be regarded with reservation, and questioned. 
Figure 16 below shows the dynamics o f public opinion on the question o f the introduction 
o f a market economy.
According to this diagram, public opinion was polarized on the question o f  the 
introduction o f a market economy. About forty percent o f respondents believed that the 
introduction o f a market economy was right throughout the period under discussion; and 
roughly the same percentage believed that it was wrong. If such results were recorded 
during a time o f economic uncertainty, reversal o f economic trends, or other types o f 
economic unpredictability, this diagram would have made sense. Instead, the diagram 
shows public opinion trends during a  time o f  economic growth. This polarization 
indicates that other considerations besides the introduction o f  a market economy were on 
people’s minds when answering their questionnaires, and that social groups were evenly
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split for a fairly significant period of time on the issue of government pursuit o f a 
particular policy. This polarization became more pronounced on the eve o f  the 1998
elections.
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Figure 16. Slovak Republic: Dynamics o f  Public Opinion on Support for the Introduction 
of a Market Economy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission of the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
The available data does not allow for an analysis o f whether those who believed in 
the introduction o f a market economy were in fact MeCiar followers, while those who did 
not, in fact rejected the kind o f  market economy that he was fostering. Given the amount 
o f public manipulation between 1993 and 1998, we can allow for the possibility that public 
support merely reflected a polarized vote o f confidence for the government by some social 
segments, rather than a vote o f confidence in economic policies that brought about general 
well-being.
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Additional data suggest that individual economic well-being was not necessarily 
the driving force in public support for the market economy. If  support for the market 
economy was indeed a result o f increased individual well-being, we should expect 
respondents to believe that their personal situation would improve. Instead, the data in 
Table 16 below indicate that the largest numbers o f  respondents were not in the category 
who believed that their situation would improve in the following twelve months, but in the 
category o f those who believed that their situation would not change.
Table 16.—Slovak Republic: Public opinion on financial situation in the household
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Will be better 21 27 23 24 22
Will be same 21 26 39 38 40
Will be worse 54 43 33 30 33
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission o f the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
Notes: Figures in percentages. In 1990, the question was, “Over the next 12 months, how 
will your own financial situation change?” Starting in 1991, the question was “Over the 
next 12 months, do you expect the financial situation o f your household will get a lot 
better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, or get a lot worse?” The ‘get a 
lot better’ and ‘get a little better’ categories were cumulated. The ‘get a little worse’ and 
‘get a lot worse’ categories were cumulated. Starting in 1997, the question was dropped 
from questionnaires.
If the constant support for the market economy in Figures 15 and 16 reflected 
support for the particular type o f  market economy being introduced, we should observe 
larger or increasing numbers o f respondents believing in the future well-being o f  their 
household. Instead, in Table 16 above we observe that the category that is consistently 
larger, especially after 1993, is the category who believes that their situation would not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
change. This suggests that the public support in Figure 15 reflected a combination o f 
considerations about the current government policies but not necessarily support for the 
introduction o f  a market economy.
This hypothesis is problematic, especially from a methodological point o f view. If 
numbers do not mean what they say they mean, then how is a comparative, or a country 
analysis to proceed? Unfortunately, the case o f Slovakia until 1998 resembles more the 
development and take-over o f political power by communist practices, than the 
development o f  an open democratic system. Me£iar was often criticized for trying to take 
the country back to communism, rather than forward, to a democracy. This may explain 
why trying to analyze political and social phenomena starting from the assumptions o f a 
democratic environment, and using the tools o f advanced democratic systems may end up 
being an attempt to count apples while thinking we were counting pears.
Puns aside, the fact remains that the case o f Slovakia poses difficult 
methodological problems to a comparative analysis o f  this kind. This is why looking at 
more, rather than less data is helpful, in order to match more descriptive assessments with 
some hard facts.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: THE VOTERS’ VERDICT 
How did the voters react to these developments and how does voter behavior 
corroborate with the assessments in previous sections? Table 17 below summarizes 
election results for the Slovak National Council for 1994 and 1998.
The 1994 election victory by HzDS was expected, and should be attributed to 
several factors other than the pursuit o f  economic policies. National feelings, popularity,
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and effective electoral campaigns influenced more the public choice o f  1994 than the belief 
in the superiority o f the HzDS program. HzDS and its leader claimed victory in restoring
Table 17.~Slovak parliamentary election results (1994-98)___________________________
Parties 1994 1998
% of vote seats % o f vote seats
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 35.0 61 27.0 43
Common Choice Bloc 10.4 18
Hungarian Parties Coalition 10.0 17
Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) 10.0 17
Slovak Democratic Coalition (CDM, DUS) 26.3 42
PDL 14.7 23
Data from Europa World Year Book (London: 1999), Vol. 2, pp. 3142-3144.
the national identity o f  the Slovaks, and convincingly argued that was the only political 
entity who could bring about domestic prosperity and international recognition. The 
HzDS leader was highly popular after the declaration o f independence, and had a personal 
charisma that no other political leader had. The HzDS electoral platform o f 1994 
promised reforms for the future o f the country, and the campaign was highly effective in 
rendering the message. Overall, HzDS was the only political group with a sound, well- 
presented program, and a well-developed election campaign.20
By comparison, the opposition was not crystalized yet and internal party power 
struggles were as common in Slovakia as in the cases o f the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. A weak and disunited opposition made it even easier for the HzDS to project an 
image of saviors o f the motherland, and to win the parliamentary elections o f  1994.
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The fact that segments o f the population truly believed that the HzDS was the sole 
hope for the country is reflected in the diagram in Figure 17 below. Prior to the 1994 
elections, the direction o f  the public mood with respect to satisfaction with democracy 
was on the decline. This trend corroborates roughly with the lowering o f support for a 
market economy; but as discussed previously, generalizations based on this support line 
should be made with care. After the 1994 elections, the public mood with respect to 
democracy witnessed a boost o f about ten percentage points, and thereafter oscillated 
between twenty and thirty percentage points.




Figure 17. Slovak Republic: Public Support for a Market Economy and Satisfaction with 
Democracy
Data from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: Commission of the 
European Community, 1991-1997).
This surge indicates that the public mood was hopeful right after the elections that 
brought HzDS to power; and indirectly supports the previous hypothesis that the public
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support line for the introduction o f  a market economy in Figure 15 may reflect more than 
support for a particular set o f policies, but rather political support for HzDS in general.
However, if the reader has questions regarding the credulity o f the Slovak people 
in face o f several years o f populist campaigns and dominance o f the political space by one 
party, the Slovak election results show that credulity did not last for ever. In 1998, the 
HzDS still won the largest percentage o f  votes, but no longer commanded a majority of 
votes. Although public support was just twelve percentage points below what the HzDS 
gained in the 1994 elections, a cumulative forty percent o f the public voted for parties 
opposed to the HzDS. In 1998, the combination o f dissatisfaction with the current 
government, the polarization o f  politics, the existence o f a political alternative (the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition), and the effects o f the failed referendum on NATO membership 
corroborated to render the HzDS less powerful than it was in the past. The 1998 election 
results suggest that the Slovak public used its power to vote out o f  office the political 
group it no longer believed in.
Further developments confirm that Me£iar no longer had the confidence o f the 
population, and that the 1998 voting out o f office was not an accident. In the spring of 
1999, Me£iar ran for president, and lost. His public reaction, displayed on national 
television, was to reproach the population for their lack of gratitude and to promise his 
total retreat from politics.21 The popular rejection o f a political figure who enjoyed wide 
popularity for many years speaks for the fact that the Slovak society is maturing, even if 
its leaders may not.
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CONCLUSIONS
The case o f Slovakia between 1993 and 1998 is probably not fit for an analysis o f 
representation. The government in power during this period displayed leadership 
characteristics more appropriate for an analysis o f  centralizing power than an analysis o f 
emerging democracies. While the data reflect progress in the transition to a market 
economy by the government in power, developments less likely to be summarized by 
numbers suggest that Slovakia developed the appearance o f a market economy and o f  a 
democracy. The only development that suggests a re-orientation of the country towards 
developing a democratic environment is the voters’ use o f their right to deny leadership to 
those who misuse power. It remains to be seen if the country will stay this course, or if 
economic hardships and lack o f political skills by the current power coalition will render 
Meiiar appealing to the population again.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VII
1. “If  the tendencies in economic policy established by the former government, 
particularly over the past two years, would have continued, it is evident that very 
serious deformations o f  a destructive character could have affected the Slovak 
economy,” Slovak Finance Minister Brigita Schmognerova said at a press conference 
in November 1998. The imbalance between budgeted and actual expenses, together 
with the existence o f a non-competitive market, forced the government that was 
voted into office in 1998 to introduce austerity measures that affected government 
spending as well as social programs spending. See “Finance Minister Outlines 
Planned Austerity Measures,” FBIS-EEU-98-335 (December 1, 1998); “Miklos 
Report Warns o f  Crisis in Slovak Economy, Society,” FBIS-EEU-98-363 (December 
29, 1998). The lack o f  awareness o f the state o f the Slovak economy at the end o f six 
years o f MeCiar rule among trade unions and other social groups resulted in weak 
popular support for government attempts to implement a mid-term economy strategy 
which capitalized first on restoring an infrastructure system that would generate 
government revenue and, second, on using the revenue for social benefits. See 
“Miklos: Unions Show Lack o f Awareness o f Economy’s State,” FBIS-EEU-1999- 
0809 (August 6, 1999).
2. “Slovak Nationalists Agitate for More Autonomy, Oppose Radical Privatization,” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, Soviet/East European Report, 
Vol. 8, No. 25 (March 20, 1991), pp. 1, 4.
3. Jan Camogusky, leader o f the Christian Democratic Movement which formed part o f 
the Slovak coalition government in 1990, advocated more autonomy for Slovakia, but 
never pushed for full independence. The Slovak National Party, a more radical party, 
associated itself with Publics Against Violence advocating complete secession of 
Slovakia from the Federation. At no point during these debates was President 
Havel’s proposal for a national referendum on the future o f the Federation accepted 
by the Slovak part o f  the Federal Assembly, dominated by Mefiiar’s group. MeSiars 
power to convince politicians and large masses of Slovak voters that independence 
was the only alternative for Slovakia seems to have been grounded in populist appeals 
to nationalist feelings and a rhetoric that Slovakia had nothing to gain from being part 
o f a strong federation. Rather, he advocated, Slovakia had been hurt by the federal 
economic policies, particularly those related to privatization. See Jan Obrman, 
“Outgoing Prime Minister on the Future o f  Slovakia,” (interview) RFL/RL Research 
Report, Vol. 1, No. 25 (June 19, 1992), pp.32-33; Jiri Pehe, “The New Slovak 
Government and Parliament,” RFL/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 28 (July 10, 
1992), p. 33.
4. Jan Obrman, “Slovakia Declares Sovereignty; President Havel Resigns,” RFL/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 31 (July 13, 1992), pp. 25-29.
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5. Increased state control over various aspects o f social and economic life were evident 
fairly early after the return to power o f  the HzDS. Slovakia’s negative image in 
Europe and the United States dates back to early 1995. Insiders have constantly 
criticized the centralization o f power, the mingling in the running o f the state 
television, the manner o f implementing the promised privatization plan, and the habit 
o f “breaking laws” by the central government. See, for instance, “Opposition Party 
Says Slovakia’s Bad Image Is Spreading,” Open Daily Digest, Vol. 2, No. 50 (March 
10, 1995); “Slovak Trade Unions Continue to Criticize Privatization Plans, Open 
Daily Digest, Vol 2, No. 86 (May 3, 1995); “Domestic Political Developments in 
Slovakia,” Open Media Research Institute, Vol. 2 (May 29, 1995); also “SDL 
Criticizes Government ‘Concentration o f Power,’" FBIS-EEU-95-048 (March 13,
1995). An amendment to the law on the organization o f ministries and other 
government bodies led to the shifting o f  “the original constitutional situation, without 
amending the Constitution, a few millimeters in favor o f the present governing team.” 
“Comment: Jurisdiction Law Expands MeCiar’s Powers,” FBIS-EEU-95-050 (March 
15, 1995).
6. “Parliament Passes Bills Increasing State Role,” FBIS-EEU-95-137 (July 18, 1995). 
The law basically provided for the state to retain a golden share in the companies 
characterized as "strategic." This golden share gave the state the right o f veto 
regardless o f its share in the company’s property. The introduction o f the bill was 
met by serious debate and protest by opposition groups, who described the law as 
“indiscriminate state interference” in economic developments. As a result o f  the 
application of the law, enterprises were sold off to a few people, at low prices, in a 
clear disregard for the need to generate state revenue for social services, as promised 
during the election campaign and demanded by the population. This practice 
prompted the first demonstration against the government policy in the social sphere, 
which was found to be lacking. See “First Mass Rally by Trade Unionists Since 
1989,” FBIS-EEU-95-190 (October 2, 1995).
7. Transition Report 1997, pp. 198-199; Transition Report 1998, pp. 188-189.
8. “Duray: U.S. See Slovak Democracy ‘Jeopardized,’” FBIS-EEU-95-138 (July 19,
1995).; “MeCiar’s Attitude Toward Democracy Criticized,” FBIS-EEU-95-194 
(October 6, 1995).
9. One such bill introduced by the HzDS-dominated government was designed to create 
a restrictive framework in which non-governmental organizations could operate. The 
European Union protested against the bill and called on the Slovak legislators to pass 
legislation compatible with European legislation and practice regarding non­
governmental organizations. See “Controversial Foundations Bill on Government 
Agenda,” FBIS-EEU-96-084-A (April 23, 1996); “European Commission Urges 
Revision o f Foundations Bill,” FBIS-EEU-96-095 (May 14, 1996), and “Approved 
Version o f Foundations Bill Criticized,” FBIS-EEU-96-084 (April 25, 1996). 
Similarly, amendments to the Penal Code were seen to infringe on the freedom of 
civilians and to disregard international values held elsewhere in the family o f
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democratic states. The amendment was opposed strongly by several civic 
organizations, which organized rallies o f  protest against the amendment. See 
"Demonstration Against Penal Code Amendment Planned,” FBIS-EEU-96-077 (April 
17, 1996). In 1996, a law on the “protection o f  the republic” was passed. The law 
defined as subversive “organized public rallies aimed at subverting the constitutional 
system” and punished people who organized anti-governmental rallies or spread “false 
information” abroad. See “Slovakia Approves Draft Law on ‘Subversion,’” Central 
European Digest, Vol. 1, No. 305 (March 11, 1996).
10. Popular demonstrations against the MeCiar government have taken place in Slovakia 
more often than is actually documented. The state-dominated television only covered 
events and news that were favorable to the government, and much of the public 
opposition to the Me£iar government has remained undocumented. See, for instance, 
“Thousands Reportedly Demonstrate against Government,” FBIS-EEU-96-223-A 
(November 14, 1996), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi. For the 
status o f  the state-dominated television, see “Kovac Sends ‘Highly Critical’ Letter to 
STV Board,” FBIS-EEU-96-097-A (May 12, 1996).
11. Constitutionally, at that time Slovakia was electing the President by securing three- 
fifths o f the National Council's support for one candidate. The vote was secret, and 
members o f the Council voted for one o f  the eligible candidates. Since that majority 
proved hard to reach (President Kova£ did not secure that kind o f support in 1993, 
when he was designated rather than elected by the National Council to be the 
President o f the country), the need was felt to amend the Constitution to provide for a 
different methodology o f  electing the president.
12. For details on the failed referendum, see “Slovakia: A Status Report,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, Home Slovak Service, particularly the section on post- 
referendum coverage (1996); also, Miroslav Sedivy, “Referendum,” Slovakia Daily 
Surveyor (May 23, 24, 1997), http://www.Slovensko.com The manner in which the 
government spoiled the referendum prompted renewed popular demonstrations 
against government practices. See “Demonstrations in Slovakia,” Open Media 
Research Institute Daily Digest, Slovak Selection (June 4, 1997).
13. Martin Butora sees the failed referendum as the “turning point” in Slovak politics, the 
moment when citizens and other political groups understood that without serious and 
concerted efforts on the part o f the civil society, and o f  opposition political groups, 
Meiiarism would not be thwarted. See Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, 
“Slovakia’s Democratic Awakening,” Journal o f  Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(January, 1999), pp: 80-95.
14. Commission o f  the European Communities, Regular Report 1999 from  the 
Commission on Slovakia s Progress Towards Accession, COM 511 final (Brussels: 
Commission o f the European Communities, October 1999), p. 26.
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15. European Commission, Agenda 2000 Enlargement: Regular Report 1998 from  the 
Commission on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, Bulletin o f the European 
Union, Supplement 8/98, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications o f  the European 
Communities, pp. 16-17.
16. Ibid., p. 17.
17. In 1998. the Slovak Statistical Office changed its methodology for recording external 
trade to apply international standards. As a result, a foil comparison o f  trade figures 
between different years is not fully possible. The European Commission considers 
that economic development may have been less favorable than it appears even prior to 
1995. Sec Agenda 2000: Slovakia, p. 12, nl.
18. Ibid., p. 14.
19. President Kovac criticized the policy o f encouraging the utilization and exhaustion o f 
domestic resources before encouraging serious foreign direct investment, fostered by 
Me£iar. He pointed out on many occasions that without confidence in Slovakia's 
domestic political stability, foreign investors would not rush to invest in any major 
sectors. “Kovac Views Republic’s Economic Situation,” FBIS-EEU-95-137 (July 18, 
1995).
20. Among other things, the HzDS program promised “economic recovery and 
prosperity” via the “implementation o f economic transformation based on market 
relations, plurality o f  property forms with preponderance o f private ownership, 
universal human values, and the individual’s participation and share in the 
implementation o f society’s targets and economic recovery.” The part about the 
individual share in the recovery o f the Slovak society could have and did sound to 
some ears like the return o f the communist ideology; however, at the time, the 
popularity o f Meiiar, given the declaration o f independence, was too high to be 
countered with suspicions o f this kind. See “Daily Carried HzDS Election 
Manifesto,” FBIS-EEU-94-188 (September 21, 1994).
21. Ross Larsen, “Mediar literally sings the blues,” Prague Post (August 24, 1999), 
http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/newsl00798a.html.
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CHAPTER VIII
ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: 
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA
BACKGROUND
Government willingness to listen to public calls for the reform o f the economy and 
the introduction o f a market economy was not as strong in Bulgaria and Romania as it was 
in the first set o f countries analyzed. In both countries, publics supported the introduction 
of a market economy, even if not as convincingly in the beginning o f the transition as their 
neighbors. In both countries, governments were slow and indecisive at introducing 
reforms, with a resulting economic crisis in Bulgaria in 1997, and a recession in Romania 
starting in 1996.
The story of Bulgaria may be one o f those stories o f late-starters that run faster 
than contestants already engaged in the race and eventually make a good race. The so- 
called “good race” comes, however, at the end o f the period under discussion in this 
study. As a result, for the period between 1990 and 1997 when the change in the 
government’s attitude towards economic reform occurred, there were few indications that 
the minimum conditions were in place for an analysis o f representation to be appropriate.
The story of Romania was found to be equally unfit for an analysis o f 
representation. Throughout the period under discussion, the country’s political scene was 
dominated by a group of reformed communists who delayed market reforms until 1994. 
Despite popular calls for the introduction of a market economy, the government chose to 
be evasive and indecisive about its program. Once some reforms were in place, the
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government modified the legislative framework to a point where reforms were stifled. 
Negative economic growth was the result o f this indecisive line o f economic policies, and 
the country entered a period o f recession that continues into the year 2000.
The brief summary o f  political and economic developments below highlights the 
two reasons why a representation analysis was found to be inappropriate at this time for 
either Bulgaria or Romania. First, governments in both countries were indecisive about 
reform when popular calls for the introduction o f  a market economy were sustained. 
Second, while publics demanded the introduction o f a market economy, they voted in 
office political groups whose plans for the reform o f the economy were vague, and 
sometimes non-existent. These two factors make the case for a lack o f maturity on 
constituencies’ part, and o f  lack o f  willingness to heed to constituencies on the 
governments part. These two aspects indicate that publics and governments in Bulgaria 
and Romania are not yet ready for the requirements of representation.
BULGARIA
The first post-communist government in Bulgaria, the Union o f Democratic Forces 
(UDF), had a poor economic agenda and did not have the needed political skills to govern 
successfully. Its poor leadership led voters to elect the former communists calling 
themselves Socialists, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in 1990.
The BSP manifested no intention to reform the economy, and vetoed legislative 
and executive initiatives which attempted to introduce measures conducive to a more open 
market in Bulgaria. In return, then-President Zhelyu Zhelev, UDF leader, vetoed several
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laws that the BSP tried to introduce to increase the government’s control over the media, 
the restitution o f land, elections, and privatization.
As the economic situation worsened, civic and labor groups started demonstrating 
in the streets, demanding real reform and democracy. Throughout the mid-nineties, labor 
unrest remained prevalent, and non-govemmental groups maintained the pressure on the 
government for reform. As a former presidential advisor captured the situation, people 
were “disappointed with the imitation o f democracy, the imitation o f market economy, and 
the imitation o f Western-oriented foreign policy.”1
After seven years o f poor economic performance and a mock democratic regime, 
the Bulgarian economy witnessed a major crisis in 1997, with hyperinflation, very low 
standards of living, virtually no economic growth, and little privatization.
The socialists were forced out o f the Parliament through the backdoor by angry 
masses o f demonstrators who demanded economic reform and political measures 
conducive to a democratic regime. The reformed and better prepared UDF was voted 
back in power, and started an aggressive program of economic reform that focused on 
macro-economic stabilization, privatization, encouraging foreign investment, reducing 
inflation, and liberalizing the economy.
By 1999, many economic analysts and investors in the region considered Bulgaria 
to be catching up with the front runner countries, and economically doing better than 
Romania, which started its economic reforms slowly, but earlier in the decade than 
Bulgaria.
A brief glance at transition indicators reveals how much behind the front-runner 
countries Bulgaria was in terms o f reforming its several key sectors in order to set the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
220
stage for a functioning market economy. Almost in all categories o f  transition indicators, 
Bulgaria is one or two points behind on the scale o f evaluation o f its reforms.
TabI^8^-Bulgaria^2|dicator^f£roges^ii^^isitioiU^^narkerecoTOm^
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share 40% 45% 45% 50% 50%
Large scale privatization 2 2 2 3 3
Small scale privatization 2 3 3 3 3
Governance and restructuring 2 2 2 2.2 2.2
Price liberalization 3 3 2 3 3
Trade system 4 4 4 4 4
Competition policy n/a 2 2 2 2
Bank reform 2 2 2 2.8 2.8
Securities reform n/a 2 2 2 2
Investment law n/a 3 4 n/a n/a
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share,’ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by 
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
Among the countries in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria had fifty percent o f GDP coming 
from the private sector, the lowest in the region at the end o f 1998. While the front 
runner countries had elaborated, passed into law, and enacted privatization schemes, 
achieving more than fifty percent o f privatization o f their state-enterprises on average, 
Bulgaria was still struggling to elaborate a comprehensive scheme for the large-scale
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privatization. Between 1992 and 1997, roughly twenty percent o f enterprise assets were 
privatized. In 1997 alone, transition indicators signal that the country moved more 
determinedly towards privatizing o f large-scale enterprises, privatizing around four 
percent o f large enterprises in the chemical and metal sectors.2
In the small-scale privatization category, while all the front-runners completed the 
privatization of their small companies and were moving towards standards o f  performance 
typical o f advanced economies, Bulgaria was lagging seriously behind, putting its 
comprehensive program together and trying to apply it.
In the governance and restructuring category, indicators signal a moderately tight 
credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement and little action taken to strengthen 
competition and corporate governance.
In the price liberalization category, and further in the trade and foreign exchange 
system, Bulgaria came the closest to being on target with its transition progress. For most 
of the period under discussion, the country had a level o f  price liberalization compatible 
with the front-runner countries. Indicators do record regression towards re-establishing 
state-control over some prices in the middle o f  the period, in 1996. In the trade and 
foreign exchange system, indicators signal that restrictions were removed from imports 
and exports, in a manner compatible with front-runner countries.
In the competition policy category, Bulgaria is again behind the other countries, 
although not as far behind as Romania. Indicators reveal that competition policy 
legislation and institutions were set up, but without the enforcing mechanisms needed to 
make competition a reality.
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In bank and securities reform, Bulgaria lagged significantly behind the other 
countries, with rudimentary reforms put in place and vaguely enforced.
The poor showing o f government reform programs and legislation had an 
immediate and hard effect on the economy. Macro-economic indicators below show that 
for most o f the period under discussion, the Bulgarian economy experienced negative 
growth, high inflation, high unemployment, very low monthly earnings, relatively low 
foreign direct investment, and a fluctuating trade balance.
Table 19.—Bulgaria: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1^93 1994 ■ w "TOT 1997 g 00
GDP at constant prices
(Percentage change) 
-11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 4.0
Consumer prices (average) 333.5 82.0 73.0 96.3 62.0 123.0 1,082 25.0
Gross average monthly earnings in
industry (annual average, adjusted
for inflation)2 n/a -50.8 -17.9 -42.4 -4.3 -28 n/a n/a
(% o f  labor force)
Unemployment 11.1 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 n/a
(in millions o f  U.S. dollars)
Trade Balance 404 -212 -885 -17 120 209 381 -200
Foreign Direct Investment 56 42 40 105 82 100 497 300
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 211. 
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.
Interposed on this catastrophic situation o f the economy remains the political 
instability and indecisiveness o f all the governments which were in office between 1990 
and 1997. Political unwillingness to reform, on the part o f the socialist government, and
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political unpreparedness to reform, on the part o f UDF and other pro-reform political 
groups led the country to sink in crisis by 1996 and 1997.
Figure 18 below shows how public support for the introduction of a market 
economy interplayed with political developments and government action on the reform o f 
the economy. Figure 18 shows that as popular support for the introduction o f a market 
economy is high, the economy is taking a negative growth direction. Government policies 
produced a serious crisis which started technically in 1991, at a time when people were 
demanding reform.
Bulgaria - Market Transition
: 12
1900 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 1997 1998
GOP per
Figure 18. Bulgaria: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 211 and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: 
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).
Additionally, Figure 18 shows that government action was not only insensitive to 
constituency demands for the introduction o f a  market economy, but also to the sky­
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rocketing rate of unemployment. At its lowest, unemployment in Bulgaria was around 
eleven percent, and growing as high as sixteen percent.
If the data recorded in Tables 18 and 19 reveal little government interest in 
reforming the economy, Figure 18 reveals little government interest in listening to 
constituency demands. Overall, an analysis of representation in this case was found to not 
be justified by the available data, nor by the political developments between 1990 and 
1997, which show government unwillingness to consider reform, therefore government 
unwillingness to heed to constituency’s voice.
An additional element that makes the choice o f representation even less likely in 
Bulgaria for the period under discussion is the role that the publics played in the political 
course of the country. While favoring the introduction o f a market economy, the 
Bulgarian public voted socialists back in power twice between 1990 and 1997.
It has been argued that the lack o f preparedness for power positions of reform- 
oriented groups such as UDF was the main element in favor o f the socialist group in the 
beginning of the transition. The population was impressed with the lack o f coherence o f 
pro-reform parties, a natural posture considering that they were emerging out of over fifty 
years of communism and had little experience with democratic politics.
The seeming lack o f experience by pro-reform groups, and the seemingly 
organized and recognizable pattern o f politics that the socialists proposed, were factors 
that weighed heavily in the popular choice o f 1990. However, it is not clear why the 
public returned socialists to power in 1994, after the evident decline o f the economy and 
the proven disinterest o f  the socialists to introduce economic reforms.
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Overall, political immaturity on behalf o f both the Bulgarian public and the 
governments in power between 1990 and 1997 indicate that a representation analysis is 
premature for this country. It remains to be seen if the course that the country took since 
it defaulted in 1996 will be maintained. If  economic reforms continue, in keeping with 
popular calls for the introduction o f a market economy, and if the public gives signs of 
maturity in the selection o f  public govemants to carry out the economic program and 
other popular mandates, it may be possible to elaborate a representation analysis for 
Bulgaria in the next five to ten years.
ROMANIA
Romania’s situation is somewhat ironic, given that the country was run eventually 
by former communists with little interest in economic reforms for most o f the period under 
discussion in this study. It is ironic because the change o f communist regime in this 
country was the only one accompanied by loss o f  human lives during a popular revolution 
in December 1989. The irony comes as a result o f  the fact that after losing many lives to 
get rid o f the communist regime o f Nicolae Ceau§escu, Romanians immediately elected a 
group o f reform-minded communists. To go further, Romanians re-elected the same 
political group after two years o f slow-to-nonexistent economic reforms, in 1992.
The resulting economic deterioration o f  the economy eventually prompted a 
different, more reform-oriented political group to power. Unfortunately, the 
Constantinescu administration voted in office in November 1996 was unable to set a clear 
direction for the country’s economy, which ended the nineties in deep recession.
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Romania started the reform o f  its economy in low gear. The change of regime in 
1989 found the society quite unprepared for massive changes, and without strong leaders 
to take the country into a market economy or a democracy. After the political 
transformation o f 1989, two rounds o f free elections were won by reform-minded former 
communists under the leadership o f  Ion Iliescu. Until 1995, minimal economic reforms 
were undertaken. Privatization o f  large state enterprises was almost non-existent, and 
small-scale privatization was allowed to start only in 1992. Liberalization o f prices was 
done in stages, with most prices liberalized only in 1995.
In late 1996, a new administration was elected to power, with promises for 
thorough and rapid reform. The coalition o f political forces that came to power under the 
leadership of Emil Constantinescu was a mix o f parties opposed to Iliescu’s PDSR, and 
center-right.
Despite the fact that the National Peasants’s Party (PNT-CD) was the strongest 
coalition partner, it failed to secure the agreement o f the other coalition partners, primarily 
o f the junior party of Petre Roman, the Democratic Party (PD). This failure led to a slow 
and unconvincing set o f reforms, a government crisis in December 1997, another crisis in 
February 1998, the resignation of Premier Victor Ciorbea and appointment o f Radu Vasile 
as the next Prime Minister, the sacking ofVasile and the appointment o f the governor of 
the Central Bank to the position o f  Prime Minister in February 2000.
Despite these reshuffles, the government coalition still failed to produce the 
promised change and reform o f the economy. A package o f  reforms was passed in 
February 1998, followed by amendments and legislative incoherence which drove 
investment out. At the end o f 1999, Constantinescu’s legitimacy as a strong leader was
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questioned, and his chances for re-election in the November 2000 elections were seriously 
challenged by Iliescu and other candidates. Provided that the current coalition decides to 
take some dramatic steps to reform the economy, which continues to decline, it is not 
clear that there is enough time for pro-market political forces to make up for the lost time 
and boost their chances for re-election.
Table 20 below shows that the Romanian governments between 1990 and 1997 
have little to show with respect to their efforts to reform the ailing Romanian economy. 
Transition indicators reveal that Romania is the country which witnessed the lowest level 
o f progress towards the introduction o f a market economy, and the largest number of 
reversal o f policies.
Table 20.—Romania: Indicators o f  progress in transition to a market economy
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Private GDP share 35% 40% 60% 60% 60%
Large scale privatization 2 2 3 2.8 2.8
Small scale privatization 3 3 3 3 3.2
Governance and restructuring 2 2 2 2 2
Price liberalization 3 3 3 3 3.2
Trade system 4 4.2 3 4 4
Competition policy n/a I 1 2 2
Bank reform 2 3 3 2.8 2.2
Securities reform n/a 2 2 2 2
Investment law n/a 2 3 n/a n/a
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Reports 
(London: 1994-1998), Tables 2.1.
Note: Except for ‘Private GDP share/ figures represent ratings o f progress calculated by 
EBRD (1 lowest, 4.2 highest).
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These indicators say that Romania was behind Bulgaria with respect to private 
share o f GDP until 1996, with thirty-five and forty percent o f GDP coming from the 
private sector. They show that until 1996, Romania was on par with Bulgaria with respect 
to large-scale privatization, having elaborated a scheme but not having started to 
implement it. In 1996, during a short period o f privatization, the government managed to 
privatize around twenty-five percent o f  large-scale enterprises. Starting in 1997, that 
trend was reversed, with the government going back on its policies and annulling a number 
of legislative and executive decisions made to boost privatization.
In the small-scale privatization area, Romania fared better than Bulgaria since it 
had a comprehensive program by 1995, and started to implement the program as well.
With respect to governance and restructuring, and price liberalization, Romania 
was roughly at the same rating level as Bulgaria. Bulgaria made additional efforts to 
enforce the restructuring scheme starting in 1997, which gave it a slight boost in the rating 
scheme (2.2) while Romania remained at a  low rating level o f  2.
With respect to the trade system ratings, we witness yet another reversal o f 
ratings, indicating a backward shift o f policies. While in 1994 and 1995 Romania was 
rating quite high, indicating that restrictions on important and exports had been removed, 
in 1996, we see a reversal o f that trend and a return to imposing some trade barriers and 
restrictions. Table 21 (Macro-Economic Indicators) below shows that foreign investment 
was immediately affected by these changes and going back on policies. In 1996, direct 
foreign investment was roughly half the size o f  the previous year.
Even less progress was made in competition policy. Until 1997, the country had 
no competition legislation and no institutions to promote market competition or to enforce
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it. In the banking sector, Romania witnessed yet another reversal o f  trends. After having 
made progress in the establishment o f  bank solvency, one o f the few areas in which 
Romania was actually ahead o f Bulgaria, in 1997 the legislative acts went back again on 
what they stipulated two years before and restricted rates, lending procedures, and capital 
availability for small and medium size enterprises.
Finally, with respect to encouraging investment, ratings place Romania behind 
Bulgaria as well.
These poor transition ratings are reflected in the state o f  the economy, Table 21
below.
Table 21.—Romania: Macro-economic indicators
1991 1992 1993 1994 
(Percentage change)
1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP at constant prices -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.6 -5.0
Consumer prices (average) 161.1 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 60.0
Net monthly average earnings (annual
average, adjusted for inflation)*-40.5 -40.0 -59.6 1.0 16.6 -13.1 -56.5 n/a
(% o f  labor force)
Unemployment 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 
(in millions o f  U.S. dollars)
9.5 6.6 8.8 n/a
Trade Balance -11,345-1,373-1,130 -483-1,605-2,494 -•1,971 -2,600
Foreign Direct Investment 37 73 97 341 417 263 1,224 900
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 224. 
a Calculated by author from EBRD data.
Table 21 highlights the swings o f reversals o f policies in the market economic field. 
It shows that the Romanian economy took time to experience growth, until 1993, then 
three years later sank into negative growth again. It shows that investment was barely
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existent until 1994, which is often credited to the absence o f primary legislation to regulate 
the rules o f trade in Romania.
Foreign direct investment witnessed a dramatic boost after the 1996 elections, 
when pro-market political forces were elected for office. This popular vote signaled the 
investor community that the Romanian population could be ready to switch to reform 
policies. Investment during that year jumped six times higher than the previous year. The 
following year, in 1998, it went down again, due to inconsistencies in the application of 
the rule o f law, and to reversals o f legislation that affected investment directly..
If  transition indicators and macro-economic indicators are not enough to show 
how complex and puzzling the Romanian situation was, Figure 19 below leaves the reader 
with an even more protracted question mark regarding the position o f the government vis- 
a-vis their constituencies.
Figure 19 shows that as unemployment was soaring and public opinion demanded 
the introduction of a market economy, granted with fluctuations and reversals as well, the 
policy line was barely moving up to meet popular demands. Why did policy makers move 
so slowly on economic reforms and how can government attitudes towards reform be 
understood?
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Figure 19. Romania: Public Support and Policy Outcomes
Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1998 
(London: 1998), p. 224 and Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Nos. 1 - 7 (Brussels: 
Commission o f the European Community, 1991-1997).
There is no simple answer to questions such as the ones above. In this particular 
case, just like the case o f Bulgaria, the one explanation that imposes itself is the political 
orientation of the government in power.
Both Iliescu’s political group, which dominated the legislative and the executive 
branches between 1990 and late 1996, and the Bulgarian BSP had a more modest change 
o f system in mind when they took power. This is reflected in its actions, and sometimes in 
their official statements. Before the parliamentary and presidential elections o f 1990, 
Iliescu admitted on national television that he was a convinced communist who believed in 
the rights o f the many against an economic system that he considered unfair, that is 
capitalism.3
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If Iliescu and his group had a right to their political beliefs, why did the Romanian 
constituencies vote them in power if, in reality, the wanted a substantial change to a 
market economy, which is another word for the capitalist management o f the economy?
Again, there is no easy answer to such questions. It is fair to say that a number o f 
hypotheses which have been advanced in the literature also point in the direction of 
delaying a representation analysis for the case o f Romania. The public seems to have been 
as unprepared for dramatic changes as the pro-reform groups in the aftermath o f the 
change of regime in 1989. Constituency’s level of maturity in understanding how their 
vote would influence the pace o f  reform in the country was also low. Overall, the data 
gathered in Tables 18 through 21, and Figures 18 and 19 indicate that Bulgaria and 
Romania are not yet ripe for an analysis o f representation.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII
1. Vladimir Philipov, former foreign policy advisor to President Petar Stoyanov,. 
quoted in Elisabeth Pond, “Reinventing Bulgaria,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, 
No. 3 (Summer 1999), p. 41.
2. Transition Report 1998, p. 158.
3. Romania Libera (Bucharest), April-May 1990.
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CHAPTER IX
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF REPRESENTATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: CONCLUSIONS
The present study analyzed the direction o f democratization in the region from a 
representative democracy perspective. It is the argument o f this study that the direction, 
depth, and irreversibility of processes o f democratization in Eastern Europe cannot be 
evaluated outside the requirements of representative democracy.
Substantively, this study looked at how constituencies across Eastern Europe 
started holding their elected representatives accountable, and how government responded 
to that call. It shows that, as transition proceeded, governments became increasingly more 
responsive to their constituencies on the question o f introducing a market economy, more 
engaged in explaining their strategies and policies to constituencies, and more timed to 
public voice in general. This finding indicates that Eastern Europe is adapting to the 
requirements of a representative type o f governance, and rules out the view that the region 
is not yet ready for a representation approach.
Methodologically, the study offered a comparative interpretive analysis o f  
representation. This type of analysis, while statistically less rigorous allowed the 
researcher to highlight aspects o f the quality and direction o f democracy in the region that 
are not regularly captured by more statistically designed research projects. It looked at 
the variations in transition, macro, and micro-economic indicators over a period o f time in 
conjunction with popular support for the change o f economic system. In so doing, the 
study looked for trends of government policy vis-a-vis popular support, keeping in mind
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that the question on the direction o f the government-public relationship prevails over the 
question on the pace o f economic development.
The country by country analysis elaborated in chapters four through eight permits 
three types o f conclusions with respect to representation elements in Eastern Europe: 
theoretical, methodological and region specific. To these conclusions we now turn.
THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS
Is representative democracy the right conceptual approach to assess the direction 
o f  democracy in Eastern Europe?
At a minimum, representative democracy poses two basic assumptions imbedded 
in the theoretical model that are essential to the question o f how appropriate 
representation is to the study o f Eastern Europe. First, representative democracy 
assumes that constituencies place value on the notion that the people elected for office 
have a mandate to represent constituency interest. Second, representative democracy 
assumes that governments heed the constituencies’ opinions towards issues of general, or 
specific concern.
These assumptions go to the core issue o f legitimation o f  political power. Since 
Eastern Europe was under an authoritarian regime for a considerable amount o f time, a 
legitimate question must be raised regarding the ability o f  constituencies to understand 
their own role in the polity. A similarly legitimate question needs to be raised regarding 
the elected officials understanding o f their role vis-a-vis constituencies. If  government 
leaders choose to defend a  political position as acting “on behalf o f those who elected” 
them to serve in office, they derive legitimacy for their decisions from those they
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represent. Conversely, if voters choose to demonstrate in front o f government buildings 
demanding the resignation o f the government, they do so out of an understanding that 
public officials did not do their job in representing public interests.
The representative democracy approach is conceptually appropriate if  we observe 
that developments in Eastern Europe indicate constituency and government awareness of 
the requirements o f representation.
The data analyzed in the country studies suggests mixed awareness o f  
responsibilities, requirements, and benefits o f  representation by both constituencies and 
governments. This mixture is, in retrospect, normal. The region has gone through many 
decades o f authoritarian rule, a type o f  governance in which government responsiveness 
and accountability is a philosophical impossibility. Therefore, behavior-wise, in the first 
years after the collapse of communism we should expect a lower degree o f awareness o f 
requirements and benefits o f representation among both governments and constituencies.
Alternatively, as freedom o f speech and availability o f information become the 
status-quo, we should expect an increased public awareness o f the obligations o f 
governments to represent popular interests, and more government inclination to recognize 
obligations towards constituencies. Referring back to the analysis in chapters four 
through eight, here are conclusions about how awareness o f representation requirements 
evolved in the analyzed countries.
In the Czech Republic, the public seems to have been aware o f their power to hold 
the government accountable for the manner in which they conducted politics and 
represented constituency interests at a fairly early stage in the transition. The Civic 
Forum, widely perceived as a group concerned with the needs o f the many in 1989 was
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voted out o f office and did not even gain representation in the parliament in 1992. After 
two and a half years in power, the public perceived the Civic Forum as too elitist and 
removed from the daily needs o f the constituencies, and therefore unfit to hold office.
In 1996, popular perceptions that politicians merely “do their thing” with little 
consideration for long-term national goals split the popular vote between the incumbent 
Civic Democratic Party o f Vaclav Klaus and the Social Democratic Party. This imbalance 
forced the incumbent government to share power with the socialists, which, as expected, 
did not produce better policies or better politics. By 1998, the stalemate between the two 
governing parties led to early elections. Voters expressed again their dissatisfaction with 
the manner o f politics o f the incumbent government, and gave the socialists more votes 
than the democrats, although not enough to form a majority government. “Political 
tunneling” has been the catch-phrase since 1999 to describe how constituencies perceived 
the manner o f Czech politics.
Ultimately, the Czech public became even more vocal about their unhappiness with 
the manner in which the government carried out its obligations towards constituencies.
The civic group Impulse 99 organized massive rallies in late 1999 and early 2000, 
demanding the government to step down. Their demands were grounded in the perceived 
failure by politicians to listen to the public needs, and the public belief that politicians were 
focused only on getting re-elected.
On the government side, awareness o f government obligations towards 
constituencies is present, although at certain levels and among some politicians. In 1996, 
the government acknowledged that it drew legitimacy for its decisions o f economic 
transformation from its citizens. The government draft policy statement made public in
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1996 highlighted the commitment o f the government to “continuing the policy o f rapid 
social and economic transformation [in the belief] that this is also the wish o f the decisive 
majority of the country’s citizens.”1
On the other hand, President Havel voiced his concerns with Czech politics in a 
manner that indicates awareness o f  what a representative government should do. The 
Czech Republic, he argued, lacked “personalities,” people with “political courage to offer 
long-term perspectives and explain them properly to the people.” The absence o f  political 
vision was credited to the fact that “political parties tend to think in short periods from 
one election to another.”2 Implicit in his remarks was the recognition that politicians had 
been self-absorbed while in office, and that they failed to communicate with their 
constituencies, or represent their needs.
In Hungary, the public also seems to have been aware o f their power to hold 
governments accountable for their policies, and for the general state o f  the economy, 
particularly in the early nineties. The voting in office o f the pro-market government o f 
Jozsef Antall in 1990 was a popular vote o f confidence in those perceived to be 
progressive and market economy oriented. The voting out o f office o f  the Antall 
government in 1994 was a direct result o f  the government’s failure to deliver the promised 
economic well-being and to perceptions that Antall and his political group were in fact 
governing by themselves, not paying attention either to their coalition partners or to the 
general public.
One important element o f  civic awareness about what the public considered 
acceptable for the government to do, or not do dates back to the battle over the national 
media, in 1992 and 1993. During those years, massive rallies and demonstrations were
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organized against what was perceived as the government’s attempt to  take control over 
the national radio and television.
At the time, the Antall government blamed its rapidly plummeting popularity on 
the anti-government media campaign which, the government argued, favored the 
opposition and weakened the government’s position in front o f the population. The 
government was convinced enough o f its own explanation that it attempted to strengthen 
its control over the national media. In 1993, government pressure was placed on media 
leaders to resign, and government supporters were appointed. This prompted the civic 
group Democratic Charter and student organizations to organize massive rallies protesting 
government interference in the national television and radio.3
The instance o f media war in the Hungarian case is a good example o f  the mixture 
o f awareness o f the requirements o f representation by the government in office. While the 
Antall government tried to cover and deny any attempt at taking control over the national 
media, President Goncz joined in the popular opposition and criticized the government for 
their undemocratic practices and lack o f responsibility towards the public.
Mid-nineties governments also displayed mixed awareness o f  their responsibilities 
towards the public who elected them. While the Socialist Party came to power largely as 
a result o f  combined popular dissatisfaction with the HDF governance and popular 
enthusiasm with the Socialist electoral platform, the HDF failed to live up to its promises 
from the very beginning. Once in office, the Horn government admitted within one year 
that the policy o f the social welfare system promised during the election campaign could 
no longer be sustained, and that austerity measures were needed to balance the budget and 
redress the economy.
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Horn and others in the government knew that their electoral promises could not be 
fulfilled even before they got into office. The Socialist Party’s chief economist, Lazio 
Bekesi, warned that empty electoral promises were going to cost the government more 
than the elections; they were going to cost the long-term credibility o f the government. 
Horn chose to disregard Bekesi’s public calls for a realistic budget, and accepted the 
latter's resignation when it was forwarded officially.
This type of behavior indicates that in Hungary, some government officials had a 
better understanding o f their responsibilities towards constituencies than others. It also 
indicates that for some politicians, winning the elections with empty, populist strategies 
was not an acceptable political position from which to face the constituencies. This is an 
element o f political behavior which indicates that the core values of representation are 
known among government officials, even if not always acted upon. It is an element o f 
hope in the direction o f Hungarian politics towards a truly representative government 
behavior.
In Poland, the country in which we observed a higher degree o f government 
responsiveness to constituency interests than in the Czech Republic or Hungary, the public 
also used its power to hold the government accountable. Despite the fact that the Polish 
economy was doing well and very well, constituencies still punished incumbents by either 
voting them out, or by lowering public support to a level that forced political groups to 
form unlikely and inefficient coalitions.
Like in the previous two cases, Poland witnessed many political polarizations, 
especially during the first years o f  transition, with a record number o f governments being 
changed by Lech Walesa. Solidarity and Walesa himself saw the rise and decline o f  their
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popular support as a result o f political indecision, increasing authoritarianism on Walesa’s 
part, party-infighting, and a public image of divisiveness.
Interesting enough, additional information dating from more recent political 
developments seems to indicate an increased public awareness of a different aspect o f 
representation, that was marginally discussed in this study, that is proportional 
representation. In preparation for the most recent SLD Congress, in December 1999, 
voivodship congresses held throughout Poland revealed agreement on the fact that some 
social groups are heavily under-represented. In the new Polish left, the proportion of 
women and youth is very low by comparison to the larger population. During a 
preparatory congress in Zielona Gora, a delegate even noted that “This conference room 
does not reflect the structure o f society; here we have mostly men, and most o f them 
represent the older generation.”4 The remark was prompted by the fact that out o f 130 
participants, only 10 were women.
In a 1996 editorial analyzing the effectiveness o f political parties in Poland, 
politicians and parties were criticized for the short-sightedness and narrow scope o f their 
political approach, often times unrelated to the needs and aspirations of their 
constituencies. Party infighting, while a healthy process if resulting in a better functioning 
political entity were primarily driven by personal interests and political interest for 
government positions. The immaturity of the political system was judged against such 
evident situations o f non-responsiveness such as the in-party conflicts. At the time, the 
KPN was going through a power struggle, which prompted the leader of one o f the 
factions to declare that the party was “where he was”, and that he would therefore 
convene his own congress condemning the other factions.5 The editorial remarked that
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the very fact that a  leader of a political entity in Poland can convene his “own” congress 
demonstrated that the intra-party democracy was still an abstract concept in Poland of 
1996. Evidently, some o f the media is attempting to analyze political events from a 
representative democracy perspective, which is another element o f  hope that this direction 
will prevail among politicians as welL
Government awareness o f their obligations as people’s representatives seems to 
emerge more often in the second half o f the nineties in Poland. During Walesa’s term in 
office, his increasing authoritarian manner disturbed many domestic and international 
actors. With the election of Kwasniewski, we see less executive interference into the 
affairs o f the legislative, and more cohesiveness on issues o f policy and method. In an 
address to the Sejm, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz acknowledged that “citizens have the 
right to bring those in government to account for their results and not just for their 
intentions,” and that “politicians are [in the government] to serve the public that can 
determine the elections and the makeup o f the political authorities.”6 Even if this may be 
interpreted as political rhetoric, we can assume that in Poland, politicians at least have a 
notion o f what is expected of them as far as their duties to the electorate goes.
Slovakia is a special case o f representation awareness. It is fair to say that with the 
story o f Slovakia, we enter the realm o f strong uncertainty regarding representation 
requirements, a realm in which the differences between Slovakia, as part o f the front- 
runner group o f  countries, and Bulgaria and Romania are evasive.
Slovak public awareness o f the requirements o f representation are unsettled for 
most o f the period under discussion. In 1992, the electorate voted into office the political 
group perceived to represent their strong desire for an independent state, the Movement
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for a Democratic Slovakia, led by Vladimir Me£iar. In 1994, voters confirmed into office 
the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, credited for having delivered on the 
independence issue, only two years after national existence. In 1998, the electorate voted 
the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia out o f office when it became increasingly 
evident that the position the group was taking domestically and internationally was not 
representative o f constituency interests. In the words o f a remarkable Slovak personality 
who likened Slovakia to a “sleeping beauty” ready to get dressed after being awakened, 
“in the September 1998 parliamentary elections, the citizens o f Slovakia made it clear that 
they did not like the attire that the new state had been wearing.”7
Slovakia is a special case o f  representation awareness because the issue o f national 
aspirations for an independent state cannot be separated from the group who carried it 
out, nor from the person who was most vocal about independence, MeSiar respectively. 
Undoubtedly, for many years M eiiar was perceived as a national hero and savior, whether 
his critics liked it or not. Undoubtedly, his personal charisma and popularity raised the 
profile o f the political group he headed, and legitimized actions that his government took 
while in office.
It is important to remember that from the standpoint o f representation, MeCiar was 
elected in 1992 and in 1996 as a result o f his pro-independence views and his popularity as 
a leader who had the country’s best interests at heart. Throughout his term in office, he 
was persuasive about the appropriateness o f the policies he pursued, whether they were 
veiled pro-Russian, or anti-West. From the standpoint o f representation, Me£iar and his 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia claimed and convinced voters that he and his group 
were the best alternative for the country.
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This aspect is important when we discuss constituency awareness o f the 
requirements o f representation, as well as government awareness o f their duties towards 
those they represented. Even if many international scholars would argue that Me£iar was 
using populist tactics to win votes, in reality he was and remains very popular in Slovakia. 
Even after his defeat at the polls in 1998, when he lost his bid for the Presidency to Rudolf 
Schuster, he publicly acknowledged that he thought he was doing the right thing for his 
country.
The major evident mistake of his years in power came in 1997, with the holding of 
a national referendum on the question o f joining NATO and on direct presidential 
elections. The manner in which the referendum was spoiled, with the removal o f the 
question on direct presidential elections without the approval o f the Constitutional Court 
was too evident for constituencies to ignore. After the failed referendum, constituency 
awareness about the manner o f politics became more astute, and voters became more 
demanding of their politicians. Additionally, civic group action to publicize the mistakes 
and manipulation o f public sentiment by the government in power became more intense.
In 1998, Meiiar lost his bid for the presidential position.
It is somewhat unfair to reduce the story o f Slovak awareness o f the requirements 
o f representation to the story o f MeCiarism. However, even insiders to these dramatic 
events acknowledged that the country was very much taken with the populism of its 
leader.
Fortunately, there were other, more representation prone positions among 
politicians as well, indicating that a minimum of recognition o f government responsibilities 
towards constituency existed. President Kovac assessed the position o f the government
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vis-a-vis the population in 1996 as one of a return o f political elites o f “privileged 
individuals who proudly rule citizens regardless o f  their essential interests and the 
preservation o f justice in the state,” a situation that was generalized under the communist 
rule. The President referred to the feet that “grand politics” was becoming increasingly 
detached from the everyday needs and preoccupations o f the people, and as a result, 
“skeptical views are being spread in society not only about individual politicians, but about 
[democratic] politics as a  whole.”8 Media analysis warned many times that Slovakia was 
still living “mentally in communism which taught people to believe that political power is 
allowed to do anything, that it can reward and punish people for nothing. Me£iarism 
pretended that it could anything bad that comes to its mind.”9
On the other hand, when the patience o f the electorate ran thin and the tables were 
turned on HzDS and its leader, Slovaks were given credit for having said “no” to Meciar’s 
politics in 1998.10
It is fair to say that the Slovak case is complex from the standpoint of 
representation. On the one hand, the governments in power between 1992 and 1998 acted 
on the popular demand for the slower introduction o f a market economy. On the other 
hand, the governments in power used populist tactics and influence over the national 
media channels to influence the popular choice for a slower strategy for the introduction 
o f a market economy. On the one hand, some layers o f the population were aware that 
the government was using its political influence to guide the popular choice; civic group 
demonstrations and protests were registered starting in 1993. On the other hand, it took 
the country five years o f semi-authoritarian governance to vote out manipulative leaders. 
The real test o f representation for Slovaks will be to create a stronger link between the
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government currently in office and the constituency, in explaining the policies that are 
being followed and the need for patience in order for reforms to work. Without that type 
of communication and govemment-voters link, MeCiar or other politicians of his 
orientation may win the voters confidence again with populist tactics and promises that 
cannot be delivered. Representative democracy may not yet be ripe for Slovakia.
Bulgaria and Romania remain the major question marks regarding the direction of 
democracy in the region from a representation standpoint. As noted in chapter eight, 
these two countries were not deemed yet ripe for an analysis o f  representation.
Conceptually, the decision not to perform a representation analysis came as result 
of the visible failure o f  successive government officials in both countries to respond in a 
convincing manner to their constituencies calls for reform. Bulgaria may be ready for such 
an analysis in the next four to five years, if the government stays the course of reform and 
listens to its publics’ calls. The Romanian government, however, has not yet started to be 
responsive.
In many ways, it is a shame that a representation analysis for these two countries 
could not be elaborated in this study. Constituencies in both countries proved on several 
occasions that they understand and exercise their right to call the government to 
accountability. Bulgarians and Romanians voted government officials out of power, as did 
their better-off neighbors to the West. Civic and labor groups staged many 
demonstrations throughout the entire period under discussion demanding real change and 
real democracy, probably with more persistence and intensity o f  action than in Poland or 
the Czech Republic. Awareness o f their power to hold the government accountable for its 
policies and actions seems to be present in both countries.
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Unfortunately, constituencies in both countries also displayed considerable 
immaturity in their electoral decisions. The inability o f both constituencies to distinguish 
the electoral choices that could have offered them more viable economic programs led 
them to making the wrong choices. Both Bulgaria and Romania legitimized former 
communists in power at the polls. In both countries mass demonstrations were staged as a 
result o f the deleterious policies followed by their chosen representatives.
Poland is a case which could be brought forth as proving that former communists 
in power are not necessarily a recipe for economic disaster. However, Poland voted 
former communists in power after their economic reform program was underway, when 
legislation, institutions, and new structures were functional and the clock o f  reforms could 
no longer be set back. Not the same happened in either Bulgaria or Romania.
Communists were legitimized into power in the beginning of the transition period, and 
stayed there for most o f the period under discussion.
An argument can be made that in both Bulgaria and Romania, the communist 
regimes were harsher than in the front-runner countries, therefore these countries’ starting 
point in the transition to a market economy was much behind the other countries in the 
region economically, as well as emotionally. However, this argument does not explain the 
fact that despite the harsh times under communism, constituencies returned former 
communists to power.
A more likely explanation for this puzzling choice is the argument made in favor o f 
deferring a representation analysis, that is for the period under analysis, neither country 
was ready for the complex requirements o f representation. Publics were either unable to 
discern at the polls which political groups could have imposed a more determined
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economic program, or they were led to believe that the former communists had good 
programs to implement. There are studies who argue that the choice o f former 
communists in both countries was prompted by the populations’ fears o f the unknown 
economic system proposed by more market economic oriented groups, or were led to 
believe that the former communists had better, sounder plans than their opponents. In 
either case, publics who favored the introduction o f  a market economy failed to select 
market-oriented representatives to represent their interests in the government. This is a 
strong indicator that Bulgarians and Romanians were unable to match public policy 
preferences with the available political choices in the period under discussion.
In the next decade, it may be possible to set up a representation analysis for both 
countries. Bulgaria is starting to look promising in terms o f government decisiveness to 
carry out popularly endorsed market reforms. Romania is not only lagging behind, but it 
is also showing signs of sinking further in its economic recession. Recent estimates place 
Romania on a par with Zimbabwe and the Ivory Cost in candidacy for going to default in 
the year 2000." Worse still, after changing three Prime Ministers since 1996, the 
Constantinescu administration is not finding the political decisiveness to act on economic 
reform.
The above summary o f events, attitudes, and public positions by both publics and 
governments in Eastern Europe indicates that, as expected, in the beginning o f  the period 
o f transition there was less government readiness to accept the responsibilities o f 
representation, and more public drive towards holding governments accountable for their 
policies and behavior. Towards mid-nineties, governments seem more prone to 
acknowledge their obligations towards constituencies.
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This finding is critical to the manner in which any researcher should approach 
Eastern Europe. It has been held for some time that constituencies do not have the 
intellectual or cultural education necessary for a viable democracy to function in the 
region. Publics have been viewed as marginally instrumental in the affairs of politics, and 
lacking the background o f democratic politics to be involved in a relevant manner in how 
governments make decisions that affect everybody’s future. Conversely, governments 
have been viewed as more responsible than the present analysis indicates.
The truly remarkable element o f this analysis is the fact that as time went by, and 
publics continued to hold governments accountable, either through elections or by other 
channels of civic demonstration, governments started to get the message. In the second 
half o f the nineties, we observe less government obliviousness to the public voice, and 
more government engagement in explaining policies to their constituencies and justifying 
their choices. This makes the point that Eastern Europe is becoming more aware and 
responsive to requirements o f representative governance, and rules out the view that the 
region is not yet ready for representative democracy.
METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
In chapter three, we have discussed the methodological difficulties that Western 
analysts have in the application o f the representative democracy model to traditional 
democracies. Congruence, causality, and other various approaches to test theories o f 
representation have been experimented for over four decades, with little agreement on the 
successful application o f  one statistical model over another.
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Recognizing these traditional difficulties, this study has applied a more modest 
methodological framework. In essence, the interpretive analysis offered here used 
available micro and macro-economic data and ratings o f transition progress to describe the 
course and outcome o f economic policies o f each case study. It then used public opinion 
approval ratings o f the course o f economic development to observe the interplay between 
approval ratings and outcomes o f economic policies. It then used complementary pollsters 
to substantiate or refute observed trends.
Lastly, since the macro-economic indicators and opinion pollsters did not always 
offer sufficient insights into the relationship between governments and their constituencies, 
the after-the-fact representation model was explored. Patterns o f voter behavior towards 
incumbents were analyzed in conjunction with the pace o f  reform, the pace of economic 
growth, and o f other available data.
While testing o f theories was not performed using the available statistical data, the 
analysis allowed for interpretation o f events from different perspectives. In so doing, we 
did not limit the possible explanations to a set o f  possible outcomes, but rather explored 
outcomes that are more counterintuitive.
This approach to the study o f Eastern Europe is viewed by this researcher as 
critical to a thorough analysis o f where the region is headed. Statistical analyses are 
valuable analytical tools, but they limit the choice o f interpretation to degrees o f reliability, 
statistical relevance, or fitness o f models. A less ambitious approach from the standpoint 
o f accuracy and reliability, but more broad from the standpoint o f how different data 
sources interplay with one another is likely to highlight aspects that are relevant and 
critical to the development o f  the region.
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One o f the reasons why this author is skeptical o f evaluating the region solely on 
the basis o f statistical approaches is because many o f the events in the region are 
influenced by people’s perceptions. That is a notoriously difficult category to quantify. In 
addition, perceptions about performance have suffered in Eastern Europe, as in traditional 
democracies, from media campaigns, the most recent events that impact on people’s 
emotions, and lack o f comparative information.
The story of Slovakia makes the case against statistical approaches or fitness o f 
models better than any of the other cases we looked at. If numbers mean what they say 
they mean, Slovakia would be a beautiful case o f representation, and o f growth o f the 
electorate into higher stages o f demand over their representatives. However, an analysis 
of various data combined with a critical look at events reveal that government 
manipulation and voter ignorance can be well masked by good indicators o f  economic 
performance and of public approval o f  government action.
Slovakia is a strong case in favor o f modesty about our methodological approaches 
to the region, and about the conclusions we draw from available data. Bulgaria and 
Romania are in the same category. In all three countries, there is a danger o f  over­
simplifying the actual course o f events due to what the data says the events are. 
Interpretive approaches give the researcher more freedom to use complementary, non- 
quantitative data to see how trends can be interpreted, and in which direction the region is 
moving.
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REGION SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
Having shown that representation is a conceptually appropriate category to use in 
analyses of Eastern Europe, what are the factors affecting it and how can we best 
summarize the manner o f representation currently occurring in the region?
For the selected policy, the introduction o f a market economy, chapters four 
through eight indicate that a minimum o f  three variables that are likely to affect 
government representation of constituency interest in Eastern Europe. They are: the 
existence of an initial reform program, elaborated at the outset o f transition as a guiding 
light to take the country into the desired economic system; the consistency o f  application 
o f the reform program; and government decisions taken in conditions of coalition 
governments. We shall discuss each o f these variables in turn, to draw conclusions on the 
manner in which they affected representation o f the popularly desired economic system in 
the region.
Initial Economic Program 
The existence o f an initial reform program which takes into account public views 
on the direction o f the country was a requirement for short and medium-term government 
credibility. In each o f the cases analyzed, the public started out by supporting the 
introduction o f a particular economic system, a market economy. In some cases, public 
support was stronger, relative to the region (Poland versus Romania or Bulgaria).
In all the front-runner countries analyzed in this study, an initial program o f reform 
was formulated and passed through the legislatures o f each country. In Slovakia, the 
reform program was adopted under the conditions o f the Czechoslovak Federation. After
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the separation o f the two republics, Slovakia did not adopt a new program, but slowed 
down considerably the application o f  the one inherited from the Czech Republic.
In Poland, the Balcerowicz plan was adopted by the end o f  1989, and its 
implementation started in early 1990. In Hungary, the Kupa plan was enacted starting in
1990.
Bulgaria and Romania alone struggled with the formulation o f  a reform program 
until 1991 and 1992. It should be noted that the absence o f a reform plan did not prevent 
these countries from introducing measures o f liberalization, in order to conform with 
World Bank and IMF conditions for the granting o f loans. However, price and trade 
liberalization were not matched by investment legislation, or a medium to long-term plan 
o f reform. The lack o f  vision de-legitimized the notion o f a market economy for 
constituencies, and created false expectations for the society at large.
The formulation of an initial reform program versus absence o f such program 
makes the case for the importance o f this variable for representation in the region. In 
those countries in which governments took their constituencies' demands for the 
introduction o f a market economy seriously, the reform program was formulated and 
adopted fairly early in the transition. As a result, these countries had a head-start on the 
reform o f their economies and could claim to have acted on popular demands. In those 
countries in which the reform program was adopted with delay, like Bulgaria and 
Romania, the economies did not grow, the general economic situation worsened, and the 
legitimacy of the notion that a market economy was diminished by the under-performing 
system.
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Consistency in Application o f  the Reform Program 
In most cases that were analyzed in this study, public support for the particular 
policy declined with time. We considered alternative hypotheses found in the literature for 
this decline. From job insecurity, to hardships in transition, to more counterintuitive 
considerations like those proposed by Przeworski (see the decline o f support likened to 
the diminished interest o f a patient to continue medication once the condition o f his/her 
health improve), a variety o f factors can claim to have influenced the decline o f public 
support for the selected policy.
This researcher found that if a reform program is formulated at the outset o f 
transition, but it is inconsistently applied, the program is likely to produce lesser results 
than expected. Under the conditions of a post-communist stressed society, lesser results 
can and will be interpreted as political incompetence or lack o f  willingness to reform. In 
either case, popular support and trust in both the government who pursed non-performing 
policies and in the policies proposed will be lower than in a well-performing environment. 
The second variable found to have made a difference in the transition to a new economic 
system is consistency in the application of the reform program.
Consistency can be measured by the manner in which newly elected governments 
chose to continue the program of their predecessors, or elaborate new strategies and plans 
and abandon the initial plan.
The only front-runner country in Eastern Europe in which the initial reform 
program was consistently applied, irrespective o f initial deleterious effects on the 
population is Poland. Despite the political instability o f  the first years o f transition, and o f 
the fact that the author o f the program lost his government position in the political
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reshuffling o f the early nineties, Polish governments pursued the same Balcerowicz plan 
through the nineties. Even when the Socialists came to power in mid-nineties the program 
was maintained. As an interesting turn of events, Poland finished the nineties with 
Balcerowicz back in the government, as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister o f Finance, 
as a recognition of the powerful influence that his economic program had on the course of 
the country.
The consistent application o f the Balcerowicz program led to economic growth 
very early in the transition, earlier than any o f  the other front-runner East European 
countries. Growth in turn led to sustained public support for the introduction o f a market 
economy. Fluctuations in public support were witnessed, but at the end o f  the period 
under discussion, Poles were as much in favor o f the program o f reform as in the 
beginning.
Not the same consistency o f application o f the reform program was observed in 
the other countries. In Hungary, the gradual approach led to dissatisfied constituencies 
early in the transition period. In the medium-term, gradualism proved to have been a not 
very happy solution for reforming the economy. In addition to non-performance, 
gradualism postponed inevitable austerity measures which were eventually taken several 
years into the transition, when the population was already exhausted by an ailing economy.
In the Czech Republic, the program o f reform was applied in bursts, with 
interruptions, and in an inefficient manner. The voucher privatization scheme was 
launched, then it was halted, then it was re-launched with changes that allowed corruption 
to flourish and turned the population against vouchers altogether. The restructuring o f 
major loss-making industrial enterprises was postponed for several years, allowing these
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enterprises to drain the budget further. Legislation that enabled banks and other financial 
institutions to become joint ventures in fact conserved the state-ownership structure and 
postponed the introduction of a modern, efficient banking system.
In neither Hungary nor the Czech Republic did we notice the maintenance o f the 
public support for the introduction o f a market economy that we have noted in Poland. 
The strongest discriminator that this researcher finds in the manner in which all three 
countries approached their mandate is the consistency o f the application of the reform 
program. Polish governments did not waver in the application o f the initial program; 
Hungary and the Czech Republic did. Poland did not significantly change its initial 
program; Hungary and the Czech Republic did. Poland did not lose popular support for 
the initial program; Hungary and the Czech Republic did.
This speaks for the fact that representation was affected by the consistency with 
which governments applied the program o f  reform in these countries. The initial program 
existed in all three countries, but was implemented with various degrees of consistency. 
The country in which the governments stayed the course retained its popular appeal as 
representing publics’ interest for reform.
It is worth making a side note regarding the quality o f the initial reform program. 
The Balcerowicz plan was a shock therapy approach to reform the economy and launch it 
on the path o f  a market economy. The plan was explained to the population, with all its 
negative effects in the short-term, and its expected benefits in the medium to long-term. 
The plan produced the expected short-term negative effects (unemployment sky-rocketed 
and purchasing power decreased significantly, to name only a few), but it also brought 
about the expected growth. The plan was well-thought through and well-explained, so
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that publics could identify the effects o f the program when they occurred. The 
government’s credibility was highly enhanced by this strategy, and the level o f endurance 
and patience of the population was secured.
The gradual approach was thought to introduce necessary reforms at a slow pace 
to minimize the negative effects on the population. The program was explained to the 
population from the standpoint o f having everybody’s best interests at heart, as a sensible 
approach in which nobody was going to be left behind in the process o f  reform. When the 
expected effects did not materialize and in fact the large majority o f Hungarians were 
affected by the reform program, the credibility o f the government as having everybody’s 
best interests at heart was greatly diminished.
While economists and political scientists still argue about the appropriateness o f 
shock therapy over gradualism, the reality is that the country which secured growth the 
fastest is the country which implemented the shock therapy approach. This is not the 
place to pass judgement on which approach is more appropriate; suffice it to point out that 
the countries which did not chose the shock therapy approach had a harder time bringing 
about economic growth.
Government Decisions Taken in Conditions of Coalition Governments 
Throughout the region, economic and social aspects o f post-communist life were 
marked by the fact that politically, countries were run primarily by coalitions, rather than 
by strong programmatic parties. The absence o f  strong programmatic parties should not 
be surprising; in all o f these countries, communism stifled political culture o f  a multi-party 
dimension for over forty years, and opposition to communism was primarily at the social,
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cultural, or most likely individual level. Political entities, wherever they tried to get 
organized, were stifled, destroyed, or their impact on social life minimized. As a result, 
post-communist parties were small, weak, with a relative and not necessary loyal degree o f 
popular support. Financially, most depended on grants from the government to get 
established.
When elections took thus place, single parties did not, and could not muster 
enough support to become viable government parties. They had to enter into coalitions 
with like-minded political groups. While this development is not necessarily bad in itself, 
it led to a fragmentation of political decisions once the government was sworn in. Political 
ambitions, struggle for power, disagreements inherent into a body politik that had too 
many points of views left these governments weak and indecisive.
In Poland, observers noted how the long-admired and effective political struggle o f 
Solidarity against the communist regime did not translate into an equally effective political 
decision-making process after they gained seats in the Sejm, in 1990. Later, in 1998, 
desperation that the Socialists would win the parliamentary elections again pushed several 
parties to unite into the Solidarity Electoral Action. United, five parties made into the 
government, but were less effective at reaching agreements on governing issues.
In the Czech Republic, the effectiveness o f the government was affected by the 
disagreements within the governing coalition as well. The inability o f Klaus and Zeman to 
agree to disagree have plagued Czech politics since 1996. Their personal enmity spilled 
into their governing manner, and led to a stalemate and early elections in 1998. It further 
prompted civic groups to demand their resignation starting in 1999.
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In Slovakia-after-Mefiiar, members o f  the 1998 ruling coalition admitted that the 
effectiveness o f the government was low, and losing credibility by its voters, due to the 
fact that so many points o f view were expressed inside the ruling body. While respecting 
the right to express an opinion and offer alternative views is inherent in a democracy, East 
European governments did not develop consensus-building effectively enough to become 
credible governments. As a result, they were voted out o f office. Their bickering, 
political in-fighting, corruption scandals, and lack of cohesion on critical economic and 
social issues turned voters towards alternatives, whether those alternatives were called 
Socialists or Nationalists.
As we can see, throughout the region, the presence o f coalition governments has 
been a blessing in disguise. While on the one hand, the possibility o f  having a coalition 
empowered political groups to gain legislative and executive power, on the other hand it 
weakened their ability to make decisions. That happened primarily because coalitions 
were glued together by the desire to oppose another political group (former communists, 
socialists, extremists, or incumbents), rather than by a common agenda, previously agreed 
to. In turn, the weakness o f  political decisions affected the way representation o f people’s 
best interest occurred.
The three variables found to have affected government representation o f  people’s 
interests in Eastern Europe are summarized in Table 22 below.
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Table 22.~Variables affecting representation in Eastern Europe






Czech Republic Yes No Yes
Hungary Yes No Yes
Poland Yes Yes Yes
Slovak Republic Yes No Yes
This summary highlights the feet that the differentiating factor in representation of 
constituency interest on the question o f  a market economy was the consistent manner in 
which governments applied the economic program conducive to the introduction o f a 
market economy. The country in which the consistency condition was fulfilled is the 
country in which the government proved to be the most responsive and representative o f 
constituency interests, Poland respectively.
Closing Thoughts
The process o f democratization is likely to continue in Eastern Europe, with 
various degrees of recognition by both the makers o f the process, and the outsider 
scholars analyzing it. It remains indisputable that this process will take much more time 
than originally anticipated. It is becoming increasingly evident that the process is not 
predictable, and that reversal trends are likely. Democratization will continue to witness 
changes that may, or may not be analyzable with analytical tools o f  traditional 
democracies. Therefore caution needs to be exercised in drawing conclusions about the 
direction o f the region, or o f individual countries, particularly when those conclusions may 
be policy relevant.
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Particular awareness needs to exist with respect to the effects o f  reductionist 
theories of the ‘political culture’ type. If  used to exhaustion, these arguments can only 
harm the on-going process o f  democratization in the region. Teleological interpretations 
o f the processes in the region merely reduce the story o f Eastern Europe to uninteresting, 
but predictable dichotomies (‘if you are on this side o f the Huntingtonian civilizations line, 
you are/not likely to become democratic’).12 As Rose has many times recommended, if a 
modicum of democratic practices can be detected, the position that analysts should take is 
less to criticize what has not been accomplished but recognize what has actually taken 
place away from positions o f authoritarianism.
Many variables influence the democratization process in the region. Even if a 
comprehensive list could be compiled, that still leaves us with the question o f which 
variables count more or less in what is happening in the region. Even if an acceptable 
ranking of variables can be compiled, from more to less likely to be driving forces in the 
developments in the region, how do we test their strengths? Regression analyses may be 
appropriate and useful in the study o f international relations; applied to democratization 
processes, regression is likely to offer misleading answers. That happens because the air 
o f infallibility with which regression is still treated in the discipline. A more modest 
approach as the one used in the present study may not offer predictable answers, but it will 
give a sense o f direction and depth o f  the processes that are currently taking place.
Theories are good guides, caution needs also to be applied in considering new 
democracies in relation to, or vis-a-vis an ideal o f  democracy called Western democracy. 
Italy is considered a democracy; but their political system is more corrupt and less stable 
than any of those discussed in this study. Turkey and Greece are NATO members on
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account o f their success in establishing some type o f political and economic system that 
conforms to NATO requirements. They have also come close to fighting each other many 
times since their acceptance into NATO, and have both proven in one manner or another 
that they are not nearly as democratic as their West European partners.
Regionally, a conglomerate o f conditions and situations can explain why events 
happened in the manner in which they did. There is, however, no guarantee that if the 
Czech Republic and Hungary followed exactly the policy line that Poland used, they would 
have had the same pace o f development as Poland. Large trends can be observed, but 
they do not guarantee any prescription for success in the transition to a democracy.
We can close this study by saying that governments in Eastern Europe did attempt 
to transform the economy to a market economy, in keeping with the popular mandate.
The task, however, proved too daunting and complex to produce results that were 
immediately favored by constituencies.
This willingness to change indicates that governments were responsive to their 
constituencies, but were either unprepared or lacked enough political cohesion to make a 
more substantial difference in the manner in which economic policies were conducted. It 
should be remembered that a market economy does not grow in a few years even if, 
ideally, the best reforms are put in place and made to work, and even if, ideally, attitudes 
and work styles change over night.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IX
1. “Czech Republic: Government Issues Draft Policy Statement,” FBIS-EEU-96-142 
(July 13, 1996).
2. “Havel: Society Lacks Personalities to Progress,” FBIS-EEU-1999-0929 (September 
29, 1999).
3. Oltay, p. 78.
4. Jerzy Szmajdzinski (delegate to the SLD Congress), quoted in “Polish SLD on Eve of 
Congress Eyed,” FBIS-EEU-I999-1210 (December 9, 1999), http:// WNC. 
FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
5. Leszek Moczulski, leader o f  KPN, condemning a faction within KPN led by Adam 
Slomka, quoted in “Parties Prepare for Elections,” FBIS-EEU-96-112 (March 30,
1996), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
6. "Prime Minister Cimoszewicz’s Address.”
7. Butora and Butorova, p. 80.
8. “President’s State o f the Nation Address,” FBIS-EEU-96-240 (December 11, 1996), 
http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
9. “CTK Carries Slovak Press Survey for 21 July,” FBIS-EEU-1999-0721 (July 21,
1999), http://WNC.FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
10. President Rudolf Schuster in “Schuster, Havel Discuss Czech-Slovak, Personal 
Relation,” FBIS-EEU-1999-0917 (September 17, 1999), http://WNC. 
FEDWORLD.GOV/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi.
11. Financial Times, 21 April 2000, p. 10.
12. The political culture argument is grounded in a legitimate concern about the ability of 
some countries to overcome legacies o f  communism, ethnic hatred, lack o f  tolerance 
for differing religious values, etc. While valid claims can be made that all this 
'baggage’ holds some countries back from democratizing faster, particularly in 
Southeastern Europe and the Balkans, the political culture argument falls short of 
being determinist. This argument cannot adequately explain change when it does 
occur, nor can it account for differences in democratization among the countries 
within the region.
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